RSSArchive for February, 2010

民主主義へのアラブとイスラム世界の課題

アロンベンメイヤー

President Bush’s notions that democratizing Iraq will have a ripple effect on the rest ofthe Arab world, bringing prosperity and peace to the region, and that democracy is the panaceafor Islamic terrorism are unsubstantiated as well as grossly misleading. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. 実際には, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. 加えて, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

エジプトの議会選挙: 民主化と専制政治の間

私はまだ. Thabet

The dissolution of the 1987 と 1990 parliaments, following two Supreme Courtrulings that the 1984 と 1987 general elections were unconstitutional, and the transfer of the power to supervise elections from the police to the judiciarysignalled an impending political opening, leaving the impression that there waspolitical will to renew the rules governing elections and make them more transparent and equitable. The paper uses the 2000 elections to the People’s Assemblyto assess the democratisation process in Egypt. It examines the extent ofinclusion of all social forces and political parties, and of changes in popular participation. It argues that the 2000 elections bore the marks of electoral anomaliesand manipulations which were characteristic of previous elections. Not withstand in gits flaws the 2000 elections marked a significant step in Egypt’s transition to liberal democracy.

W&のMプログレッシブ

ジュリアンカー
Richael忠実
イーサンフォレスト

選挙人による選択の責任を受け入れる

民主制度の発展には負の外部性が伴う. 政治進歩主義者として, 確固たる民主主義の基盤を確立するという全体像は、宗教やジェンダーに対する不寛容を主張する可能性のある政党が出現する可能性よりも重要であると私は信じています. 私は民主的なプロセスの仕組みを固く信じています. 一学期エジプトに留学している間、, 米国の民主主義システムの不完全さにもかかわらず、, 政党を非合法化し、権力を行使して権力を維持するためにさまざまな場所に憲兵を配置する権威主義的な政権の下で生活するよりは、何倍もましです。.

エジプトで, 選挙プロセスは民主的ではない. ムバラク大統領の政党である国民政党は、国内で絶大な影響力を発揮している. その主な反対派はムスリム同胞団です, で作成された 1928 ハッサン・アル・バンナ. ムスリム同胞団は、コーランの非常に厳格な解釈と、世俗的な政府はコーランの教えに直接違反するという考えに基づいています。. パーティーには非常に暴力的な過去があります; それは、いくつかの暗殺の試みとエジプトの指導者アンワル・アズ・サダトの暗殺に直接責任を負っています。 1981.

ムスリム同胞団は違法な政党です. 政党が宗教だから, エジプトの法律では公共の場に参加することは許可されていません. この専門性にもかかわらず, その党はエジプト議会に議員を持っている. しかし、, 国会議員は、ムスリム同胞団への所属を正式に宣言することはできませんが、代わりに無所属であると認識しています。. パーティーは違法のままですが, それは与党国民民主党に対する最も強力な野党であり続けている.

エジプトの地方選挙笑劇は、原因と結果

モハメドHerzallah

アムルHamzawy

4月のエジプトの地方選挙 8, 2008 エジプトの政治にbackwardslideを確認しました. 彼らは、社会不安やpoliticaldiscordに悩まされました. 選挙前の数週間で, 労働抗議がエスカレート,少なくとも2人が死亡し、多くのinjuries.Theの国内最大野党の力をもたらしたこと、過酷な弾圧を沈殿させます, ムスリム同胞団, 選挙をボイコットする最後の最後で決めました. 投票者は超えなかっ判明します 5 パーセントと与党国民民主党 (NDP),ほとんどの競争に直面していません, このプロセスのエジプトpolitics.Three要素における光より広範な悪化にもたらすstake.These発展の座席の抜本的な勝利を受賞したroughly95%が目立つと細心の注意に値する上陸:•

最初, 制御インフレのうちに起因する急成長する社会的な危機, acrippled福祉制度, そして永続的な失業;

•第二に, rulingestablishmentの古い権威慣行に戻ります; と

• 三番, 心配兆候その質問へのコール政治プロセスを通じて改革を進めることができaviable野党の存在そのもの.

