RSS所有条目标记为: "巴勒斯坦"

保守主义和伊斯兰主义之间的女权主义: 巴勒斯坦的情况

博士, Islah Jad |

在西岸和加沙地带举行了立法选举。 2006 掌权的伊斯兰运动哈马斯, 后来组成了巴勒斯坦立法委员会的多数席位,也是哈马斯的第一多数席位政府. 这些选举导致任命了第一位哈马斯女部长, 成为妇女事务部长. 三月之间 2006 和六月 2007, 两名不同的哈马斯女部长上任, 但两人都发现很难管理该部,因为该部的大多数雇员不是哈马斯成员,而是属于其他政党, 大多数是法塔赫的成员, 控制大多数巴勒斯坦权力机构机构的主导运动. 在哈马斯在加沙地带掌权并导致其政府在西岸倒台后,妇女事务部哈马斯妇女与法塔赫女性成员之间的紧张斗争期结束——一场斗争有时会发生剧烈的转变. 后来引用来解释这场斗争的一个原因是世俗女权主义话语和伊斯兰主义关于妇女问题的话语之间的区别. 在巴勒斯坦的背景下,这种分歧具有危险性,因为它被用来证明使血腥的政治斗争永存。, 将哈马斯妇女从其职务或职位上撤职, 以及当时在西岸和被占领的加沙地带普遍存在的政治和地理鸿沟.
这场斗争提出了一些重要的问题: 我们应该惩罚已经掌权的伊斯兰运动吗, 还是我们应该考虑导致法塔赫在政治舞台上失败的原因? 女权主义可以为女性提供一个全面的框架吗, 不论他们的社会和意识形态有何关系? 对女性具有共同点的论述可以帮助她们实现并达成共同目标? 家长制仅存在于伊斯兰意识形态中吗, 而不是民族主义和爱国主义? 我们所说的女权主义是什么意思? 是否只有一种女权主义, 或几种女权主义? 我们所说的伊斯兰教是什么意思 – 是这个名字或宗教所知道的运动吗, 哲学, 或法律制度? 我们需要深入了解这些问题并仔细考虑, 我们必须同意它们,以便我们以后可以决定, 作为女权主义者, 如果我们对家长作风的批评应该针对宗教 (信仰), 应该局限在信徒的心里,不能控制整个世界, 或法理, 它涉及不同的信仰流派,这些流派解释了《古兰经》中包含的法律制度和先知的言论 – 圣训.

伊斯兰妇女在被占巴勒斯坦的行动

Khaled Amayreh的采访

Sameera Al-Halayka 访谈

Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. 她

出生在希伯伦附近的肖尤赫村 1964. 她拥有伊斯兰教法学士学位 (伊斯兰

法理) 来自希伯伦大学. 她曾是一名记者 1996 至 2006 什么时候

she entered the Palestinian Legislative Council as an elected member in the 2006 选举.

她已婚并育有七个孩子.

问: 在一些西方国家,女性接受的普遍印象

伊斯兰抵抗组织内的低劣待遇, 比如哈马斯. 这是真的?

哈马斯如何对待女性活动家?
穆斯林妇女的权利和义务首先来自伊斯兰教法或法律.

它们不是我们从哈马斯或任何人那里收到的自愿或慈善行为或姿态

别的. 因此, 就政治参与和行动而言, 女性一般都有

与男性相同的权利和义务. 毕竟, 女性至少弥补 50 的百分比

社会. 在某种意义上, 他们是整个社会,因为他们生, 并提高,

新一代.

所以, 我可以说,哈马斯内部的妇女地位完全符合她的要求

在伊斯兰教本身的地位. 这意味着她是各个级别的全面合作伙伴. 的确, 这将是

对伊斯兰教徒来说是不公平和不公正的 (或伊斯兰主义者,如果你愿意) 女人成为痛苦的伙伴

而她被排除在决策过程之外. 这就是为什么女人扮演的角色

哈马斯一直在开拓.

问: 您是否觉得哈马斯内部出现女性政治激进主义是

符合古典伊斯兰概念的自然发展

关于妇女的地位和作用, 还是仅仅是对

现代性的压力和政治行动的要求以及持续的

以色列占领?

伊斯兰法学和哈马斯宪章中没有任何文字禁止女性

政治参与. 我相信事实正好相反 — 有许多古兰经经文

和先知穆罕默德的格言敦促妇女积极参与政治和公共事务

影响穆斯林的问题. 但对于女性来说,这也是事实, 就像男人一样, 政治活动

不是强制性的,而是自愿的, 并且很大程度上取决于每个女人的能力,

资格和个人情况. 尽管如此, 关心公众

每个穆斯林男人和女人都必须遵守. 先知

穆罕默德说: “不关心穆斯林事务的人不是穆斯林。”

而且, 巴勒斯坦伊斯兰主义妇女必须将实地的所有客观因素纳入

决定是否加入政治或参与政治活动时的帐户.


