RSSArchive for September, 2010

The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

October 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, az egyik hadsereg teherautója megállt közvetlenül a szemle előtt, amikor hat Mirage repülőgép zúgott a fejünk fölött akrobatikus előadásban, hosszú vörös nyomokkal festve az eget, sárga, lila,és zöld füst. Szadat felállt, nyilvánvalóan arra készül, hogy tisztelgést váltson az egyiptomi csapatok újabb kontingensével. Tökéletes célponttá tette magát négy iszlamista bérgyilkos számára, akik kiugrottak a teherautóról, felrohant a pódiumra, és golyókkal teletömte a testét.Miközben a gyilkosok egy örökkévalóságnak tűnően folytatták, hogy halálos tüzükkel permetezzék az állványt, Egy pillanatig azon gondolkodtam, hogy lecsapjak-e a földre, és megkockáztatom, hogy a pánikba esett nézők halálra gázolják, vagy talpon maradok, és megkockáztatom, hogy elkapok egy eltévedt golyót. Az ösztön azt súgta, hogy maradjak a lábamon, és újságírói kötelességem arra késztetett, hogy kiderítsem, él-e vagy halott-e Szadat.

Az iszlám és az államhatalom megteremtése

seyyed vali reza nasr

Ban ben 1979 Muhammad Zia ul-Haq tábornok, Pakisztán katonai uralkodója, kijelentette, hogy Pakisztán iszlám állam lesz. Az iszlám értékek és normák szolgálnák a nemzeti identitás alapját, törvény, gazdaság, és a társadalmi kapcsolatok, és minden politikai döntéshozatalt inspirálna. Ban ben 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, Malajzia új miniszterelnöke, hasonló, széles körű tervet vezetett be, hogy az állami politikát az iszlám értékekhez rögzítse, és hogy országa törvényeit és gazdasági gyakorlatát összhangba hozza az iszlám tanításaival. Miért választották ezek az uralkodók országaik számára az „iszlamizáció” útját?? And how did one-time secular postcolonial states become the agents of Islamization and the harbinger of the “true” Islamic state?
Malaysia and Pakistan have since the late 1970s–early 1980s followed a unique path to development that diverges from the experiences of other Third World states. In these two countries religious identity was integrated into state ideology to inform the goal and process of development with Islamic values.
This undertaking has also presented a very different picture of the relation between Islam and politics in Muslim societies. In Malaysia and Pakistan, it has been state institutions rather than Islamist activists (those who advocate a political reading of Islam; also known as revivalists or fundamentalists) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, és tágabb értelemben hogyan szolgálja a kultúra és a vallás az államhatalom és a fejlődés szükségleteit. Az itt végzett elemzés elméleti vitákon alapul
az állammagatartás társadalomtudományában, valamint a kultúra és a vallás szerepe ebben. Fontosabb, a vizsgált esetekből következtetéseket von le, hogy szélesebb körű, a tudományágak számára érdekes következtetéseket vonjon le.

