Archive for February, 2010

Uitdagingen voor de democratie in de Arabische en moslimwereld

Alon Ben-Meir

President Bush’s notions that democratizing Iraq will have a ripple effect on the rest ofthe Arab world, bringing prosperity and peace to the region, and that democracy is the panaceafor Islamic terrorism are unsubstantiated as well as grossly misleading. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. In feite, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. In aanvulling, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

Egyptische parlementsverkiezingen: Tussen democratisering en autocratie

Ik heb nog. Thabet

The dissolution of the 1987 en 1990 parliaments, following two Supreme Courtrulings that the 1984 en 1987 general elections were unconstitutional, and the transfer of the power to supervise elections from the police to the judiciarysignalled an impending political opening, leaving the impression that there waspolitical will to renew the rules governing elections and make them more transparent and equitable. The paper uses the 2000 elections to the People’s Assemblyto assess the democratisation process in Egypt. It examines the extent ofinclusion of all social forces and political parties, and of changes in popular participation. It argues that the 2000 elections bore the marks of electoral anomaliesand manipulations which were characteristic of previous elections. Not withstand in gits flaws the 2000 elections marked a significant step in Egypt’s transition to liberal democracy.

de W&M Progressief

De verantwoordelijkheid van electorale keuze aanvaarden

De ontwikkeling van democratische instellingen gaat gepaard met negatieve externe effecten. Als politiek progressief, Ik ben van mening dat het grote geheel - het leggen van een solide democratische basis - opweegt tegen de mogelijke opkomst van politieke partijen die religieuze of genderintolerantie kunnen bepleiten. Ik ben een groot voorstander van de werking van het democratisch proces. Terwijl ik een semester in Egypte heb gestudeerd, Ik word eraan herinnerd dat ondanks de onvolkomenheden van het democratische systeem van de Verenigde Staten, het is nog steeds vele malen beter dan te leven onder een autoritair regime dat politieke partijen verbiedt en militaire politie op verschillende locaties plaatst in een poging controle uit te oefenen en de macht te behouden.

In Egypte, het verkiezingsproces is niet democratisch. De Nationale Politieke Partij – de partij van president Mubarak – oefent een enorme invloed uit in het land. De belangrijkste oppositie is de Moslim Broederschap, die is gemaakt in 1928 door Hassan al-Banna. De Moslimbroederschap is gebaseerd op zeer strikte interpretaties van de Koran en het idee dat seculiere regeringen een directe schending zijn van de leer van de Koran. Het feest heeft een zeer gewelddadig verleden; het is direct verantwoordelijk geweest voor verschillende moordpogingen en de moord op de Egyptische leider Anwar-as-Sadat in 1981.

De Moslimbroederschap is een illegale politieke partij. Omdat de politieke partij religieus is, het is volgens de Egyptische wet niet toegestaan ​​om deel te nemen aan de publieke sfeer. Ondanks deze technische details, de partij heeft leden in het Egyptische parlement. Evenwel, de parlementariërs kunnen hun band met de Moslimbroederschap officieel niet verklaren, maar identificeren zich in plaats daarvan als onafhankelijken. Hoewel het feest illegaal blijft, het blijft de machtigste oppositie tegen de regerende Nationale Democratische Partij.

Egyptische lokale verkiezingen Farce Oorzaken en gevolgen

Mohammed Herzallah

Amr Hamzawy

Egypt’s local elections of April 8, 2008 were a confirmation of a backwardslide in Egyptian politics. They were plagued by social unrest and politicaldiscord. In the weeks prior to the elections, labor protests escalated,precipitating a harsh crackdown that resulted in at least two fatalities and many injuries.The country’s largest opposition force, de Moslim Broederschap, decided at the last minute to boycott the elections. Voter turn out did not exceed 5 percent and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP),facing virtually no competition, landed a sweeping victory—winning roughly95 percent of the seats at stake.These developments bring to light a broader deterioration in Egyptian politics.Three elements of this process stand out and deserve careful attention:•

Eerst, the burgeoning social crisis caused by out of control inflation, acrippled welfare system, and persistent unemployment;

• Second, a return to the old authoritarian practices of the rulingestablishment; en

• Third, worrying signs that call into question the very existence of aviable opposition capable of advancing reform through the political process.

