所有帶有標籤的條目: "中等"
阿拉伯的明天
大衛乙. 渥太威
十月 6, 1981, 本來是埃及慶祝的一天. 它標誌著埃及在三場阿以沖突中取得勝利的最偉大時刻的周年紀念, 當該國處於劣勢的軍隊在蘇伊士運河上突進時 1973 贖罪日戰爭並派遣以色列軍隊撤退. 在一個很酷的, 萬里無雲的早晨, 開羅體育場擠滿了前來觀看軍隊展示其硬件的埃及家庭。在檢閱台上, 安瓦爾·薩達特總統,戰爭的建築師, 滿意地看著人和機器在他面前遊行. 我在附近, 一位新來的外國記者。突然, 一輛軍用卡車直接停在檢閱台前,六架幻影噴氣式飛機在頭頂進行雜技表演, 用長長的紅色畫出天空, 黃色, 紫色的,和綠煙. 薩達特站了起來, 顯然準備與另一支埃及軍隊交換敬意. 他使自己成為四名從卡車上跳下來的伊斯蘭刺客的完美目標, 衝上講台, 並用子彈打滿了他的身體。當兇手繼續用他們致命的火焰噴射看台似乎是永恆的, 我考慮了一下,是摔倒在地,冒著被驚慌失措的觀眾踩死的風險,還是留在原地,冒著被流彈擊中的風險. 本能告訴我要站穩腳跟, 我的新聞責任感驅使我去查明薩達特是死是活.
自由民主與政治伊斯蘭: 尋找共同點.
莫斯塔法Benhenda
伊拉克與政治伊斯蘭的未來
詹姆斯皮斯克托瑞
伊斯蘭政治文化, 民主, 和人權
丹尼爾E·. 價錢
參與政治伊斯蘭的策略
沙迪哈米德
AMANDA卡德萊茨
埃及的穆斯林兄弟會
威廉·托馬森
Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. 確實, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. 當然, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam
溫和而激進的伊斯蘭教
ANGEL RABASA
One of the components of this study is relevant to a question that I was asked to address,which is how radical Islam differs from moderate or mainstream Islam. Frankly, one ofthe problems that we have found in the discourse about Islam is that the terms “radical”or “moderate” are often used in a subjective and imprecise way, without going through aprocess of critically examining what these terms mean. In some cases, the term radical ormilitant is defined in terms of support for terrorism or other forms of violence. Webelieve that this is too narrow a focus, that there is, in fact, a much larger universe offundamentalist or Salafi groups who may not themselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive ofthe values of democratic societies.
伊斯蘭主義者和投票箱
Vickie Langohr
As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”
Brothers in Arms?
Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.
The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.
The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.