Archive for March, 2010

THE RISE OF “MUSLIM DEMOCRACY”

Vali Nasr

A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Umjesto toga, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indonezija, Malezija, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (islamsko pravo) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

It’s the Policy, Stupid

Ivan L. Esposito

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. Grm. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. Međutim, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terorizam, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Thus, na primjer, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?

Hamas and political reform in the middle east

The Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights Rising on Women’s Bodies

REPORT

Throughout the last century, women’s right to vote has remained impaired during parliamentary elections. Women were denied the right to vote during the revolution era, although they actively participated in the struggle and were among the martyrs. Nadalje, women’s participation was barely acknowledged during the codification of political rights during the revolution. In other words, women’s political participation was rare and for the most part they were absent from the political arena.

Women didn’t obtain their right to vote until after the Revolution through the constitutional amendments of 1956. Međutim, this change remained minimal since the amendments did not include concerted efforts to increase women’s participation in the electoral process at all levels.

During the decolonization and civic movements, women’s participation was always necessary and considered as an important factor. Women were asked to participate in the struggle for independence and they showed a strong spirit of self-sacrifice. Many were among the victims in the struggle for liberation, but once the goal was achieved, they had to face an extremely harsh situation in their fight to secure the political rights of their people and family, due to the unemployment that followed. So the victory did not translate into anything for women and they became overshadowed by other issues. Today’s political marginalization of women comes from the original institutions which failed to include them in the decision making processes and severely restricted their representation.

Women’s representation in the legislature has ranged from 0.5% do 2.4% since women were first granted their political rights in the 1956 constitution which allowed them seats in the parliament until the last legislative elections in the year 2000. The only exception was during the first half of the 1980s, when female representation rose to the unprecedented level of 9% u 1979 council election, due to Law 21 (1979) that reserved a minimum of 30 seats for women.

Although Law 21 was later abolished by Law 188 (1986), female representation remained high because of the use of a party list system. When resolution 201 (1990) was passed, the party lists were abolished and replaced by individual elections, restricting women’s access to the parliament by forcing them to directly compete with their male counterparts.

The parliamentary elections of 2005 seemed very different; they happened in the midst of national political reforms that gave hope for a revitalization of Egyptian political life and fair elections. One feature was the participation of 21 political parties. And for the first time the religious factions revealed their true colors through representative of Brotherhood Muslim Party.

Another feature of these elections is that the civil and human rights organizations insisted on monitoring of the elections. This had been granted ten years earlier during the struggles that stemmed from the 1995 izbori

Another familiar aspect that was recorded during these elections was the use of transparent ballot boxes, finger ink, judicial supervision, use of identity cards for voting and neglecting statements made by witnesses. This widespread optimism that the elections generated was short-lived and many insist upon calling the next parliamentary elections the ‘future elections.’

Usprkos tome, this fostered optimistic reactions among women, particularly when the media repeatedly approached the issue of their involvement in the process. In turn, it led to a law proposal, guarantying an additional 26 seats for women (one per governorate) in the parliament. This bill was submitted to the Ministry of Justice for review. Although this proposal does not tally women’s votes, which reached 40%, it fails to representatively express what this number stands for on the population percentage. This number may, at least, correspond to the minimal level of women’s participation without the endorsement of the law.

Nadalje, the National Democratic Party pledged to nominate 26 women and support their political participation, emphasized their role during the presidential elections and promoted the women’s movement and the National Council for Women.

The political parties committed themselves, during a meeting held last year by the ECWR along with the Arab Alliance for Women, to promote women’s participation by appointing a representative proportional to the number of women on the lists. They also vowed to work with the women representatives that represent 25% of the El Tagamoa’a party list Master Hussein AbdEl Razek to ensure safe electoral processes shortly before the election, at a conference held by the National Council for Women.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

William Thomasson

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Doista, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Certainly, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam

Trial of the Holy Land Foundation begins

Abdus Sattar Ghazali |

srpanj 24, 2007 – The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development went on trial today in Dallas, Texas as the federal agents were raiding two other Muslim charities in Dearborn, Michigan. The Holy Land was being tried on suspicion of aiding terrorism by helping the Palestinian militant group Hamas while the two Michigan charities – the Goodwill Charitable Organization and Al-Mabarrat Charitable Organization were suspected of having ties to extremist groups in Lebanon. Just like the Holy Land, assets of the two Michigan charities have been frozen.

The Holy Land, founded in 1989 was one of the largest Muslim charities in the nation before it was shut down under executive orders in December 2001. It was one of six Muslim major charities in the country that have been shut in recent years as the Muslim charities were scrutinized and persecuted as part of a broader backlash against Muslims after the 9/11 napadi. Other five shut down charities are: Global Relief Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Islamic American Relief Agency and Kind Hearts USA.