FEMINIZMUS A SZEKULARIZMUS ÉS AZ ISLAMIZMUS KÖZÖTT: PALESTINA ESETE

Dr, Islah Jad

Törvényhozási választásokat tartottak Ciszjordániában és a Gázai övezetben 2006 hatalomra juttatta a Hamász iszlamista mozgalmat, amely ezután a Palesztin Törvényhozó Tanács többségét és egyben a Hamász első többségi kormányát alkotta. Ezek a választások eredményezték a Hamász első női miniszterének kinevezését, aki nőügyminiszter lett. Március között 2006 és június 2007, két különböző Hamász-miniszter töltötte be ezt a posztot, de mindketten nehezen kezelték a minisztériumot, mivel alkalmazottainak többsége nem a Hamasz tagja, hanem más politikai pártokhoz tartozott, és a legtöbben a Fatah tagjai voltak, a Palesztin Hatóság legtöbb intézményét irányító domináns mozgalom. A nőügyi minisztériumban dolgozó Hamász női és a Fatah női tagjai közötti küzdelem feszült időszaka véget ért, miután a Hamász átvette a hatalmat a Gázai övezetben, és ennek következtében megbukott a ciszjordániai kormány. amely olykor heves fordulatot vett. One reason later cited to explain this struggle was the difference between secular feminist discourse and Islamist discourse on women’s issues. In the Palestinian context this disagreement took on a dangerous nature as it was used to justify perpetuating the bloody political struggle, the removal of Hamas women from their positions or posts, and the political and geographical divides prevailing at the time in both the West Bank and the occupied Gaza Strip.
This struggle raises a number of important questions: should we punish the Islamist movement which has come to power, or should we consider the reasons which led to Fateh’s failure in the political arena? Can feminism offer a comprehensive framework for women, regardless of their social and ideological affiliations? Segíthet-e a nők közös közös alapjáról szóló diskurzus közös céljaik felismerésében és megegyezésében?? A paternalizmus csak az iszlamista ideológiában van jelen?, és nem a nacionalizmusban és a patriotizmusban? Mit értünk feminizmus alatt?? Csak egy feminizmus létezik, vagy több feminizmus? Mit értünk iszlám alatt – az ezen a néven ismert mozgalom vagy a vallás, a filozófia, vagy a jogrendszer? E kérdések mélyére kell mennünk, és alaposan meg kell fontolnunk őket, és meg kell állapodnunk bennük, hogy később dönthessünk, mint feministák, ha a paternalizmussal kapcsolatos kritikánk a vallásra irányul (hit), amelynek a hívő szívére kell korlátozódnia, és nem szabad megengedni, hogy átvegye az irányítást a világ felett, vagy a joggyakorlat, which relates to different schools of faith which explain the legal system contained in the Quran and the sayings of the Prophetthe Sunnah.

ISLAMISTA NŐI AKTIVIZMUS A MEGSZÁLLÍTOTT PALESTINÁBAN

Interviews by Khaled Amayreh

Interview with Sameera Al-Halayka

Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. She was

born in the village of Shoyoukh near Hebron in 1964. She has a BA in Sharia (iszlám

Jurisprudence) from Hebron University. She worked as a journalist from 1996 to 2006 when

she entered the Palestinian Legislative Council as an elected member in the 2006 választások.

She is married and has seven children.

Q: There is a general impression in some western countries that women receive

inferior treatment within Islamic resistance groups, such as Hamas. Is this true?

How are women activists treated in Hamas?
Rights and duties of Muslim women emanate first and foremost from Islamic Sharia or law.

They are not voluntary or charitable acts or gestures we receive from Hamas or anyone

else. Thus, as far as political involvement and activism is concerned, women generally have

the same rights and duties as men. After all, women make up at least 50 per cent of

society. In a certain sense, they are the entire society because they give birth to, and raise,

the new generation.

Therefore, I can say that the status of women within Hamas is in full conformity with her

status in Islam itself. This means that she is a full partner at all levels. Indeed, it would be

unfair and unjust for an Islamic (or Islamist if you prefer) woman to be partner in suffering

miközben ki van zárva a döntéshozatali folyamatból. Ez az oka annak, hogy a nő szerepe

A Hamasz mindig is úttörő volt.

Q: Úgy érzi, hogy a nők politikai aktivizmusának megjelenése a Hamaszon belül az

természetes fejlődés, amely összeegyeztethető a klasszikus iszlám felfogásokkal

a nők helyzetével és szerepével kapcsolatban, vagy csupán szükségszerű válasz arra

a modernitás nyomása és a politikai cselekvés követelményei és a folyamatosság

izraeli megszállás?

