RSS所有帶有標籤的條目: "中等"

阿拉伯的明天

大衛乙. 渥太威

十月 6, 1981, 本來是埃及慶祝的一天. 它標誌著埃及在三場阿以沖突中取得勝利的最偉大時刻的周年紀念, 當該國處於劣勢的軍隊在蘇伊士運河上突進時 1973 贖罪日戰爭並派遣以色列軍隊撤退. 在一個很酷的, 萬里無雲的早晨, 開羅體育場擠滿了前來觀看軍隊展示其硬件的埃及家庭。在檢閱台上, 安瓦爾·薩達特總統,戰爭的建築師, 滿意地看著人和機器在他面前遊行. 我在附近, 一位新來的外國記者。突然, 一輛軍用卡車直接停在檢閱台前,六架幻影噴氣式飛機在頭頂進行雜技表演, 用長長的紅色畫出天空, 黃色, 紫色的,和綠煙. 薩達特站了起來, 顯然準備與另一支埃及軍隊交換敬意. 他使自己成為四名從卡車上跳下來的伊斯蘭刺客的完美目標, 衝上講台, 並用子彈打滿了他的身體。當兇手繼續用他們致命的火焰噴射看台似乎是永恆的, 我考慮了一下,是摔倒在地,冒著被驚慌失措的觀眾踩死的風險,還是留在原地,冒著被流彈擊中的風險. 本能告訴我要站穩腳跟, 我的新聞責任感驅使我去查明薩達特是死是活.

自由民主與政治伊斯蘭: 尋找共同點.

莫斯塔法Benhenda

本文旨在建立民主和伊斯蘭政治理論之間的對話。1 它們之間的相互作用令人費解: 例如, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
政權, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. 例如, 穆斯林學者和活動家經常贊同對統治者負責的原則, 這是民主的一個決定性特徵. 相反, 他們經常拒絕政教分離的原則, 這通常被認為是民主的一部分 (至少, 當今美國所熟知的民主). 鑑於對民主原則的這種混合評價, 確定伊斯蘭政治模式背後的民主概念似乎很有趣. 換句話說, 我們應該嘗試找出什麼是“神民主”中的民主. 為此, 在規範性政治思想的伊斯蘭傳統的令人印象深刻的多樣性和多元化中, 我們主要關注可追溯到 Abu ‘Ala Maududi 和埃及知識分子 Sayyed Qutb 的廣泛思想潮流。8 這種特殊的思想趨勢很有趣,因為在穆斯林世界, 它是對源自西方的價值觀傳播的一些最具挑戰性的反對意見的基礎. 基於宗教價值觀, 這一趨勢闡述了一種替代自由民主的政治模式. 廣義上講, 這種伊斯蘭政治模式中包含的民主概念是程序性的. 有一些不同, 這一概念受到一些憲政主義者和政治學家所倡導的民主理論的啟發。 10 它是單薄且極簡主義的, 到某一點. 例如, 它不依賴於任何人民主權的概念,也不需要將宗教與政治分開. 本文的第一個目的是闡述這種極簡主義的概念. 我們對它進行了詳細的重述,以便將這個概念與它的道德 (自由主義的) 基礎, 從這裡考慮的特定伊斯蘭觀點來看,這是有爭議的. 確實, 民主進程通常源於個人自治原則, 這些伊斯蘭理論並不認可這一點。 11 這裡, 我們表明,這樣的原則對於證明民主進程的正當性並不是必要的.

伊拉克與政治伊斯蘭的未來

詹姆斯皮斯克托瑞

65 年前,一位現代伊斯蘭教最偉大的學者提出了一個簡單的問題, “伊斯蘭教何去何從?”, 伊斯蘭世界將走向何方? 這是西方和穆斯林世界都處於劇烈動蕩的時期——帝國主義的消亡和歐洲以外新國家體系的結晶; neo的創建和測試- 國際聯盟中的威爾遜世界秩序; 歐洲法西斯主義的出現. 漢密爾頓·吉布爵士認識到穆斯林社會, 無法避免這樣的世界趨勢, 還面臨同樣不可避免的民族主義滲透, 世俗主義, 和西化. 儘管他謹慎地警告不要做出預測——對我們所有對中東和伊斯蘭政治感興趣的人來說都是危險的——但他確信兩件事:
(一個) 伊斯蘭世界將在團結的理想和分裂的現實之間徘徊;
(b) 未來的關鍵在於領導力, 或誰為伊斯蘭教權威發聲.
今天,隨著我們面臨伊拉克危機的加深,吉布的預言很可能重新具有相關性, 一場廣泛而有爭議的反恐戰爭的展開, 和持續的巴勒斯坦問題. 在本次講座中,我想看看可能影響當前和近期穆斯林政治進程的因素. 儘管我將提出的觀點可能具有更廣泛的相關性, 我將主要以阿拉伯世界為例.
關於政治伊斯蘭的假設 關於政治化的伊斯蘭或伊斯蘭主義,不乏預測. “伊斯蘭主義”最好理解為一種感覺,即當代穆斯林社會出了問題,解決方案必須在於一系列政治行動. 通常與“原教旨主義”互換使用, 伊斯蘭主義更好地等同於“政治伊斯蘭”. 一些評論家已經宣布它的消亡和後伊斯蘭時代的到來. 他們認為,事實證明,國家的鎮壓機器比伊斯蘭反對派更持久,伊斯蘭主義者的意識形態不連貫性使他們不適合現代政治競爭. 9 月 11 日的事件似乎與這個預測相矛盾, 然而, 不動搖, 他們爭辯說,如此壯觀, 幾乎無政府主義的行為只能證明伊斯蘭思想的破產,並表明激進分子已經放棄了奪取政權的任何真正希望.