职业, 殖民主义, 种族隔离?

人类科学研究委员会

南非人文科学研究委员会委托进行这项研究,以检验 John Dugard 教授在 1 月份提交给联合国人权理事会的报告中提出的假设 2007, 以联合国以色列占领的巴勒斯坦领土人权状况特别报告员的身份 (即, 西岸, 包括东耶路撒冷, 和
加沙, 以后选择). Dugard教授提出了这个问题: 以色列显然是对被占领土的军事占领. 同时, 占领的因素构成殖民主义和种族隔离的形式, 违反国际法的. 具有殖民主义和种族隔离特征的长期占领政权对被占领人民的法律后果是什么, 占领国和第三国?
为了考虑这些后果, 这项研究旨在合法地检查杜加德教授问题的前提: 以色列是 OPT 的占领者吗, 和, 如果是这样, 它对这些领土的占领是否构成殖民主义或种族隔离? 鉴于其痛苦的种族隔离历史,南非对这些问题有着明显的兴趣, 这意味着否认自决
对其大多数人口和, 在占领纳米比亚期间, 将种族隔离扩大到南非有效地寻求殖民的领土. 这些非法做法绝不能在其他地方复制: 其他民族绝不能像南非和纳米比亚人民那样遭受苦难.
探索这些问题, 组建了一个国际学者团队. 该项目的目的是从国际法的无党派角度审视局势, 而不是参与政治话语和修辞. 这项研究是为期 15 个月的深入研究协作过程的结果, 咨询, 写作和审查. 它总结和, 这是值得期待的, 有说服力地论证并清楚地表明,以色列, 自从 1967, 一直是 OPT 的交战占领国, 并且它对这些领土的占领已成为实施种族隔离制度的殖民企业. 交战占领本身并不是非法情况: 它被认为是武装冲突的可能后果. 同时, 根据武装冲突法 (也称为国际人道法), 占领只是一种暂时的状态. 国际法禁止以武力威胁或使用武力的方式单方面吞并或永久获取领土: 如果发生这种情况, 任何国家不得承认或支持由此产生的非法情况. 相对于职业, 殖民主义和种族隔离总是非法的,并且确实被认为是特别严重的违反国际法的行为,因为它们从根本上违背了国际法律秩序的核心价值观. 殖民主义违反自决原则,
其中国际法院 (国际法院) 被确认为“当代国际法的基本原则之一”. 所有国家都有义务尊重和促进自决. 种族隔离是种族歧视的严重案例, 根据《禁止并惩治种族隔离罪行国际公约》构成 (1973,
此后的“种族隔离公约”) “为了建立和维持一个种族群体对任何其他种族群体的统治并有系统地压迫他们而实施的不人道行为”. 种族隔离的做法, 而且, 是国际犯罪.
Dugard 教授在其向联合国人权理事会提交的报告中 2007 建议应就以色列行为的法律后果征求国际法院的咨询意见. 这一咨询意见无疑将补充国际法院在 2004 关于在被占巴勒斯坦领土修建隔离墙的法律后果 (此后的“墙咨询意见”). 这一法律行动过程并未穷尽国际社会可以选择的选项, 第三国和国际组织在被评估为另一国从事殖民主义或种族隔离做法时的义务.

伊斯兰教, 民主 & 美国:

科尔多瓦基金会

阿卜杜拉·法利克 |

介绍 ,


尽管这是一场长期而复杂的辩论, Arches Quarterly 从神学和实践的角度重新审视, 关于伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系和兼容性的重要辩论, 正如巴拉克奥巴马的希望和变革议程所呼应的那样. 虽然许多人庆祝奥巴马登上椭圆形办公室作为美国的全国宣泄者, 其他人对国际舞台上意识形态和方法的转变仍然不乐观. 虽然穆斯林世界和美国之间的许多紧张局势和不信任可归因于促进民主的方法, 通常偏爱专制政权和伪造政权,这些政权为民主价值观和人权提供口红, 余震 9/11 通过美国在政治伊斯兰上的立场,确实进一步加剧了担忧. 它创造了由worldpublicopinion.org发现的负面墙, 根据该 67% 的埃及人认为,全球范围内,美国正在扮演“主要消极”角色.
因此,美国的反应很贴切. 通过选举奥巴马, 世界各地的许多人都寄希望于发展一个不太好战的人, 但对穆斯林世界更公平的外交政策. 奥巴马的考验, 当我们讨论, 是美国及其盟友促进民主的方式. 它会促进还是强加?
而且, 它能否成为长期冲突地区的诚实经纪人?? 吸收 prolifi 的专业知识和洞察力
c学者, 学者, 经验丰富的记者和政治家, Arches Quarterly 揭示了伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系以及美国的角色——以及奥巴马带来的变化, 在寻求共同点. 阿纳斯·阿尔蒂克里蒂, The e Cordoba Foundation 的首席执行官为这次讨论提供了开场白, 他反思了奥巴马道路上的希望和挑战. 跟随 Altikriti, 尼克松总统的前顾问, 罗伯特·克莱恩(Robert Craneoff)博士对伊斯兰自由权原则进行了透彻的分析. 安瓦尔·易卜拉欣, 马来西亚前副总理, 通过在穆斯林占主导地位的社会中实施民主的实际现实来丰富讨论, 即, 在印度尼西亚和马来西亚.
我们也有Shireen Hunter博士, 乔治敦大学, 美国, 探索落后于民主化和现代化的穆斯林国家. 恐怖主义作家对此予以补充, 纳菲兹·艾哈迈德(Nafeez Ahmed)博士对后现代危机和
民主的灭亡. Daud Abdullah博士 (中东媒体监控总监), 艾伦·哈特 (前ITN和BBC Panorama通讯员; 犹太复国主义的作者: 犹太人的真正敌人) 和Asem Sondos (埃及《 Sawt Al Omma》杂志编辑) 专注于奥巴马及其在穆斯林世界促进民主方面的作用, 以及美国与以色列和穆斯林兄弟会的关系.
外交部长, 马尔代夫, 艾哈迈德·沙希德 (Ahmed Shaheed) 推测伊斯兰教和民主的未来; 克莱尔. 格里·麦克洛克林
– 因爱尔兰共和党活动而入狱四年的新芬党成员和吉尔福德的活动家 4 和伯明翰 6, 反映了他最近去加沙的旅行,在那里他目睹了对巴勒斯坦人的残暴和不公正的影响; 玛丽·布林-史密斯博士, 激进化和当代政治暴力研究中心主任讨论批判性研究政治恐怖的挑战; 哈立德·穆巴拉克博士, 作家和剧作家, 讨论达尔富尔和平的前景; 最后,记者和人权活动家 Ashur Shamis 批判性地审视了当今穆斯林的民主化和政治化.
我们希望所有这些都有助于在新的希望曙光中对影响我们所有人的问题进行全面的阅读和反思.
谢谢

美国哈马斯政策阻碍中东和平

亨利·西格曼


过去的双边会谈失败 16 多年的经验表明,中东和平协议永远不可能靠各方自己达成. 以色列政府相信他们可以无视国际社会对其在约旦河西岸的非法殖民项目的谴责,因为他们可以指望美国反对国际制裁. 不受美国制定的参数框架的双边会谈 (根据安全理事会决议, 奥斯陆协定, 阿拉伯和平倡议, “路线图”和其他以前的巴以协议) 不能成功. 以色列政府认为,美国国会不会允许美国总统发布此类参数并要求其接受. 9月在华盛顿特区恢复双边会谈有什么希望 2 完全取决于奥巴马总统证明这种信念是错误的, 以及他承诺的“过渡建议”是否, 如果谈判陷入僵局, 是提交美式参数的委婉说法. 这样的美国倡议必须为以色列在其 1967 年前边界内的安全提供铁定的保证, 但同时必须明确指出,如果以色列坚持不让巴勒斯坦人在约旦河西岸和加沙建立一个可行的主权国家,这些保证是不可用的. 本文重点讨论永久地位协议的另一个主要障碍: 缺乏有效的巴勒斯坦对话者. 解决哈马斯的正当不满——正如中央司令部最近的一份报告所指出的那样, 哈马斯有正当的不满——可能导致其重返巴勒斯坦联合政府,为以色列提供可靠的和平伙伴. 如果由于哈马斯的拒绝主义而导致外展失败, 该组织阻止其他巴勒斯坦政党谈判达成的合理协议的能力将受到严重阻碍. 如果奥巴马政府不领导一项国际倡议,以定义巴以协议的内容,并积极促进巴勒斯坦政治和解, 欧洲必须这样做, 希望美国能效法. 不幸, 没有银弹可以保证“两国在和平与安全中并存”的目标。
但是,奥巴马总统目前的做法绝对不能.

埃及的穆斯林兄弟: 对抗或整合?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 选举. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. 同时, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

伊斯兰教与民主

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

埃及穆斯林兄弟会的组织连续性

苔丝·李·艾森哈特

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (兄弟会) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, 然而, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

昨天和今天之间

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in 它, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, 和 provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
然后, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. 这 Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

伊斯兰政治思想中的民主

Azzam S. 塔米米

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, 在 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, 在 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

伊斯兰政党 : 为什么他们不能民主

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, 它有

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, 民主, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

伊斯兰政党 : 三种动作

塔玛拉·科夫曼(Tamara Cofman)

Between 1991 和 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Today, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
尽管如此, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.