Egypte in Profetie

Brad Macdonald

De Moslim Broederschap, though officially banned, is now Egypt’s largest and most influential opposition party. This signals a stunning shift within one of America’s few remaining Middle Eastern allies.December 2005 was a water shedmonth in the history of Egyptian politics. Thanks to elections thatwere closer to being democratic than any in Egypt’s history, the Islamic party of the Muslim Brotherhood (mb)won 88 parliamentary seats (the organization is officially out lawed, but it ran its candidates as independents)—a more than six-fold increase over its previous representation.Considering that Egypt’s parliament is comprised of 454seats, the mb’s capture of 88 seats—fewer than a quarter of the total—may not seem like much to write home about.Despite the gains,the Islamic partywill remain out numbered by the majority rule of autocratic leader Hosni Mubarak’sN a t i o n a lDemocratic Party.Some argue that as long as Mubarak controls parliament—as he hasfor the past 24years—the mb can never play a more significant role in Egyptian politics.But politics can be messy business—especially in the Middle East.Death, incitement, revolution—all can turn a governmenT on its head in a matter of days. The rise of an openly Islamist party in Egypt is no small matter. The political success Of this long-established Islamic group represents a major step toward a fundamental shift in Egyptian politics, made possible by an electorate with a growing affinity for Islamic leadership and law, and mounting disdain for the Mubarak government.Political Shift Banned from government in 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood is an organization of staunch Islamic conservatives with a strong desire to install Islamic law as the foundation of Egyptian government.In the run up to the elections,the Brotherhood’s ominously vague campaign motto was “Islam is the solution.”Thu s , the Brotherhood ’s rising popularity unmistakably signalsthe growingdesire of many foran Islamic governmentin Egypt—which makes itssuccess nothingshort of profound.“Considering thatthe mb won almosthalf of the seatsit is contesting,despite reportedly wide spread

Egypte: 2005 Presidents- en parlementsverkiezingen

Jeremy M. Scherp

In recent years, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and his ruling NationalDemocratic Party (NDP) have faced growing criticism, both domestically andinternationally, regarding limited progress on political liberalization. One frequently citedobstacle of reform had been the indirect presidential election process, in which acandidate was nominated and confirmed by the NDP-controlled People’s Assembly(lower house of parliament) and then approved in a nationwide “yes or no” referendum,which was thought to be manipulated by authorities. With the past four referendumswithout a competitor routinely resulting in Mubarak receiving anywhere from 93% to98% “yes” votes, the process was widely viewed at home and abroad as illegitimate andwas perceived as an anachronism in the eyes of younger Egyptians. The recent publicity surrounding elections in Iraq, Libanon, Saoedi-Arabië, and the West Bank & Gaza Striponly heightened this perception, as Egypt, the largest Arab country, appeared out of stepwith the trend in the Arab world. In aanvulling, Egypt’s ruling elite has been graduallyundergoing a generational shift, in which a new faction of young, media-savvy, andWestern-educated leaders within the NDP (led by the President’s son, Gamal Mubarak)has attempted to reinvigorate political culture in order to modernize the NDP’s imagewithout having to relinquish the party’s grip on power.

Het maatschappelijk middenveld en democratisering in de Arabische wereld

Saad Eddin Ibrahim

Zelfs als de islam het antwoord is, Arabische moslims zijn het probleem

In mei 2008, de Arabische natie heeft een aantal branden meegemaakt, of liever:, gewapende conflicten—in

Libanon, Irak, Palestina, Jemen, en Somalië. In deze conflicten,

de strijdende partijen gebruikten de islam als instrument voor mobilisatie

en het vergaren van steun. collectief, moslims zijn

oorlog voeren tegen moslims.

Nadat sommige moslims de slogan “Islam is de oplossing”,”

het

werd duidelijk dat “hun islam het probleem is”. Nauwelijks hebben sommigen van hen wapens verworven,

dan dat ze het tegen de staat en zijn heersende regime inbrachten, ongeacht

of dat regime regeerde in naam van de islam of niet?.

Wij hebben

dit de afgelopen jaren gezien tussen de volgelingen van Osama bin Laden

en de Al-Qaeda-organisatie aan de ene kant, en de autoriteiten in

het Koninkrijk Saoedi-Arabië, op de andere. We hebben ook gezien een

explosief voorbeeld van dit fenomeen in Marokko, wiens koning regeert in naam van de islam en

wiens titel de 'Prins van de Gelovigen' is.’ Dus elke moslimfractie doodt andere moslims in de

naam van de islam.

Een snelle blik op de inhoud van de media bevestigt hoe de

term islam en de bijbehorende symbolen zijn slechts werktuigen geworden in de handen van deze moslims.