Under a provision of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, the government has largely unchecked power to designate any group as a terrorist organization. When that happens, a group’s property may be seized and its assets frozen. The charity is unable to see the government’s evidence and thus understand the basis for the charges. And it has only a limited right of appeal. So, the government can target a charity, obtain indictments against its leaders, and then delay a trial indefinitely.

The Bush administration froze the Holy Land Foundation’s assets charging it with funneling money to Hamas, an allegation strongly refuted by the Holy Land officials. According to its mission statement, the Foundation is a humanitarian organization that works to find “solutions to human suffering,” primarily focusing on providing urgent nutritional and medical care to the destitute and displaced Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Palestina, and Lebanon.

The government says Hamas’ support organization in the United States, known as the “Palestinian Committee,” organized the “Occupied Land Fund” u 1988. The name was later changed to the Holy Land Foundation. First based in California, the foundation moved to Richardson, Texas in 1992.

The defendants named in a 42-count indictment in 2004 are Holy Land Foundation, which federal authorities raided and shut down in December 2001; Shukri Abu Baker, the charity’s president; Ghassan Elashi, its chairman; Abdulrahman Odeh; Mohammad El-Mezain; and Mufid Abdulqader. Two other men named in the indictment remain fugitives.

This is the third trial involving Ghassan Elashi brothers. The court, because of the complexities of the investigation, decided to break the proceedings into three trials, with the one beginning today being the most expansive and the one directly related to the Holy Land Foundation. In summer 2004, five brothers who ran Infocom were convicted of selling computers to countries that support terrorism. U travnju 2005, three of the brothers were convicted of conspiracy, money laundering and “dealing in the property of a terrorist.”

Politička evolucija Muslimanskog bratstva u Egiptu

Stephen Bennett

“Allah je naš cilj. Poslanik je naš vođa. Kur’an je naš zakon. Džihad je naš put. Smrt na Allahovom putu je naša najveća nada.”

Od svojih prvih dana u Egiptu, Muslimansko bratstvo izazvalo je mnogo kontroverzi, jer neki tvrde da organizacija zagovara nasilje u ime islama. Prema Dr. Mamoun Fandy iz James A. Baker III Institut za javnu politiku, “džihadizam i aktiviranje pogleda na svijet kuće islama i kuće rata su ideje proizašle iz spisa i učenja Muslimanskog bratstva” (živahno, 2005). Primarni dokaz za ovaj argument je istaknuti član Bratstva, Sayeed Qutb, koji je zaslužan za razvoj revizionističke i kontroverzne interpretacije džihad koji je pružao vjerska opravdanja za nasilje koje su počinile organizacije ogranci Bratstva poput al-džihad, al-Takfir ve al-Hijra, Hamas, i al-Qaeda.

Ipak, to je još uvijek diskutabilno stajalište, jer unatoč tome što je ideološki roditelj tih nasilnih organizacija, samo Muslimansko bratstvo uvijek je zadržalo službeni stav protiv nasilja i umjesto toga promicalo je islamsko građansko i društveno djelovanje na lokalnoj razini. Unutar prvih dvadeset godina svog postojanja Muslimansko bratstvo je svojim popularnim aktivizmom steklo status najutjecajnije od svih velikih grupa na Bliskom istoku. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.

While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, str. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob također nam kaže da od trenutnih islamističkih oporbenih skupina koje danas postoje "'radikalnije' ili militantnije od tih skupina inzistiraju na revolucionarnoj promjeni koja se treba nametnuti masama i političkom sustavu, dok... novo Muslimansko bratstvo Egipta, poziv na postupnu promjenu koja se treba poduzeti unutar političkog sustava i uz uključivanje muslimanskih masa”

MUSLIM INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

SARA SILVESTRI

In Europe, and most of the Western world, Muslim presence in the publicsphere is a recent phenomenon that characterised the last decade of the 20thcentury and has deeply marked the beginning of the 21st. This visiblepresence, which amounts to something between 15 i 20 millionindividuals, can best be analysed if dissected into a number of components.The first part of this chapter illustrates where, when and why organisedMuslim voices and institutions have emerged in Europe, and which actorshave been involved. The second part is more schematic and analytical, inthat it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through whichMuslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often incompeting political forces and priorities. It does so by observing theobjectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in orderto articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors.The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of theconsequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation forEuropean society and policy-making.