政治伊斯兰教: 准备好订婚?

埃马德·埃尔丁·沙欣

The voluminous literature on reform and democratization in the Middle East region reveals a number of facts: a main obstacle to reform is the incumbent regimes that have been trying to resist and circumvent genuine democratic transformations; political reform cannot be credible without integrating moderate Islamists in the process; and external actors (mainly the US and the EU) have not yet formulated a coherent approach to reform that could simultaneously achieve stability and democracy in the region. This paper explores the possibilities and implications of a European engagement with moderate Islamists on democracy promotion in the region. It argues that the EU approach to political reform in the Middle East region needs to be enhanced and linked to realities on the ground. Political reform cannot be effective without the integration of non-violent Islamic groups in a gradual, multifaceted process. It should be highlighted that the process of engagement is a risky one for both the EU and the Islamists, yet both stand to gain from a systematic dialogue on democracy. To reduce the risks, the engagement with political Islam should come within a broader EU strategy for democracy promotion in the region. 实际上, what the Islamists would expect from Europe is to maintain a
consistent and assertive stand on political reforms that would allow for a genuine representation of the popular will through peaceful means.
In this regard, a number of questions seem pertinent. Does the EU really need to engage political Islam in democratic reforms? Is political Islam ready for engagement and will it be willing to engage? How can an engagement policy be formulated on the basis of plausible implementation with minimal risks to the interests of the parties involved?

对政治伊斯兰教的误判

马丁·克拉默

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderatesorreformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.

伊斯兰政党 , 他们是民主党人吗? 有关系吗 ?

塔雷克·马苏德(Tarek Masoud)

受“伊斯兰主义者来袭”的感觉驱使,” 记者和政策制定者最近一直在激烈猜测埃及穆斯林兄弟会等伊斯兰政党是否 (兆字节) 或者巴勒斯坦的哈马斯真的相信民主. 虽然我试图勾勒出伊斯兰民主承诺的界限, 我认为凝视伊斯兰灵魂是对能量的滥用. 伊斯兰主义者不来. 而且, 正如 Adam Przeworski 和其他人所争论的那样, 对民主的承诺更多地源于环境限制而不是真正的信仰. 而不是担心伊斯兰主义者是否是真正的民主主义者,
我们的目标应该是帮助加强民主和自由的机构和行动者,这样任何团体——无论是伊斯兰主义者还是其他人——都无法颠覆它们.
但是我们担心这场运动的民主善意是什么?? 伊斯兰主义是一个狡猾的概念. 例如, 如果我们将那些要求应用伊斯兰教法的政党称为伊斯兰主义者, 我们必须排除土耳其的正义与发展党 (这被广泛认为是伊斯兰主义者) 包括埃及执政的民族民主党 (积极镇压伊斯兰主义者). 而不是陷入定义问题, 我们会更好地专注于从相同的历史根源发展起来的一组政党, 他们的许多目标和立场来自同一个思想体系, 并保持彼此之间的组织联系——也就是说, 那些来自国际 MB 的政党. 其中包括埃及母亲组织 (成立于 1928), 还有哈马斯, 约旦的伊斯兰行动阵线, 阿尔及利亚和平社会运动, 伊拉克伊斯兰党, 黎巴嫩伊斯兰组织, 和别的.

城市公共空间中的穆斯林公民社会: 全球化, 话语转变, 和社会运动

保罗·M. 吕贝克
布里亚纳·布里兹(Bryana Britts)
Cities are processes, not products. The three Islamic elements that set in motion the processes that give rise to Islamic cities were: a distinction between the members of the Umma and the outsiders, which led to juridical and spatial distinction by neighborhoods; the segregation of the sexes which gave rise to a particular solution to the question of spatial organization; and a legal system which, rather than imposing general regulations over land uses of various types in various places, left to the litigation of the neighbors the detailed adjudication of mutual rights over space and use. (Janet Abu Lughod 1987: 173)
Framing: Muslim Movements in Urban Situations We live in an intellectual moment when the complexity of the global Islamic
revival renders it difficult to generalize about Muslim institutions, social movements, and discursive practices. While diversity and locality remain paramount features of Muslim cities, globalization has inadvertently nurtured transnational Muslim networks from the homeland of Islam and extended them into the web of interconnected world cities. Quite opportunistically, urban-based
Muslim networks and insurrectionist movements now thrive in the interstitial spaces created by the new global communication and transportation infrastructures. What, then, are the long-term patterns for Muslims in cities? Since the last millennium, as Janet Abu-Lughod reminds us, “the Islamic cityhas been the primary site for: defining power relations between ruler and subject, specifying the rights and identities of spatial communities, and regulating urban social relations between genders. Today’s Muslim city remains the epicenter of a burgeoning public sphere in which informed publics debate highly contested Islamic discourses regarding social justice,