予言エジプト

ブラッドマクドナルド

ムスリム同胞団, though officially banned, is now Egypt’s largest and most influential opposition party. This signals a stunning shift within one of America’s few remaining Middle Eastern allies.December 2005 was a water shedmonth in the history of Egyptian politics. Thanks to elections thatwere closer to being democratic than any in Egypt’s history, the Islamic party of the Muslim Brotherhood (mb)勝った 88 parliamentary seats (the organization is officially out lawed, but it ran its candidates as independents)—a more than six-fold increase over its previous representation.Considering that Egypt’s parliament is comprised of 454seats, the mb’s capture of 88 seats—fewer than a quarter of the total—may not seem like much to write home about.Despite the gains,the Islamic partywill remain out numbered by the majority rule of autocratic leader Hosni Mubarak’sN a t i o n a lDemocratic Party.Some argue that as long as Mubarak controls parliament—as he hasfor the past 24years—the mb can never play a more significant role in Egyptian politics.But politics can be messy business—especially in the Middle East.Death, incitement, revolution—all can turn a governmenT on its head in a matter of days. The rise of an openly Islamist party in Egypt is no small matter. The political success Of this long-established Islamic group represents a major step toward a fundamental shift in Egyptian politics, made possible by an electorate with a growing affinity for Islamic leadership and law, and mounting disdain for the Mubarak government.Political Shift Banned from government in 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood is an organization of staunch Islamic conservatives with a strong desire to install Islamic law as the foundation of Egyptian government.In the run up to the elections,the Brotherhood’s ominously vague campaign motto was “Islam is the solution.”Thu s , the Brotherhood ’s rising popularity unmistakably signalsthe growingdesire of many foran Islamic governmentin Egypt—which makes itssuccess nothingshort of profound.“Considering thatthe mb won almosthalf of the seatsit is contesting,despite reportedly wide spread

エジプト: 2005 大統領選挙と議会選挙

ジェレミーによる. シャープ

In recent years, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and his ruling NationalDemocratic Party (NDP) have faced growing criticism, both domestically andinternationally, regarding limited progress on political liberalization. One frequently citedobstacle of reform had been the indirect presidential election process, in which acandidate was nominated and confirmed by the NDP-controlled People’s Assembly(lower house of parliament) and then approved in a nationwide “yes or no” referendum,which was thought to be manipulated by authorities. With the past four referendumswithout a competitor routinely resulting in Mubarak receiving anywhere from 93% to98% “yes” votes, the process was widely viewed at home and abroad as illegitimate andwas perceived as an anachronism in the eyes of younger Egyptians. The recent publicity surrounding elections in Iraq, レバノン, サウジアラビア, and the West Bank & Gaza Striponly heightened this perception, as Egypt, the largest Arab country, appeared out of stepwith the trend in the Arab world. 加えて, Egypt’s ruling elite has been graduallyundergoing a generational shift, in which a new faction of young, media-savvy, andWestern-educated leaders within the NDP (led by the President’s son, Gamalさんムバラク)has attempted to reinvigorate political culture in order to modernize the NDP’s imagewithout having to relinquish the party’s grip on power.

アラブ世界の市民社会と民主化

サードのエディンイブラヒム
イスラムが答えであっても, アラブのイスラム教徒が問題

5月 2008, アラブ諸国は多くの火災を経験しました, というより, 武力紛争—に

レバノン, イラク, パレスチナ, イエメン, とソマリア. これらの紛争で,

戦争当事者は動員のための手段としてイスラム教を使用しました

とサポートを蓄積. まとめて, イスラム教徒は

イスラム教徒に対する戦争.

一部のイスラム教徒が「イスラム教が解決策である」というスローガンを掲げた後,」

それ

「彼らのイスラム教が問題だ」と明らかになった。彼らのうちのいくつかはすぐに武器を手に入れました,

関係なく国家とその支配体制に反対してそれを提起したより

その政権がイスラムの名の下で支配していたかどうか.

我々は持っています

オサマビンラディンの信者の間で近年これを見て

一方でアルカイダ組織, と当局

サウジアラビア王国, もう一方の. また、

モロッコでのこの現象の爆発的な例, その王はイスラムの名の下で支配し、

そのタイトルは「忠実な王子。’ したがって、各イスラム教派閥は他のイスラム教徒を殺す

イスラームの名前.
メディアの内容を一目見ると、

イスラム教とそれに関連するシンボルは、これらのイスラム教徒の手に渡る単なるツールに.