Az iszlám joggyakorlatban és a Hamász chartájában nincs olyan szöveg, amely akadályozza a nőket

politikai részvétel. Szerintem ennek az ellenkezője igaz — számos Korán-vers létezik

és Mohamed próféta mondásai, amelyek arra buzdítják a nőket, hogy legyenek aktívak a politikában és a nyilvánosságban

muszlimokat érintő kérdésekről. De a nőkre is igaz, mint a férfiaknál, politikai aktivizmus

nem kötelező, hanem önkéntes, és nagyrészt minden nő képességei fényében dől el,

képesítések és egyéni körülmények. Ennek ellenére, aggodalmát mutatja a nyilvánosság iránt

minden muszlim férfi és nő számára kötelező. A próféta

– mondta Muhammed: "Aki nem mutat törődést a muszlimok ügyei iránt, az nem muszlim."

Ráadásul, A palesztin iszlamista nőknek minden objektív tényezőt figyelembe kell venniük

figyelembe kell venni, amikor eldönti, hogy csatlakozik-e a politikához vagy politikai aktivizmusba.


IRÁNI NŐK AZ ISZLÁM FORRADALOM UTÁN

Ansiia Khaz Allii


Több mint harminc év telt el az iráni iszlám forradalom diadala óta, mégis marad a number of questions and ambiguities about the way the Islamic Republic and its laws deal with contemporary problems and current circumstances, particularly with regard to women and women’s rights. This short paper will shed light on these issues and study the current position of women in various spheres, comparing this to the situation prior to the Islamic Revolution. Reliable and authenticated data has been used wherever possible. The introduction summarises a number of theoretical and legal studies which provide the basis for the subsequent more practical analysis and are the sources from where the data has been obtained.
The first section considers attitudes of the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards women and women’s rights, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, the relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Women in Islam

Amira Burghul

Despite major consensus amongst a large number of philosophers and historians that the

principles and teachings of Islam caused a fundamental change in the position of women

compared to the prevailing situation in countries in both East and West at the time, and despite

the agreement of a large number of thinkers and legislators that women during the time of the

Prophet (PBUH) were granted rights and legal privileges not granted by man-made laws until

recently, propaganda campaigns by Westerners and people with a Westernised perspective

consistently accuse Islam of being unjust to women, of imposing restrictions on them, and

marginalising their role in society.

This situation has been made worse by the atmosphere and conditions prevalent across the

Muslim world, where ignorance and poverty have produced a limited understanding of religion

valamint a családi és emberi kapcsolatok, amelyek elzárják az igazságosságot és a civilizált életformát, különösen

férfiak és nők között. Az emberek azon kis csoportja, akiknek lehetőséget adtak

az iskolai végzettség és a képességek megszerzése is abba a csapdába esett, hogy azt hiszik, hogy az igazságosság megvalósul

a nők számára és képességeik hasznosítása a vallás és a jámborság elutasításán múlik és

nyugati életforma elfogadása, felületes iszlám-tanulmányaik eredményeként egyrészt

és az élet eltereléseinek hatása a másikra.

E két csoportból csak nagyon kevés embernek sikerült megszöknie és eldobni

a tudatlanság és a hagyomány köntöseiket. Ezek az emberek mélyrehatóan tanulmányozták örökségüket

és részletesen, és nyitott szemmel nézték a nyugati tapasztalatok eredményeit. Van nekik

különbséget tett a búza és a pelyva között a múltban és a jelenben egyaránt, és elintézték

tudományosan és tárgyilagosan a felmerült problémákkal. Megcáfolták a hamisságot

ékesszóló érvekkel emelt vádak az iszlám ellen, és elismerték eltitkolt hibákat.

Újra megvizsgálták a tévedhetetlenek mondásait és szokásait is annak érdekében

különbséget tenni a bevett és a szent és a megváltozott és eltorzított között.

Ennek a csoportnak a felelősségteljes magatartása új irányokat és új kezelési módokat határozott meg

a nők kérdésével az iszlám társadalmakban. Nyilvánvalóan még nem kezeltek minden problémát

és végső megoldásokat talált a számos jogszabályi hiányosságra és hiányosságra, but they have laid the

ground for the emergence of a new model for Muslim women, who are both strong and

committed to the legal and effective foundations of their society.

