RSSTout Entries Atenn Avèk: "Modere"

Arab demen an

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktòb 6, 1981, te vle di yo dwe yon jou selebrasyon nan peyi Lejip. Li te make anivèsè pi gwo moman viktwa peyi Lejip la nan twa konfli Arab-Izrayèl, lè lame moun ki pa gen anyen nan peyi a t'ap travèse Kanal Suez la nan premye jou yo 1973 Yom Kippur Lagè ak voye twoup Izrayelyen yo anroule nan retrè. Sou yon fre, maten san nyaj, estad Cairo a te chaje ak fanmi moun peyi Lejip yo ki te vin wè militè a strut pyès ki nan konpitè li yo.Sou kanpe revizyon an., Prezidan Anwar el-Sadat,achitèk lagè a, te gade ak satisfaksyon kòm moun ak machin parad devan l '. Mwen te tou pre, yon korespondan etranje ki fèk rive.Switdenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: the Search for Common Ground.

Mostapha Benhenda

This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: for example, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
rejim, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. For example, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, ki se yon karakteristik defini nan demokrasi. Okontrè, yo souvan rejte prensip separasyon ant relijyon ak leta, ki souvan konsidere kòm yon pati nan demokrasi (omwen, demokrasi jan yo konnen Ozetazini jodi a). Bay evalyasyon sa a melanje nan prensip demokratik yo, li sanble enteresan detèmine konsepsyon demokrasi ki kache sou modèl politik islamik yo. Nan yon lòt sans, nou ta dwe eseye chèche konnen kisa ki demokratik nan "teyomokrasi". Pou sa, pami divèsite enpresyonan ak pliryèl tradisyon Islamik nan panse politik normatif, nou esansyèlman konsantre sou gwo aktyèl la nan panse ki pral tounen nan Abu 'Ala Maududi ak entelektyèl moun peyi Lejip Sayyed Qutb la.8 Tandans patikilye sa a nan panse a enteresan paske nan mond Mizilman an., li chita nan baz kèk nan opozisyon ki pi difisil sou difizyon valè ki soti nan Lwès la.. Ki baze sou valè relijye yo, tandans sa a elabore yon altènatif modèl politik nan demokrasi liberal. An jeneral, konsepsyon demokrasi ki enkli nan modèl politik Islamik sa a se pwosedi. Ak kèk diferans, KONSEPSYON sa a enspire pa teyori demokratik kèk konstitisyonèl ak syantis politik defann.10 Li mens ak minimalist., jiska yon sèten pwen. For example, li pa konte sou okenn nosyon souverènte popilè e li pa mande okenn separasyon ant relijyon ak politik.. Premye objektif papye sa a se elabore konsepsyon minimalist sa a. Nou fè yon retade detaye sou li pou nou izole konsepsyon sa a de moral li (liberal) fondasyon, ki kontwovèsyal nan pwen de vi Islamik patikilye konsidere isit la. Vreman vre, pwosesis demokratik la anjeneral sòti nan yon prensip otonomi pèsonèl, ki pa andose pa teyori Islamik sa yo.11 Isit la, nou montre ke prensip sa a pa nesesè pou jistifye yon pwosesis demokratik.

Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Kilti politik Islamik, Demokrasi, ak Dwa Moun

Daniele. Pri

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, sepandan, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

ESTRATEJI POU ANGAJE ISLAM POLITIK

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Islam politik se sèl fòs politik ki pi aktif nan Mwayen Oryan jodi a. Avni li se intimman lye ak sa ki nan rejyon an. Si Etazini ak Inyon Ewopeyen an pran angajman pou sipòte refòm politik nan rejyon an, yo pral bezwen elabore beton, estrateji koyeran pou angaje gwoup islamis yo. Poutan, Etazini. jeneralman pa t vle louvri yon dyalòg ak mouvman sa yo. Menm jan an tou, Angajman Inyon Ewopeyen ak Islamis yo te eksepsyon, pa règ la. Kote kontak ki ba-nivo egziste, yo sitou sèvi nan objektif pou rasanble enfòmasyon, pa objektif estratejik yo. Etazini an. ak Inyon Ewopeyen gen yon kantite pwogram ki adrese devlopman ekonomik ak politik nan rejyon an - pami yo Inisyativ Patenarya Mwayen Oryan an. (MEPI), Millennium Challenge Corporation la (MCC), Inyon pou Mediterane a, ak politik Ewopeyen an katye (ENP) – Men, yo pa gen anyen pou di sou fason defi opozisyon politik islamis la anfòm nan objektif rejyonal ki pi laj yo. Etazini. ak asistans ak pwogram demokrasi Inyon Ewopeyen yo dirije prèske antyèman swa gouvènman otoritè tèt yo oswa gwoup eksklizyon sosyete sivil ak sipò minimòm nan pwòp sosyete yo..
Lè a se mi pou yon reevalyasyon politik aktyèl yo. Depi atak teworis yo nan mwa septanm nan 11, 2001, sipòte demokrasi Mwayen Oryan an te pran yon pi gwo enpòtans pou mizisyen politik Lwès yo, ki wè yon lyen ant mank demokrasi ak vyolans politik. Pi gwo atansyon yo te konsakre nan konpreyansyon varyasyon yo nan Islam politik. Nouvo administrasyon Ameriken an pi ouvè pou elaji kominikasyon ak mond Mizilman an. Pandan se tan, a vas majorite nan òganizasyon islamis endikap - ki gen ladan Frè Mizilman an nan peyi Lejip, Fwon Aksyon Islamik lòt bò larivyè Jouden an (IAF), Pati Jistis ak Devlopman Mawòk la (PJD), Mouvman Konstitisyonèl Islamik Kowet, ak Yemeni Islah Party - te de pli zan pli fè sipò pou refòm politik ak demokrasi yon eleman santral nan platfòm politik yo.. An plis, anpil moun te siyale gwo enterè nan ouvèti dyalòg ak U.S. ak gouvènman Inyon Ewopeyen yo.
Avni relasyon ant nasyon oksidantal yo ak Mwayen Oryan an ka detèmine pa degre ansyen an angaje pati islamis san vyolans yo nan yon dyalòg laj sou enterè ak objektif pataje.. Te gen yon pwopagasyon resan etid sou angajman ak islamis yo, men kèk klèman adrese sa li ta ka enplike nan pratik. Kòm Zoe Nautre, vizite parèy nan Konsèy Alman an sou Relasyon Etranje, mete li, "Inyon Ewopeyen an ap panse sou angajman men li pa vrèman konnen ki jan."1 Nan espwa nan klarifye diskisyon an, nou fè distenksyon ant twa nivo "angajman,” yo chak ak diferan mwayen ak fen: kontak ba nivo, dyalòg estratejik, ak patenarya.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

William Thomasson

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Vreman vre, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Certainly, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam


Moderate and Radical Islam

ANGEL RABASA

One of the components of this study is relevant to a question that I was asked to address,which is how radical Islam differs from moderate or mainstream Islam. Frankly, one ofthe problems that we have found in the discourse about Islam is that the terms “radical”or “moderate” are often used in a subjective and imprecise way, without going through aprocess of critically examining what these terms mean. In some cases, the term radical ormilitant is defined in terms of support for terrorism or other forms of violence. Webelieve that this is too narrow a focus, that there is, in fact, a much larger universe offundamentalist or Salafi groups who may not themselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive ofthe values of democratic societies.

OF ISLAMISTS AND BALLOT BOXES

Vickie Langohr

As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”

Brothers in Arms?

Joshua Stacher
Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.
The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.
The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.

Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.

The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.

The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.