これらのイスラムを利用する派閥の顕著な例は:
ムスリム同胞団, エジプトのイスラム聖戦, ジャミアット・アル・イスラミヤ, エジプトで

ハマスとイスラムのジハード運動, パレスチナのヒズボラで, ファタハ・イスラム,

とJamiat al-Islammiyya, レバノンでは、フーティザヤディ反乱軍とイスラム改革グループ

(改善), イエメンイスラム法廷, ソマリアのイスラム戦線 ,

三イスラムエルマンダーを比較する: シリア, ジョーダン, エジプト

バリールービン

The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, とメソッド. Each, もちろん, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, とメソッド. Each, もちろん, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.First, it is important to understand the Brotherhood’s policy toward and relations with both jihadist groups (アルカイダ, the Zarqawi network, and others such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Hamas) and theorists (such as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir—which is regarded by them as a small, cultish group of no importance. Other than in Jordan, they have had little contact with it at all.Regarding al-Qa’ida—both its theorists and its terrorist infrastructure—the Brotherhoods approve generally of its militancy, attacks on America, and ideology (or respect its ideologues), but view it as a rival.

政治と文明対話の約束

M日付. A. Muqtedar Khan

In response to Harvard Professor SamuelHuntington’s now infamous argument predicting afuture full of clashes between civilizations, the world’sliberals responded with a call for a civilizational dialogue.After 9/11, this call for a dialogue betweenIslam and the West has become even more urgent.The philosophical assumptions behind these dialoguesare not too difficult to discern. Islam and themodern West share a common Abrahamic traditionand their foundational sources; Islamic law and philosophyand Western enlightenment philosophy havecommon roots—Hellenistic reason and Biblical revelation.The two civilizations have a common past anda common future, particularly in the light of strongeconomic relations between the West and the Muslimworld and the growing presence of Islam in nearlyevery Western society.Because the future of the two civilizations is inseparable,any clash will be devastating to both, regardlessof the asymmetry of power. A clash between Islamand the modern West would be like a collisionbetween the present and the future for both. Islam isintegral to the future of the West and Islamic civilization’sreticence toward modernity is untenable.Eventually, the Muslim world will have to modernize,democratize, and recognize that its future, それも, isinterdependent. Neither the West nor the Muslimworld can imagine a mutually exclusive future.

ムスリム同胞団の未来

アムルアルChobaki


The Muslim Brotherhood managed to maintain its organizational existence since its establishment in 1928, by the late Hasan Al-Banna. Throughout eight decades, it has managed to exist as a religious movement as well as a political and social organization. これ, on one hand, helped it to be sufficiently strong to be distinguished from other political powers, but also made it weak and feeble in some other ways.

The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement is similar to other Egyptian political movements, as it was established at the time of the royal regime and a semi-liberal era. It clashed with the government during the time of President `Abd Al-Nasser, adapted to the regime of President Sadat, and tended to fluctuate in its relationship with President Mubarak, しかし、, the relationship was based on partial elimination, just like the state during the age of President `Abd Al-Nasser. また, it has been outlawed for most of its history; 以来 1954 until the present time (つまり、. more than half a century).

The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to be both a witness and a party in the political and cultural dispute in Egypt and the Arab countries, throughout different historical periods; Egypt in the time of the royal regime and in the time of the republic with its three stages. This dispute was about issues of identity and cultural belonging, the relationship between the religion – on one handand politics, the East and the West on the other hand, as well as the coming and the inherited. The Muslim Brotherhood had a flexible political and intellectual reference that gave it a comprehensive conception of Islam.

エジプトのムスリム同胞団のイデオロギーの現在の動向

ディーアール. イスラエル他サイトオルトマン

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last twoyears has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up fordissent. 私達と一緒に. およびヨーロッパのサポート, local opposition groups have been able to takeinitiative, 彼らの原因を前進させ、国家から譲歩を引き出す. The EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood movement (メガバイト), which has been officially outlawed as a politicalorganization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks.Western governments, アメリカ合衆国政府を含む, are consideringthe MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advancedemocracy in their countries, そしておそらくイスラム教徒のテロリズムを根絶することにおいても. Couldthe Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) とインドネシアの福祉正義党 (MCC), twoIslamist parties that, 一部のアナリストによると, are successfully adapting to the rules ofliberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with,それぞれ, ヨーロッパと「異教の」アジア?この記事では、MBが新しい現実にどのように対応したかを検証します, how it has handledthe ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the pasttwo years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to newcircumstances? その目的と政治秩序のビジョンは何ですか? How has itreacted to U.S. 序曲と改革と民主化キャンペーンへ? How has itnavigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forceson the other, 国が秋の2つの劇的な選挙に向かって進んだとき 2005? Towhat extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt toward liberaldemocracy?