伊斯蘭政治文化, 民主, 和人權

丹尼爾E·. 價錢

有人認為伊斯蘭教助長了威權主義, 矛盾的

西方社會的價值觀, 並顯著影響重要的政治結果
在穆斯林國家. 所以, 學者, 評論員, 和政府
官員們經常指出“伊斯蘭原教旨主義”是下一個
對自由民主國家的意識形態威脅. 這種觀點, 然而, 主要是基於
關於文本分析, 伊斯蘭政治理論, 和特別研究
個別國家, 不考慮其他因素. 這是我的爭論
伊斯蘭教的文本和傳統, 像其他宗教一樣,
可用於支持各種政治制度和政策. 國家
具體的和描述性的研究並不能幫助我們找到有幫助的模式
我們解釋伊斯蘭教與政治之間的不同關係
穆斯林世界的國家. 因此, 一種新的研究方法
伊斯蘭教與政治之間的聯繫被要求.
我建議, 通過嚴格評估伊斯蘭教之間的關係,
民主, 和跨國一級的人權, 太多了
強調伊斯蘭教作為一種政治力量的力量. 我先來
使用比較案例研究, 關注與相互作用相關的因素
伊斯蘭團體和政權之間, 經濟影響, 種族分裂,

和社會發展, 解釋影響的差異

八個國家的伊斯蘭教政治.

參與政治伊斯蘭的策略

沙迪哈米德

AMANDA卡德萊茨

政治伊斯蘭教是當今中東地區最活躍的政治力量. 它的未來與該地區的未來密切相關. 如果美國和歐盟致力於支持該地區的政治改革, 他們需要設計具體的, 參與伊斯蘭團體的連貫戰略. 然而, 美國. 普遍不願意與這些運動展開對話. 相似地, 歐盟與伊斯蘭主義者的接觸是個例外, 不是規則. 存在低級聯繫人的地方, 它們主要用於信息收集目的, 不是戰略目標. 美國. 和歐盟有許多解決該地區經濟和政治發展的計劃——其中包括中東夥伴關係倡議 (美皮), 千年挑戰公司 (中冶), 地中海聯盟, 和歐洲睦鄰政策 (ENP) - 然而,他們對伊斯蘭政治反對派的挑戰如何適應更廣泛的區域目標幾乎沒有什麼可說的. 我們. 和歐盟的民主援助和規劃幾乎完全針對威權政府本身或世俗的民間社會團體,在他們自己的社會中得到的支持很少.
重新評估現行政策的時機已經成熟. 自九月恐怖襲擊以來 11, 2001, 支持中東民主對西方政策制定者來說具有更大的重要性, 誰看到了缺乏民主和政治暴力之間的聯繫. 人們更加關注理解政治伊斯蘭內部的變化. 美國新政府更願意擴大與穆斯林世界的交流. 同時, 絕大多數主流伊斯蘭組織——包括埃及的穆斯林兄弟會, 約旦的伊斯蘭行動陣線 (印度空軍), 摩洛哥正義與發展黨 (PJD), 科威特伊斯蘭立憲運動, 和也門伊斯蘭黨——越來越多地將支持政治改革和民主作為其政治綱領的核心組成部分. 此外, 許多人表示有興趣與美國展開對話. 和歐盟政府.
西方國家與中東關係的未來可能在很大程度上取決於前者與非暴力伊斯蘭政黨就共同利益和目標進行廣泛對話的程度. 最近有大量關於與伊斯蘭主義者接觸的研究, 但很少有人清楚地說明它在實踐中可能需要什麼. 佐伊·諾特, 德國外交關係委員會訪問學者, 把它, “歐盟正在考慮參與,但並不真正知道如何參與。”1 希望澄清討論, 我們區分了三個級別的“參與度”,”每個都有不同的手段和目的: 低級接觸, 戰略對話, 和夥伴關係.

埃及的穆斯林兄弟會

威廉·托馬森

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. 確實, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. 當然, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam


溫和而激進的伊斯蘭教

ANGEL RABASA

One of the components of this study is relevant to a question that I was asked to address,which is how radical Islam differs from moderate or mainstream Islam. Frankly, one ofthe problems that we have found in the discourse about Islam is that the terms “radical”or “moderate” are often used in a subjective and imprecise way, without going through aprocess of critically examining what these terms mean. In some cases, the term radical ormilitant is defined in terms of support for terrorism or other forms of violence. Webelieve that this is too narrow a focus, that there is, in fact, a much larger universe offundamentalist or Salafi groups who may not themselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive ofthe values of democratic societies.

伊斯蘭主義者和投票箱

Vickie Langohr

As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”

Brothers in Arms?

Joshua Stacher
Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.
The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.
The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.

Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.

The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.

The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.