With the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the blessing of its leaders, which is the

main religious authority for the participation of women and their effective political and social

participation, the scope for strong debate over women in Islam has been significantly expanded.

The model of Muslim women in Iran has spread to Islamic resistance movements in Lebanon,

Palestine other Arab countries and even the Western world, and as a result, propaganda

campaigns against Islam have abated to some extent.

The emergence of Salafi Islamic movements such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and similar

Szalafi mozgalmak Szaúd-Arábiában és Észak-Afrikában, és a nőkkel való fanatikus bánásmódjukat,

Az iszlám feltámadásától félő ideges bámészkodókat új propaganda indítására késztették

kampányok, amelyek azzal vádolják az iszlámot, hogy ösztönzi a terrorizmust, és hátramaradt és igazságtalan

nők.

maszatosodás: Hogyan terjesztik az iszlamofóbok a félelmet, fanatizmus és félretájékoztatás

BECSÜLETES

Julie Hollar

Jim Naureckas

Az iszlamofóbia általánossá tétele:
Hogyan közvetítik a muszlim gyalázkodók fanatizmusukat
Figyelemre méltó dolog történt a Nemzeti Könyvkritikusok Körében (NBCC) jelöléseket februárban 2007: Az általában előkelő és toleráns csoportot jelölték a legjobb könyvnek a kritika terén, egy könyvet, amelyet széles körben úgy tekintenek, mint amely egy egész vallási csoportot becsmérel..
Bruce Bawer Míg Európa aludt című filmjének jelölése: Nem múlt el vita nélkül, hogy a radikális iszlám belülről pusztítja el a Nyugatot. A korábbi jelölt Eliot Weinberger elítélte a könyvet az NBCC éves összejövetelén, „rasszizmusnak mint kritikának” nevezve (New York Times, 2/8/07). Az NBCC igazgatótanácsának elnöke, John Freeman írta a csoport blogján (Kritikus tömeg, 2/4/07): ''Soha nem voltam
jobban kínos egy választás miatt, mint Bruce Bawer Míg Európa aludt című művében voltam…. Hiperventillált retorikájának tippjei a tényleges kritikától az iszlamofóbiáig.
Bár végül nem ez nyerte el a díjat, Míg az Europe Slept elismertsége a legmagasabb irodalmi körökben az iszlamofóbia általános érvényesülésének jelképe volt., nemcsak az amerikai kiadókban, hanem a szélesebb médiában is. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, fanatizmus és félretájékoztatás. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. And not unlike the charges made in the classical document of anti-Semitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, some of Islamophobia’s more virulent expressionslike While Europe Sleptinclude evocations of Islamic designs to dominate the West.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, of course, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. For instance, when a Norwegian Islamic Council debates whether gay men and lesbians should be executed, one may forcefully condemn individuals or groups sharing that opinion without pulling all European Muslims into it, as did Bawer’s Pajamas Media post (8/7/08),
“European Muslims Debate: Should Gays Be Executed?
Similarly, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. After all, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeighan adherent of the racist Christian Identity sectwithout resorting to generalized statements about “Christian terrorism.” Likewise, media have covered acts of terrorism by fanatics who are Jewishfor instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.