イスラム教徒のアメリカ人の中産階級と主に主流

ピューリサーチセンター

Muslims constitute a growing and increasingly important segment of American society.Yet there is surprisingly little quantitative research about the attitudes and opinions of thissegment of the public for two reasons. 最初, アメリカ. Census is forbidden by law from askingquestions about religious belief and affiliation, と, as a result, we know very little about thebasic demographic characteristics of Muslim Americans. 2番, Muslim Americans comprisesuch a small percentage of the U.S. population that general population surveys do not interview asufficient number of them to allow for meaningful analysis.This Pew Research Center study is therefore the first ever nationwide survey to attempt tomeasure rigorously the demographics, attitudes and experiences of Muslim Americans. It buildson surveys conducted in 2006 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project of Muslim minority publics inGreat Britain, フランス, Germany and Spain. The Muslim American survey also follows on Pew’sglobal surveys conducted over the past five years with more than 30,000 Muslims in 22 nationsaround the world since 2002.The methodological approach employed was the most comprehensive ever used to studyMuslim Americans. Nearly 60,000 respondents were interviewed to find a representative sampleof Muslims. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, Urdu and Farsi, as well as English. Subsamplesof the national poll were large enough to explore how various subgroups of thepopulationincluding recent immigrants, native-born converts, and selected ethnic groupsincluding those of Arab, Pakistani, and African American heritagediffer in their attitudesThe survey also contrasts the views of the Muslim population as a whole with those ofthe U.S. general population, and with the attitudes of Muslims all around the world, includingWestern Europe. ついに, findings from the survey make important contributions to the debateover the total size of the Muslim American population.The survey is a collaborative effort of a number of Pew Research Center projects,including the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, the Pew Forum on Religion &Public Life and the Pew Hispanic Center. The project was overseen by Pew Research CenterPresident Andrew Kohut and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Director Luis Lugo. ThePew Research Center’s Director of Survey Research, Scott Keeter, served as project director forthe study, with the close assistance of Gregory Smith, Research Fellow at the Pew Forum. Manyother Pew researchers participated in the design, execution and analysis of the survey.

北米での兄弟: 小史

ダグラスファラー

ロンサンディー


聖地財団救済開発のための反対、現在の連邦裁判所の場合 (別ファイルを参照) in Dallas, Texas,1 offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, as well as its goals and structure. The documents discuss recruitment, organization, ideology and the development of the organization in different phases in the United States. The prosecution in the case has presented many internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980’s and early 1990’s that give a first-ever, public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) in the U.S. over the past four decades. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the Ikhwan leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources.

ウィル政治はエジプトのムスリム同胞団を飼いならす?

08004マクファーカー


CAIRO, 12月. 7 – When stumping through the port city of Alexandria, whose crumbling mansions and rickety tram lines evoke long-faded glory, Sobhe Saleh of the Muslim Brotherhood vowed he had a different vision for Egypt’s future.

If Islam were applied, no one would be hungry,” he roared recently to a crowd of fully veiled women ululating with joy. “Islam is a religion of construction. Islam is a religion of investment. Islam is a religion of development.

Religion, 実際には, should profoundly alter both Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy, said Mr. Saleh, a 52-year-old lawyer with a clipped helmet of steel-gray hair.

If Islam were applied, the television would not show us prostitution and people lacking all decency!” he declared. “If Islam were applied, Iraq could not have been invaded, Israel could not occupy Jerusalem, and aggression could not have been used to humiliate Muslims everywhere!”

A long-expected day of reckoning is at hand in Egyptian politics now that the Brotherhood, an illegal organization with a violent past, is entering the corridors of power for the first time in significant numbers.

The outcome of the freest election in more than 50 years could determine whether political Islam will turn Egypt into a repressive, anti-American theocracy or if Islamic parties across the Arab world will themselves be transformed by participating in mainstream politics.

No sudden earthquake is expected. But initial results from the final round of voting on Wednesday showed that the Brotherhood had gained at least 12 more seats to bring its total to 88, with seven races from all three rounds still unsettled, according to a spokesman. That is five times the 17 seats the group won in 2000.

