RSS所有条目标记为: "政治伊斯兰教"

阿拉伯明天

大卫·B. OTTAWAY

十月 6, 1981, 本来是在埃及庆祝的一天. 它标志着埃及在三项阿以冲突中取得最伟大胜利的周年纪念日, 在开国之日,该国的失败者军队冲过苏伊士运河 1973 赎罪日战争,使以色列军队退缩. 酷, 万里无云的早晨, 开罗体育馆里挤满了埃及家庭,他们前来参观是为了看准军事力量。, 总统安瓦尔·萨达特,战争的建筑师, 人和机器在他面前游行时满意地看着. 我在附近, 刚到的外国记者, 六架幻影喷气式飞机在杂技表演中高高呼啸,其中一辆军车直接停在了检阅台前, 用长长的红色画天空, 黄色, 紫色,和绿色的烟雾. 萨达特站了起来, 显然准备与另一支埃及军队交换礼炮. 他使自己成为四名从卡车上跳下来的伊斯兰刺客的理想目标。, 冲上领奖台, 随着子弹的杀手不断地向他们的致命之火喷洒架子, 我考虑了一下是跌倒在地,冒着被惊恐的观众踩死的危险,还是保持脚步并冒着流弹的风险. 本能告诉我要站稳脚跟, 我的新闻责任感促使我去寻找萨达特是活着还是死了.

关于等度遗产和伊斯兰政治思想的注释: 教育的例子

詹姆斯·缪尔

人类历史的一个不幸特征是宗教差异和冲突倾向于用无知和偏见的毒酒滋养自己. 虽然有时可以做很多事情来减少偏见, 在我看来,学者和教育工作者应该主要关注减少无知的更基本和持久的目标. 一个人在减少无知方面的成功——包括自己的——将取决于一个人的动机.
伊斯兰教育哲学的研究可能受到当前实际问题的推动: 英国穆斯林渴望拥有伊斯兰学校, 无论是私人资助还是国家资助, 是一个典型的例子. 从教育哲学的角度, 然而, 这样的动机是极其狭隘的, circumscribed by the concepts and categories of the local political disputes of the moment. For those motivated by a desire for knowledge and understanding of a tradition outside their own, it is most doubtful that any study of Islamic philosophy restricted by current practical concerns can be at all productive. There is no simple correspondence between knowledge and “relevance.”
There must, 然而, be some connection between two traditions of thought and practice if there is to be a point of departure, and a point of entry, which allows the scholar to step from one tradition to another. The legacy of Isocrates may constitute one such point of departure, which will help us to understand the relation between two traditions, the classical Greek and the Islamic. The dominance of the Isocratic legacy in Western education is well established and widely known among historians, classicists
and political philosophers, although awareness of it has only just begun to surface among educationists.2 Similarly, the Isocratic legacy to education (and the rich tradition of Arabic Platonism in philosophy) has in uenced Islamic thought, though in ways that are
still not yet well understood. The intention of this paper is to suggest that a modiŽ ed form of the Isocratic educational tradition is a fundamental component of Islamic political thought, 即, Islamic educational thought. This general wording of the intention of this paper in terms of Islamic political thought may give rise to a misunderstanding. 伊斯兰教, 当然, is regarded by its adherents as a uniŽ ed and universal system of belief and behaviour.

伊斯兰教与新政治格局

莱斯回来, 迈克尔·基思, 阿兹拉汗,
Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos

IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 九月 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 和 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006A; Mirza et al., 2007). 对伊斯兰主义和圣战主义的研究特别关注伊斯兰宗教信仰与社会运动和政治动员形式之间的融合和复杂联系 (侯赛因, 2007; 凯佩尔, 2004, 2006; 麦克罗伊, 2006; 内维尔-琼斯等人。, 2006, 2007; 菲利普斯, 2006; 罗伊, 2004, 2006). 传统上, 分析重点突出了伊斯兰文化, 信徒的信仰体系, 以及全世界穆斯林人口的历史和地理轨迹,特别是在“西方” (阿巴斯, 2005; 安萨里, 2002; 伊德和加宾, 2002; 侯赛因, 2006; 模式, 2005; 斋月, 1999, 2005). 这篇文章的侧重点不同. 我们认为,伊斯兰政治参与的研究需要仔细地进行背景化,而不是求助于关于文化和信仰的宏大概括. 这是因为文化和信仰都是由文化构成的,反过来又构成了文化。, 表达它们的制度性和审议性景观. 以英国经验为例, 基督教在上世纪福利国家形成中的隐匿痕迹, 快速变化的政治空间制图和“信仰组织”在福利提供重组中的作用产生了物质社会背景,决定了新的政治参与形式的机会和轮廓.