The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam

Basso tibi

When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, however, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, as a reaction to its intensive secularisation resulting from globalisation.
The analysis of political ideologies that are based on religions, and that can exert appeal as a political religion as a consequence of this, involves a social science understanding of the role of religion played by world politics, especially after the bi-polar system of the Cold War has given way to a multi-polar world. In a project conducted at the Hannah Arendt Institute for the application of totalitarianism to the study of political religions, I proposed the distinction between secular ideologies that act as a substitute for religion, and religious ideologies based on genuine religious faith, which is the case in religious fundamentalism (see note
24). Another project on ‘Political Religion’, a Bázeli Egyetemen végezték, világosabbá tette azt a pontot, hogy a politika új megközelítései válnak szükségessé, ha egy vallásos hit politikai köntösbe öltözik. A politikai iszlám tekintélyes forrásaiból merítve, ez a cikk azt sugallja, hogy az iszlamista ideológia által ihletett szervezetek sokféleségét mind politikai vallásként, mind politikai mozgalmaként kell felfogni.. A politikai iszlám egyedülálló tulajdonsága abban rejlik, hogy transznacionális valláson alapul (see note 26).

iszlám, A politikai iszlám és Amerika

Arab belátás

Lehetséges a „testvériség” Amerikával??

khalil al-anani

„nincs esély kommunikálni egyetlen USA-val sem. mindaddig, amíg az Egyesült Államok fenntartja azt a régóta fennálló nézetét, hogy az iszlám valós veszély, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna viewed the West mostly as a symbol of moral decay. Other Salafis – an Islamic school of thought that relies on ancestors as exemplary models – have taken the same view of the United States, but lack the ideological flexibility espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood believes in engaging the Americans in civil dialogue, other extremist groups see no point in dialogue and maintain that force is the only way of dealing with the United States.

Notes on the Isocratic Legacy and Islamic Political Thought: The Example of Education

JAMES MUIR

An unfortunate feature of human history is the tendency for religious differences and con icts to nourish themselves with the poisonous brew of ignorance and prejudice. While much can sometimes be done to reduce prejudice, it seems to me that scholars and educators ought to be primarily concerned with the more fundamental and enduring goal of reducing ignorance. One’s success in reducing ignorance—including one’s own—will depend upon one’s motives.
The study of Islamic educational philosophy may be motivated by current practical concerns: the desire of British Muslims to have Islamic schools, whether funded privately or by the state, is one topical example. From the perspective of educational philosophy, however, such a motive is exceedingly narrow, circumscribed by the concepts and categories of the local political disputes of the moment. For those motivated by a desire for knowledge and understanding of a tradition outside their own, it is most doubtful that any study of Islamic philosophy restricted by current practical concerns can be at all productive. There is no simple correspondence between knowledge and “relevance.”
There must, however, be some connection between two traditions of thought and practice if there is to be a point of departure, and a point of entry, which allows the scholar to step from one tradition to another. The legacy of Isocrates may constitute one such point of departure, which will help us to understand the relation between two traditions, the classical Greek and the Islamic. The dominance of the Isocratic legacy in Western education is well established and widely known among historians, classicists
and political philosophers, although awareness of it has only just begun to surface among educationists.2 Similarly, the Isocratic legacy to education (and the rich tradition of Arabic Platonism in philosophy) has in uenced Islamic thought, though in ways that are
still not yet well understood. The intention of this paper is to suggest that a modiŽ ed form of the Isocratic educational tradition is a fundamental component of Islamic political thought, namely, Islamic educational thought. This general wording of the intention of this paper in terms of Islamic political thought may give rise to a misunderstanding. iszlám, of course, is regarded by its adherents as a uniŽ ed and universal system of belief and behaviour.

Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: the Search for Common Ground.

Mostapha Benhenda

This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: for example, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regime, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. For example, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, amelyet gyakran a demokrácia részének tekintenek (legalább, az Egyesült Államokban ma ismert demokrácia). Tekintettel a demokratikus elvek ilyen vegyes értékelésére, érdekesnek tűnik az iszlám politikai modellek mögött meghúzódó demokráciafelfogás meghatározása. Más szavakkal, meg kell próbálnunk kideríteni, mi a demokratikus a „teodemokráciában”. Addig, a normatív politikai gondolkodás iszlám hagyományainak lenyűgöző sokfélesége és pluralitása között, lényegében az Abu 'Ala Maududiig és az egyiptomi értelmiségi Sayyed Qutbig visszanyúló széles gondolati áramlatra összpontosítunk.8 Ez a sajátos gondolkodási irányzat azért érdekes, mert a muszlim világban, ez az alapja a nyugatról származó értékek terjesztésével szembeni legnagyobb kihívást jelentő ellenállásoknak.. Based on religious values, this trend elaborated a political model alternative to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. For example, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Indeed, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.