Prominente voorbeelden van deze islam-uitbuitende facties zijn::

De Moslim Broederschap, Egyptische Islamitische Jihad, en Jamiat al-Islamiyya, in Egypte

Hamas en de Islamitische Jihad-beweging, in Palestina Hezbollah, Fatah al-Islam,

en Jamiat al-Islammiyya, in Libanon De Houthi Zayadi-rebellen en de Islamitische Hervormingsgroepering

(Correctie), inJemen De islamitische rechtbanken, in Somalië Het Islamitisch Front ,

ZD Scribd iPaper

VERGELIJKING VAN DRIE MOSLIM broederschappen: SYRIË, JORDANIË, EGYPTE

Barry Rubin

The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, natuurlijk, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, natuurlijk, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.First, it is important to understand the Brotherhood’s policy toward and relations with both jihadist groups (Al-Qaeda, the Zarqawi network, and others such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Hamas) and theorists (such as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir—which is regarded by them as a small, cultish group of no importance. Other than in Jordan, they have had little contact with it at all.Regarding al-Qa’ida—both its theorists and its terrorist infrastructure—the Brotherhoods approve generally of its militancy, attacks on America, and ideology (or respect its ideologues), but view it as a rival.

De politiek en de belofte van beschavingsdialogen

M. EEN. Muqtedar Khan

In response to Harvard Professor SamuelHuntington’s now infamous argument predicting afuture full of clashes between civilizations, the world’sliberals responded with a call for a civilizational dialogue.After 9/11, this call for a dialogue betweenIslam and the West has become even more urgent.The philosophical assumptions behind these dialoguesare not too difficult to discern. Islam and themodern West share a common Abrahamic traditionand their foundational sources; Islamic law and philosophyand Western enlightenment philosophy havecommon roots—Hellenistic reason and Biblical revelation.The two civilizations have a common past anda common future, particularly in the light of strongeconomic relations between the West and the Muslimworld and the growing presence of Islam in nearlyevery Western society.Because the future of the two civilizations is inseparable,any clash will be devastating to both, regardlessof the asymmetry of power. A clash between Islamand the modern West would be like a collisionbetween the present and the future for both. Islam isintegral to the future of the West and Islamic civilization’sreticence toward modernity is untenable.Eventually, the Muslim world will have to modernize,democratize, and recognize that its future, too, isinterdependent. Neither the West nor the Muslimworld can imagine a mutually exclusive future.

De toekomst van de Moslimbroederschap

Amr Al-Chobaki

The Muslim Brotherhood managed to maintain its organizational existence since its establishment in 1928, by the late Hasan Al-Banna. Throughout eight decades, it has managed to exist as a religious movement as well as a political and social organization. This, on one hand, helped it to be sufficiently strong to be distinguished from other political powers, but also made it weak and feeble in some other ways.

The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement is similar to other Egyptian political movements, as it was established at the time of the royal regime and a semi-liberal era. It clashed with the government during the time of President `Abd Al-Nasser, adapted to the regime of President Sadat, and tended to fluctuate in its relationship with President Mubarak, echter, the relationship was based on partial elimination, just like the state during the age of President `Abd Al-Nasser. Bovendien, it has been outlawed for most of its history; sinds 1954 until the present time (i. more than half a century).

The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to be both a witness and a party in the political and cultural dispute in Egypt and the Arab countries, throughout different historical periods; Egypt in the time of the royal regime and in the time of the republic with its three stages. This dispute was about issues of identity and cultural belonging, the relationship between the religion – on one hand – and politics, the East and the West on the other hand, as well as the coming and the inherited. The Muslim Brotherhood had a flexible political and intellectual reference that gave it a comprehensive conception of Islam.

Huidige trends in de ideologie van de Egyptische Moslimbroederschap

Dr. Israël Elad Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last twoyears has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up fordissent. Met ons. en Europese steun, local opposition groups have been able to takeinitiative, hun doelen te bevorderen en concessies van de staat af te dwingen. The EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a politicalorganization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks.Western governments, inclusief de regering van de Verenigde Staten, are consideringthe MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advancedemocracy in their countries, en misschien ook bij het uitroeien van islamistisch terrorisme. Couldthe Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) en de Indonesische Welvarende Rechtvaardigheidspartij (PKS), twoIslamist parties that, volgens sommige analisten, are successfully adapting to the rules ofliberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with,respectievelijk, Europa en een “heidens” Azië?Dit artikel onderzoekt hoe de MB heeft gereageerd op de nieuwe realiteit, how it has handledthe ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the pasttwo years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to newcircumstances? Wat zijn haar doelstellingen en haar visie op de politieke orde?? How has itreacted to U.S. toenadering tot de hervormings- en democratiseringscampagne? How has itnavigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forceson the other, terwijl het land afstevent op twee dramatische verkiezingen in de herfst 2005? Towhat extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt toward liberaldemocracy?