西方的伊斯兰教

乔斯琳·塞萨里

穆斯林移民欧洲, 北美, 澳大利亚和随后发展起来的复杂的社会宗教动态使西方的伊斯兰教成为一个引人注目的新研究领域. 萨尔曼·拉什迪事件, 头巾争议, 对世贸中心的袭击, 以及对丹麦漫画的愤怒都是国际危机的例子,这些危机揭示了西方穆斯林与全球穆斯林世界之间的联系. 这些新情况对当代伊斯兰教的研究带来了理论和方法上的挑战, 我们避免将伊斯兰教或穆斯林本质化并抵制专注于安全和恐怖主义的话语的修辞结构已变得至关重要.
在本文中, 我认为伊斯兰教作为一种宗教传统是一个未知领域. 造成这种情况的一个初步原因是宗教作为研究对象没有达成共识. 宗教, 作为一门学科, 已成为历史之间的撕裂, 社会学, 和诠释学方法. 与伊斯兰教, 情况更加复杂. 在西方, 伊斯兰教研究始于东方学的一个分支,因此走上了一条与宗教研究不同的独特道路. 尽管对东方主义的批判对于伊斯兰研究在社会科学领域的出现起到了核心作用, 伊斯兰主义者与人类学家和社会学家之间的紧张关系仍然很强烈. 伊斯兰教和西方穆斯林的话题嵌入在这场斗争中. 这种方法论紧张的一个含义是,开始他们在法国学习伊斯兰教的学术生涯的伊斯兰教学生, 德国, 或者美国认为建立伊斯兰学者的信誉具有挑战性, 尤其是在北美学术界
语境.

伊斯兰教, 民主 & 美国:

科尔多瓦基金会

阿卜杜拉·法利克 |

介绍 ,


尽管这是一场长期而复杂的辩论, Arches Quarterly 从神学和实践的角度重新审视, 关于伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系和兼容性的重要辩论, 正如巴拉克奥巴马的希望和变革议程所呼应的那样. 虽然许多人庆祝奥巴马登上椭圆形办公室作为美国的全国宣泄者, 其他人对国际舞台上意识形态和方法的转变仍然不乐观. 虽然穆斯林世界和美国之间的许多紧张局势和不信任可归因于促进民主的方法, 通常偏爱专制政权和伪造政权,这些政权为民主价值观和人权提供口红, 余震 9/11 通过美国在政治伊斯兰上的立场,确实进一步加剧了担忧. 它创造了由worldpublicopinion.org发现的负面墙, 根据该 67% 的埃及人认为,全球范围内,美国正在扮演“主要消极”角色.
因此,美国的反应很贴切. 通过选举奥巴马, 世界各地的许多人都寄希望于发展一个不太好战的人, 但对穆斯林世界更公平的外交政策. 奥巴马的考验, 当我们讨论, 是美国及其盟友促进民主的方式. 它会促进还是强加?
而且, 它能否成为长期冲突地区的诚实经纪人?? 吸收 prolifi 的专业知识和洞察力
c学者, 学者, 经验丰富的记者和政治家, Arches Quarterly 揭示了伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系以及美国的角色——以及奥巴马带来的变化, 在寻求共同点. 阿纳斯·阿尔蒂克里蒂, The e Cordoba Foundation 的首席执行官为这次讨论提供了开场白, 他反思了奥巴马道路上的希望和挑战. 跟随 Altikriti, 尼克松总统的前顾问, 罗伯特·克莱恩(Robert Craneoff)博士对伊斯兰自由权原则进行了透彻的分析. 安瓦尔·易卜拉欣, 马来西亚前副总理, 通过在穆斯林占主导地位的社会中实施民主的实际现实来丰富讨论, 即, 在印度尼西亚和马来西亚.
我们也有Shireen Hunter博士, 乔治敦大学, 美国, 探索落后于民主化和现代化的穆斯林国家. 恐怖主义作家对此予以补充, 纳菲兹·艾哈迈德(Nafeez Ahmed)博士对后现代危机和
民主的灭亡. Daud Abdullah博士 (中东媒体监控总监), 艾伦·哈特 (前ITN和BBC Panorama通讯员; 犹太复国主义的作者: 犹太人的真正敌人) 和Asem Sondos (埃及《 Sawt Al Omma》杂志编辑) 专注于奥巴马及其在穆斯林世界促进民主方面的作用, 以及美国与以色列和穆斯林兄弟会的关系.
外交部长, 马尔代夫, 艾哈迈德·沙希德 (Ahmed Shaheed) 推测伊斯兰教和民主的未来; 克莱尔. 格里·麦克洛克林
– 因爱尔兰共和党活动而入狱四年的新芬党成员和吉尔福德的活动家 4 和伯明翰 6, 反映了他最近去加沙的旅行,在那里他目睹了对巴勒斯坦人的残暴和不公正的影响; 玛丽·布林-史密斯博士, 激进化和当代政治暴力研究中心主任讨论批判性研究政治恐怖的挑战; 哈立德·穆巴拉克博士, 作家和剧作家, 讨论达尔富尔和平的前景; 最后,记者和人权活动家 Ashur Shamis 批判性地审视了当今穆斯林的民主化和政治化.
我们希望所有这些都有助于在新的希望曙光中对影响我们所有人的问题进行全面的阅读和反思.
谢谢

美国哈马斯政策阻碍中东和平

亨利·西格曼


过去的双边会谈失败 16 多年的经验表明,中东和平协议永远不可能靠各方自己达成. 以色列政府相信他们可以无视国际社会对其在约旦河西岸的非法殖民项目的谴责,因为他们可以指望美国反对国际制裁. 不受美国制定的参数框架的双边会谈 (根据安全理事会决议, 奥斯陆协定, 阿拉伯和平倡议, “路线图”和其他以前的巴以协议) 不能成功. 以色列政府认为,美国国会不会允许美国总统发布此类参数并要求其接受. 9月在华盛顿特区恢复双边会谈有什么希望 2 完全取决于奥巴马总统证明这种信念是错误的, 以及他承诺的“过渡建议”是否, 如果谈判陷入僵局, 是提交美式参数的委婉说法. 这样的美国倡议必须为以色列在其 1967 年前边界内的安全提供铁定的保证, 但同时必须明确指出,如果以色列坚持不让巴勒斯坦人在约旦河西岸和加沙建立一个可行的主权国家,这些保证是不可用的. 本文重点讨论永久地位协议的另一个主要障碍: 缺乏有效的巴勒斯坦对话者. 解决哈马斯的正当不满——正如中央司令部最近的一份报告所指出的那样, 哈马斯有正当的不满——可能导致其重返巴勒斯坦联合政府,为以色列提供可靠的和平伙伴. 如果由于哈马斯的拒绝主义而导致外展失败, 该组织阻止其他巴勒斯坦政党谈判达成的合理协议的能力将受到严重阻碍. 如果奥巴马政府不领导一项国际倡议,以定义巴以协议的内容,并积极促进巴勒斯坦政治和解, 欧洲必须这样做, 希望美国能效法. 不幸, 没有银弹可以保证“两国在和平与安全中并存”的目标。
但是,奥巴马总统目前的做法绝对不能.