On the American Constitution from the Perspective of the Qur’an and the Madinah Covenant

Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad

This paper is by no means an exhaustive comparison of the American Constitution with the Qur’an and the Madinah Covenant. Rather, it explores the kinds of insights that a comparison between these two documents may suggest. Accordingly, the constitutional topics selected are those in which the author or the commentators on earlier drafts perceived an assessment within the Islamic sources.4 This paper should be taken as an invitation for future studies with more systematic comparisons. In addition to rational inference from the text of the Qur’an and of the Madinah Covenant, I shall draw on the views of the Prophet’s Companions as recorded in the leading Hadith books. Analogously, the views of the Founding Fathers of the American Republic on constitutional
matters are articulated in The Federalist Papers.We shall begin by reviewing the Madinah Covenant, and then evaluate the Constitution’s goals as expressed in the preamble. After that, we shall explore a variety of topics in the main body of the text that lend themselves to the examination proposed here. In particular, these are the roles of the branches of government according to the separation of powers, the role of elections in determining the next head of state, the penalty for treason, the existence of the slave trade and racism, the republican form of government, the provisions for amending the Constitution, religious tests, and the Bill of Rights. Finally, we consider the Madisonian arguments on how the Constitution may be considered a model for avoiding fitnah.
The Madinah Covenant That Muslims attach great significance to their organization as a political community can be seen in the fact that their calendar is dated neither from the birth nor the death of the Prophet, but from the establishment of the first Muslim polity in the city-state of Madinah in 622. Before Madinah was founded, the Arabs had no state to “establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty” The custom at that time was that those who were too weak to protect themselves became clients of a protector (wali). Muhammad, himself an orphan, was brought up under the protection of his uncle Abu Talib.
After his uncle’s death in 619, Muhammad received an invitation from Yathrib’s feuding Arab tribes to govern there. Once in Yathrib, he entered into a covenant with all of its residents, whether they had accepted Islam or not. Even the Jews living on the city’s outskirts subscribed to it.

ISZLÁM ÉS LIBERÁLIS DEMOKRÁCIA

Robin Wright
Of all the challenges facing democracy in the 1990s, one of the greatest lies in the Islamic world. Only a handful of the more than four dozen predominantly Muslim countries have made significant strides toward establishing democratic systems. Among this handfulincluding Albania, Bangladesh, Jordánia, Kyrgyzstan, Libanon, Mali, Pakisztán, and Turkeynot one has yet achieved full, stable, or secure democracy. And the largest single regional bloc holding out against the global trend toward political pluralism comprises the Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa.
Yet the resistance to political change associated with the Islamic bloc is not necessarily a function of the Muslim faith. Indeed, the evidence indicates quite the reverse. Rulers in some of the most antidemocratic regimes in the Islamic worldsuch as Brunei, Indonézia, Irak, Oman, Qatar, Szíria, and Turkmenistanare secular autocrats who refuse to share power with their brethren.
Overall, the obstacles to political pluralism in Islamic countries are not unlike the problems earlier faced in other parts of the world: secular ideologies such as Ba’athism in Iraq and Syria, Pancasila in Indonesia, or lingering communism in some former Soviet Central Asian states brook no real opposition. Ironically, many of these ideologies were adapted from the West; Ba’athism, for instance, was inspired by the European socialism of the 1930s and 1940s. Rigid government controls over everything from communications in Saudi Arabia and Brunei to foreign visitors in Uzbekistan and Indonesia also isolate their people from democratic ideas and debate on popular empowerment. In the largest and poorest Muslim countries, moreover, problems common to [End Page 64] developing states, from illiteracy and disease to poverty, make simple survival a priority and render democratic politics a seeming luxury. Finally, like their non-Muslim neighbors in Asia and Africa, most Muslim societies have no local history of democracy on which to draw. As democracy has blossomed in Western states over the past three centuries, Muslim societies have usually lived under colonial rulers, kings, or tribal and clan leaders.
Más szavakkal, neither Islam nor its culture is the major obstacle to political modernity, even if undemocratic rulers sometimes use Islam as their excuse. 1 In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the ruling House of Saud relied on Wahhabism, a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam, first to unite the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula and then to justify dynastic rule. Like other monotheistic religions, Islam offers wide-ranging and sometimes contradictory instruction. In Saudi Arabia, Islam’s tenets have been selectively shaped to sustain an authoritarian monarchy.