Moslim Amerikanen Middenklasse en meestal mainstream

Pew Research Center

Muslims constitute a growing and increasingly important segment of American society.Yet there is surprisingly little quantitative research about the attitudes and opinions of thissegment of the public for two reasons. Eerst, de VS. Census is forbidden by law from askingquestions about religious belief and affiliation, en, as a result, we know very little about thebasic demographic characteristics of Muslim Americans. Seconde, Muslim Americans comprisesuch a small percentage of the U.S. population that general population surveys do not interview asufficient number of them to allow for meaningful analysis.This Pew Research Center study is therefore the first ever nationwide survey to attempt tomeasure rigorously the demographics, attitudes and experiences of Muslim Americans. It buildson surveys conducted in 2006 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project of Muslim minority publics inGreat Britain, Frankrijk, Germany and Spain. The Muslim American survey also follows on Pew’sglobal surveys conducted over the past five years with more than 30,000 Muslims in 22 nationsaround the world since 2002.The methodological approach employed was the most comprehensive ever used to studyMuslim Americans. Nearly 60,000 respondents were interviewed to find a representative sampleof Muslims. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, Urdu and Farsi, as well as English. Subsamplesof the national poll were large enough to explore how various subgroups of thepopulation — including recent immigrants, native-born converts, and selected ethnic groupsincluding those of Arab, Pakistani, and African American heritage — differ in their attitudesThe survey also contrasts the views of the Muslim population as a whole with those ofthe U.S. general population, and with the attitudes of Muslims all around the world, includingWestern Europe. Tot slot, findings from the survey make important contributions to the debateover the total size of the Muslim American population.The survey is a collaborative effort of a number of Pew Research Center projects,including the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, the Pew Forum on Religion &Public Life and the Pew Hispanic Center. The project was overseen by Pew Research CenterPresident Andrew Kohut and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Director Luis Lugo. ThePew Research Center’s Director of Survey Research, Scott Keeter, served as project director forthe study, with the close assistance of Gregory Smith, Research Fellow at the Pew Forum. Manyother Pew researchers participated in the design, execution and analysis of the survey.

De ichwaan in Noord-Amerika: Een korte geschiedenis

Douglas Farah

Ron Sandee

The current federal court case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) in Dallas, Texas,1 offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, as well as its goals and structure. The documents discuss recruitment, organization, ideology and the development of the organization in different phases in the United States. The prosecution in the case has presented many internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980’s and early 1990’s that give a first-ever, public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) in the U.S. over the past four decades. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the Ikhwan leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources.

Zal de politiek de moslimbroederschap in Egypte temmen??

NEIL MacFARQUHAR

CAIRO, December. 7 – When stumping through the port city of Alexandria, whose crumbling mansions and rickety tram lines evoke long-faded glory, Sobhe Saleh of the Muslim Brotherhood vowed he had a different vision for Egypt’s future.

“If Islam were applied, no one would be hungry,” he roared recently to a crowd of fully veiled women ululating with joy. “Islam is a religion of construction. Islam is a religion of investment. Islam is a religion of development.”

Religie, in fact, should profoundly alter both Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy, said Mr. Saleh, a 52-year-old lawyer with a clipped helmet of steel-gray hair.

“If Islam were applied, the television would not show us prostitution and people lacking all decency!” he declared. “If Islam were applied, Iraq could not have been invaded, Israel could not occupy Jerusalem, and aggression could not have been used to humiliate Muslims everywhere!”

A long-expected day of reckoning is at hand in Egyptian politics now that the Brotherhood, an illegal organization with a violent past, is entering the corridors of power for the first time in significant numbers.

The outcome of the freest election in more than 50 years could determine whether political Islam will turn Egypt into a repressive, anti-American theocracy or if Islamic parties across the Arab world will themselves be transformed by participating in mainstream politics.

No sudden earthquake is expected. But initial results from the final round of voting on Wednesday showed that the Brotherhood had gained at least 12 more seats to bring its total to 88, with seven races from all three rounds still unsettled, according to a spokesman. That is five times the 17 seats the group won in 2000.