The Syrian Opposition

Joshua Landis

Joe Pace

High noon in Egypt

Devika Parashar

F. Andy Messing

Parting the Veil

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Danas,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. Egipat, Jordan, Tunis, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Libanon, Irak, i palestinske teritorije,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Od ranih 1990-ih, NAS. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, Predsjednik George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

Islamski pokret: Political Freedom & Demokracija

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Islamske) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, demokracija. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Egipat, Sirija, Irak, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

Rješavanje američke islamističke dileme

The Alleged Opposition Emerges: Goals and Strategies of the Ikhawan Al-Muslimun vis a vis the State.

ILham El hamoumi

In discussing the political and intellectual nature of governmentsthroughout the Middle East, it is vital to pay attention to notions of definedliberties of the individual within the state in the way to democracy. It isalso imperative to attempt to understand the Islamic resurgence we have seen instates like Egypt. Acknowledging that this phenomenon has emerged as a reactionof failed and corrupt laic governments is important in order to comprehend howgroups such as the Muslim Brotherhood emerge and enjoy great popularity. Inthis paper, I will discuss the causes for the emergence of the MuslimBrotherhood of Egypt and the reasons behind its popularity. I will also discussits positives aspects in trying to revitalize and change the political system inEgypt, in addition to drawing attention to the negative externalities of itsreligiously tainted power.The social discourse on the blatant state infringement on their populacein the Arab world in general and more specifically in the case of Egypt,invariably bifurcates into a confusion on the part of the people between Islamand the state because of their lack of knowledge about their own political andreligious history, and state oppression. Fatima Mernissi’s discussion about thelack of awareness and understanding of history in the Arab world is quitereflective of the ta’a (obedience) of the Muslim populations to their unjustrulers, which initially might seem a little incomprehensible for a westernaudience. Još, how can one expect people to rise against an Imam or vote out apolitical leader when they have no understanding of their religious and/orpolitical histories? On what grounds will they do that? The concept of ta’a orobedience implies a banning of reflection, personal opinion (ra’y) andeventually ihdah (innovation, modernization).

Hasan Al-Banna

Guilain Denoelcx

Hasan al-Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood or Society of the Muslim Brothers, thelargest and most influential Sunni revivalist organization in the 20th century. Created in Egypt in1928, the Muslim Brotherhood became the first mass-based, overtly political movement to opposethe ascendancy of secular and Western ideas in the Middle East. The brotherhood saw in theseideas the root of the decay of Islamic societies in the modern world, and advocated a return toIslam as a solution to the ills that had befallen Muslim societies. Al-Banna’s leadership was criticalto the spectacular growth of the brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s. By the early 1950s,branches had been established in Syria, Sudan, i Jordan. Soon, the movement’s influence would be felt inplaces as far away as the Gulf and non-Arab countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Indonezija, and Malaysia. Drivingthis expansion was the appeal of the organizational model embodied in the original, Egypt-based section of thebrotherhood, and the success of al-Banna’s writings. Translated into several languages, these writings haveshaped two generations of Sunni religious activists across the Islamic world.

The Hamas Victory in the Palestinian Elections

Riaz Hassan

The parliamentary election triumph of Hamas surprised almost everybody, including the Hamas leadership, if the press reported correctly. The Bush Administration is blaming its intelligence services for failing to predict Hamas’ victory. Most observers forecast that Fatah would win theelections because of its political dominance in Palestinian affairs. Zašto, zatim, did most politicalobservers in the West get it so wrong? This political miscalculation will be the subject of much analysis and commentary in the coming months.A number of specific local issues delivered Hamas its historic electoral victory. Credit must goto the Palestinian people, who turned out to be astute voters. A significant number of Palestinians were simply unable to accept the corruption and cronyism that allegedly flourished under the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah. While most Palestinians remember well and admire the sacrifices made by Fatah leaders in the past, they were simply deterred by their in ability to institute political and economic reforms to better the lives of ordinary people. Hamashad a much better reading of the Palestinian political pulse. It was not difficult for Hamas to doso: Hamas delivers health, educational and social services to large numbers of Palestinians,making daily life bearable.Unlike Fatah, which had several candidates contesting the same constituency, resulting in asplitting of Fatah’s votes, Hamas ran an extremely disciplined political campaign. Hamas alsomade use of its female supporters, sending them door-to-door to canvass voters and to pollingstations to campaign for Hamas’ candidates. These election strategies obviously worked in Hamas’ favor. Hamas has also amassed political capital through its resistance and military campaigns against the Israeli occupation. It was these actions which led to Hamas’ being labelled and treated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union andseveral other western countries. In a political environment in which ordinary Palestinians feelcompletely powerless, Hamas’ acts of resistance and tough rhetoric gave Palestinians a senseof empowerment that may well be the reason for its electoral victory over its opponents.