Islam and the New Political Landscape

Les Back, Michael Keith, Azra Khan,
Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos

IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 szeptember 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 and 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.

The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal

As a cultural movement Islam rejects the old static view of the universe, and reaches a dynamic view. As an emotional system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual as such, and rejects bloodrelationship as a basis of human unity. Blood-relationship is earthrootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual in its origin.1 Such a perception is creative of fresh loyalties without any ceremonial to keep them alive, and makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity which had originally appeared as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification.2 Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian3 to return to the old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. A modern historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized world about the time when Islam appeared on the stage of History: It seemed then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown . . . The
old tribal sanctions had lost their power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer operate. The new sanctions created by
Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a gigantic tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk no longer alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to the core, riven by the storms of war, and held together only by the cords of ancient customs and laws, that might snap at any moment. Was there any emotional culture that could be brought in, to gather mankind once more into unity and to save civilization? This culture must be something of a new type, for the old sanctions and ceremonials were dead, and to build up others of the same kind would be the work
of centuries.’The writer then proceeds to tell us that the world stood in need of a new culture to take the place of the culture of the throne, and the systems of unification which were based on bloodrelationship.
It is amazing, he adds, that such a culture should have arisen from Arabia just at the time when it was most needed. There is, however, nothing amazing in the phenomenon. The world-life intuitively sees its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is what, in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation. It is only natural that Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched by any of the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where three continents meet together. The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of Tauhâd.’5 Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change.

Iszlám reformáció

Adnan Khan

The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi boasted after the events of 9/11:
“…we must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed

well being, respect for human rights andin contrast with Islamic countriesrespect

for religious and political rights, a system that has its values understanding of diversity

and tolerance…The West will conquer peoples, like it conquered communism, even if it

means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was

1,400 years ago…”1

And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of

ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”

Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute

The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the

history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical

Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified

their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to

apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the

Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time

understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined

principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of

study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became

smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah

were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Thus for

any Muslim attempting to deduce rules or understand what stance should be taken upon a particular

issue the Qur’an is the basis of this study.

The first attempt at reforming Islam took place at the turn of the 19th century. By the turn of the

century the Ummah had been in a lengthy period of decline where the global balance of power shifted

from the Khilafah to Britain. Mounting problems engulfed the Khilafah whilst Western Europe was in

the midst of the industrial revolution. The Ummah came to lose her pristine understanding of Islam, and

in an attempt to reverse the decline engulfing the Uthmani’s (Ottomans) some Muslims were sent to the

nyugat, and as a result became smitten by what they saw. Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi of Egypt (1801-1873),

on his return from Paris, wrote a biographical book called Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The

Extraction of Gold, or an Overview of Paris, 1834), praising their cleanliness, love of work, and above

all social morality. He declared that we must mimic what is being done in Paris, advocating changes to

the Islamic society from liberalising women to the systems of ruling. This thought, and others like it,

marked the beginning of the reinventing trend in Islam.