BESTUURSPROFIEL VAN EGYPTE

Monique Nardi Roquette

Mamadi Kourouma

Major political developments since 1990Egypt is constitutionally a democratic republic based on a multiparty system. Th e 1971 Constitutionprovides for the separation of powers between the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. Noconstitutional changes have taken place in Egypt since 1980. In het 1980 referendum, the currentpresident, Hosni Mubarak, assumed offi ce with a two-thirds majority vote of the People’s Assembly(PA). (Th e president is currently in his fourth presidential term.) He holds wide-ranging authoritiesand is the supreme commander of the armed forces, chair of the higher council for policeagencies, and the higher council for judicial entities. Th e president nominates ministers, appoints10 of the 454 members of the PA and 88 of the 264 members of the Shura Council, appoints anddismisses governors, university chairs, and other high ranking offi cials (to be further discussed insection on “Institutional Eff ectiveness”).Th e president is also the chair of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which has been inpower since it was established by former President Anwar Sadat in 1978 and eff ectively controlslocal government, de media, and the public sector.Egypt’s 16 legally registered opposition parties’ ability to compete has been frustrated by theNDP’s dominance in the PA with a large majority of almost 90% (Figure 1). Evenwel, NDP hasexperienced a disappointing result in the parliamentary elections of 2000, which has prompted thesubstantial changes introduced to reform the party led by the President’s son Gamal Mubarak.

Islamisten betrekken en democratie bevorderen

Mona Yacoubian

Democratische verandering beschouwen als een langdurig tegengif voor islamistisch extremisme, de regering-Bush koppelde haar militaire interventies in Afghanistan en Irak aan intensievere inspanningen om de democratie in de Arabische wereld te bevorderen, de noodzaak van vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen onderstrepen. Tot op heden, In de hele regio hebben parlementsverkiezingen met wisselende openheid plaatsgevonden, van Marokko naar Koeweit. De verkiezingen luidden een golf van islamitische overwinningen in, door velen omschreven als een 'islamistische tsunami'. 1De successen van de islamisten komen voort uit hun effectiviteit als vehikel voor populaire oppositie. terwijl liberaal, seculiere oppositiepartijen blijven grotendeels los van een groot deel van de bevolking, Islamisten hebben uitgebreide en gemakkelijk te mobiliseren basisnetwerken ontwikkeld via liefdadigheidsorganisaties en moskeeën. De leiding is vaak jonger en dynamischer, met sterke banden met de gemeenschap, en de partijorganisaties barsten van de energie en ideeën, het aantrekken van degenen die op zoek zijn naar verandering. De V.S. regering heeft gedurende meerdere jaren stilletjes een aantal gematigde en legale islamistische partijen in de regio ingeschakeld, soms door normale diplomatieke activiteiten, soms via door de overheid gefinancierde subsidies aan de VS. organisaties. Dit speciaal verslag onderzoekt de door de VS gefinancierde betrokkenheid bij juridische, geweldloze islamitische partijen via het National Democratic Institute (IK BEN) en het Internationaal Republikeins Instituut (IRI), die de meest uitgebreide ervaring hebben met het omgaan met islamisten in de regio, en richt zich op Marokko, Jordanië, en Jemen, vanwege hun relatieve politieke openheid en de kracht en levendigheid van hun islamitische politieke oppositie. Succesvolle strategie. Een succesvolle strategie voor islamistische betrokkenheid stelt zowel individuen in staat als instellingen om meer transparantie te bewerkstelligen, meer verantwoordelijkheid, en verschuift naar matiging. Het trainen en empoweren van individuen cultiveert gematigden binnen de partijen en vergroot hun politieke verfijning en invloed. In de tussentijd, terwijl regimes in de Arabische wereld politieke hervormingen weerstaan ​​of manipuleren, het versterken van de infrastructuur van de democratie is net zo belangrijk als het ondersteunen van individuen. Onafhankelijke verkiezingsprocedures en monitoring helpen om vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen tot stand te brengen. Institutionele opbouw zorgt voor passende controles op de uitvoerende macht en een sterke rechtsstaat. Vooral het versterken van parlementen is cruciaal, aangezien islamisten voornamelijk deelnemen aan de wetgevende macht. Bij het beoordelen of islamistische partijen gematigd hebben gereageerd op de Amerikaanse. verloving, het is moeilijk, zo niet onmogelijk om verschuivingen te kwantificeren of te meten die zelf relatief en subjectief kunnen zijn. Meer gematigdheid rechtstreeks koppelen aan specifieke VS. betrokkenheidsactiviteiten zijn ook zeer problematisch. Op zijn best, deze betrokkenheid moet worden beschouwd als een bijdragende factor. Niettemin, de voorlopige resultaten in Marokko, Jordanië, en Jemen beloven genoeg dat voortdurende betrokkenheid bij gematigde islamisten moet worden aangemoedigd, zij het met meer nadruk op institutionele opbouw en oog voor de bredere context van de ideologische strijd in de moslimwereld tussen extremisme en gematigdheid.