再谈伊斯兰教

马哈·阿扎姆(MAHA AZZAM)

围绕所谓的伊斯兰教存在着政治和安全危机, 一场先例已久的危机 9/11. 在过去的 25 年份, 关于如何解释和打击伊斯兰教有不同的侧重点. 分析师和决策者
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
由于恐怖袭击反过来影响了对移民的态度,西方对伊斯兰教的敌意和恐惧日益加剧,今天的情况变得更加复杂, 宗教和文化. umma 或信徒社区的边界已从穆斯林国家延伸到欧洲城市. 只要有穆斯林社区,乌玛就可能存在. 在融入周围社区的感觉不明确且歧视可能很明显的环境中,共同信仰的归属感会增加. 对社会价值观的排斥越大,
无论是在西方还是在穆斯林国家, 伊斯兰教作为一种文化认同和价值体系的道德力量得到更大的巩固.
在伦敦发生爆炸事件之后 7 七月 2005 越来越明显的是,一些年轻人将宗教承诺作为表达种族的一种方式. 全球穆斯林之间的联系以及他们认为穆斯林易受伤害的看法,导致世界不同地区的许多人将当地的困境融入到更广泛的穆斯林困境中, 有文化认同, 主要或部分, 具有广泛定义的伊斯兰教.

全球反恐战争中的精准:

Sherifa Zuhur

九月之后的七年 11, 2001 (9/11) 攻击, 许多专家认为,基地组织已经恢复了力量,其模仿者或分支机构比以前更具杀伤力. 国家情报估计 2007 断言基地组织现在比以前更危险 9/11.1 基地组织的模仿者继续威胁西方, 中东, 和欧洲国家, 就像在九月被挫败的情节一样 2007 在德国. 布鲁斯·里德尔说: 很大程度上要归功于华盛顿急于进入伊拉克而不是追捕基地组织的领导人, 该组织现在在巴基斯坦的荒地拥有坚实的业务基础,并在伊拉克西部拥有有效的特许经营权. 它的影响力遍及整个穆斯林世界和欧洲 . . . 奥萨马·本·拉登开展了一场成功的宣传活动. . . . 他的想法现在吸引了比以往更多的追随者.
确实,各种萨拉菲圣战组织仍在整个伊斯兰世界中出现. 为什么对我们称之为全球圣战的伊斯兰恐怖主义的大量资源反应没有证明非常有效?
转向“软实力”工具,” 西方在全球反恐战争中支持穆斯林的努力效果如何? (长城汽车)? 为什么美国在更广泛的伊斯兰世界中赢得如此少的“民心”? 为什么美国在这个问题上的战略信息在该地区发挥如此糟糕? 为什么, 尽管穆斯林普遍反对极端主义,正如主要穆斯林领导人的调查和官方言论所示, 约旦和巴基斯坦对本拉登的支持实际上有所增加?
本专着不会重新审视伊斯兰暴力的起源. 相反,它关注的是一种错误地构建 GWOT 并阻止穆斯林支持它的概念上的失败. 他们无法认同提议的变革性对策,因为他们将自己的一些核心信念和制度视为目标
这种努力.
几个严重成问题的趋势混淆了美国对 GWOT 的概念化以及为打这场战争而制定的战略信息. 这些演变自 (1) 对穆斯林和穆斯林占多数的国家的后殖民政治方法差异很大,因此产生了相互矛盾和令人困惑的印象和效果; 和 (2) 对伊斯兰教和次区域文化的普遍无知和偏见. 增加美国人的愤怒, 恐惧, 和对致命事件的焦虑 9/11, 和某些元素, 尽管有冷静的头脑的敦促, 让穆斯林和他们的宗教为他们的同教者的罪行负责, 或出于政治原因认为这样做有用的人.

民主, 选举和埃及穆斯林兄弟会

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (兆字节), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

埃及的穆斯林兄弟: 对抗或整合?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 选举. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. 同时, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

伊斯兰教与民主

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

寻找伊斯兰宪政

纳迪西亚·霍根

While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. 例如, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. As
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. 然而, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
First, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts

埃及穆斯林兄弟会的组织连续性

苔丝·李·艾森哈特

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (兄弟会) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, 然而, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

博士致辞,穆罕默德·巴迪

博士,穆罕默德·巴迪

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (兆字节) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; therefore, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.

昨天和今天之间

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in 它, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, 和 provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
然后, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. 这 Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

一个穆斯林群岛

最大L. 毛

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.