エジプトのガバナンスプロファイル

モニークナーディロケット

Mamadi Kourouma

Major political developments since 1990Egypt is constitutionally a democratic republic based on a multiparty system. Th e 1971 Constitutionprovides for the separation of powers between the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. Noconstitutional changes have taken place in Egypt since 1980. の中に 1980 referendum, the currentpresident, ホスニムバラクエジプト大統領, assumed offi ce with a two-thirds majority vote of the People’s Assembly(PA). (Th e president is currently in his fourth presidential term.) He holds wide-ranging authoritiesand is the supreme commander of the armed forces, chair of the higher council for policeagencies, and the higher council for judicial entities. Th e president nominates ministers, appoints10 of the 454 members of the PA and 88 of the 264 members of the Shura Council, appoints anddismisses governors, university chairs, and other high ranking offi cials (to be further discussed insection on “Institutional Eff ectiveness”).Th e president is also the chair of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which has been inpower since it was established by former President Anwar Sadat in 1978 and eff ectively controlslocal government, メディア, and the public sector.Egypt’s 16 legally registered opposition parties’ ability to compete has been frustrated by theNDP’s dominance in the PA with a large majority of almost 90% (Figure 1). しかし、, NDP hasexperienced a disappointing result in the parliamentary elections of 2000, which has prompted thesubstantial changes introduced to reform the party led by the President’s son Gamal Mubarak.

イスラム主義者の関与と民主主義の促進

モナYacoubian

民主主義の変化をイスラム過激派に対する長期的な解毒剤と見なす, ブッシュ政権は、アフガニスタンとイラクへの軍事介入とアラブ世界の民主主義を促進するための強化された努力を結びつけました。, 自由で公正な選挙の必要性を強調する. 現在まで, さまざまな開放性の議会選挙が地域全体で行われています, モロッコからクウェートへ. 選挙はイスラム主義の勝利の波をもたらしました, 多くの人から「イスラム津波」と呼ばれています。 1イスラム主義者の成功は、人気のある反対派の手段としての有効性に端を発しています。. リベラルながら, 世俗的な野党は、大部分の人口から切り離されたままです, イスラム主義者は、慈善団体やモスクを通じて、広大で簡単に動員できる草の根ネットワークを開発してきました。. リーダーシップはしばしば若く、よりダイナミックです, コミュニティとの強いつながりを持つ, そして党組織はエネルギーとアイデアで溢れています, 変化を求める人々を引き付ける米国. 政府は、数年間、この地域全体で多数の穏健で合法的なイスラム党と静かに関与してきました。, 時には通常の外交活動を通じて, 時には米国への政府資金による助成金を通じて. 組織. この特別報告書は、米国が資金提供する法務への関与を検証します, 国立民主研究所を通じた非暴力イスラム党 (は) と共和党国際研究所 (IRI), 地域でイスラム主義者と関わった最も豊富な経験を持っている, モロッコに焦点を当てています, ジョーダン, とイエメン, 彼らの相対的な政治的開放性と彼らのイスラム教徒の政治的反対の強さと活気のために。成功した戦略. 成功したイスラム主義者の関与戦略は、個人に力を与え、制度を強化して透明性を高める, より多くの説明責任, 適度にシフトします. 個人を訓練し、権限を与えることは、政党内で穏健派を育成し、彼らの政治的洗練と影響力を強化します. その間, アラブ世界の政権が政治改革に抵抗したり操作したりするとき, 民主主義のインフラストラクチャを強化することは、個人を支援することと同じくらい重要です. 独立した選挙手続きと監視は、自由で公正な選挙を確立するのに役立ちます. 制度構築は、行政権と強力な法の支配の適切なチェックを確実にします. 議会の強化は特に重要です, イスラム主義者は主に立法府に参加しているため、イスラム主義者の政党が米国に応じて緩和したかどうかを評価する際に. 婚約, それ自体が相対的で主観的である可能性のあるシフトを定量化または測定することは、不可能ではないにしても困難です。. より大きな節度を特定の米国に直接リンクする. エンゲージメント活動も非常に問題があります. せいぜい, このエンゲージメントは貢献要因と見なされるべきです. それにもかかわらず, モロッコでの暫定的な結果, ジョーダン, そしてイエメンは中程度のイスラム主義者との継続的な関与が奨励されるべきであるほど十分に有望です, 制度構築に重点を置き、過激主義と節度の間のイスラム世界におけるイデオロギーの戦いのより広い文脈に目を向けているが.