Усе запісы з тэгамі: "ўмераны"
Арабскае заўтра
ДЭВІД Б. ВОТРЫМ
Кастрычніцкая 6, 1981, задумваўся як дзень святкавання ў Егіпце. Гэта адзначыла гадавіну найвялікшага моманту перамогі Егіпта ў трох араба-ізраільскіх канфліктах, калі недабрая армія краіны прасунулася праз Суэцкі канал у дні адкрыцця 1973 Вайна Ём-Кіпура і адправіла ізраільскія войскі, якія адступалі. На круты, бясхмарная раніца, Каірскі стадыён быў запоўнены егіпецкімі сем'ямі, якія прыйшлі паглядзець, як вайскоўцы расстаўляюць яго абсталяванне, Прэзідэнт Анвар эль-Садат,архітэктар вайны, задаволена назіраў, як перад ім дэфіліруюць людзі і машыны. Я быў побач, нядаўна прыбылы замежны карэспандэнт.Раптам, адзін з армейскіх грузавікоў спыніўся непасрэдна перад агляднай пляцоўкай, як толькі шэсць самалётаў "Міраж" прагрымелі над галавой у акрабатычным выкананні, роспіс неба доўгімі сцежкамі чырвонага колеру, жоўты, фіялетавы,і зялёны дым. Садат устаў, мабыць, рыхтуецца абмяняцца салютамі з чарговым кантынгентам егіпецкіх войскаў. Ён зрабіў сабе ідэальную мішэнь для чатырох забойцаў-ісламістаў, якія ўскочылі з грузавіка, штурмавалі трыбуну, і забіваў яго цела кулямі. Калі забойцы працягвалі цэлую вечнасць распыляць трыбуну сваім смяротным агнём, Я імгненна паразважаў, ці не зваліцца на зямлю і рызыкнуць быць затаптаным панічнымі гледачамі, ці застацца ў руху, і рызыкнуць прыняць заблудшую кулю. Інстынкт падказваў мне трымацца на нагах, і маё пачуццё журналісцкага абавязку прымусіла мяне даведацца, жывы ці мёртвы Садат.
Лібэральная дэмакратыя і палітычны іслам: Пошукі Common Ground.
Mostapha Benhenda
Ірак і будучыня палітычнага ісламу
Джэймс Piscatori
Ісламская палітычная культура, дэмакратыя, і правы чалавека
Daniel E. цана
СТРАТЭГІІ ДЛЯ УПРАЎЛЕННЯ ПАЛІТЫЧНЫХ ІСЛАМ
ШАДЗІ ХАМІД
AMANDA KADLEC
Браты-мусульмане ў Егіпце
Уільям Томассон
Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Сапраўды, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Вядома, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam
Умераны і радыкальны іслам
ANGEL RABASA
One of the components of this study is relevant to a question that I was asked to address,which is how radical Islam differs from moderate or mainstream Islam. Frankly, one ofthe problems that we have found in the discourse about Islam is that the terms “radical”or “moderate” are often used in a subjective and imprecise way, without going through aprocess of critically examining what these terms mean. In some cases, the term radical ormilitant is defined in terms of support for terrorism or other forms of violence. Webelieve that this is too narrow a focus, that there is, in fact, a much larger universe offundamentalist or Salafi groups who may not themselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive ofthe values of democratic societies.
ІСЛАМІСТАЎ І ЎРНЫ
Vickie Langohr
As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”
Brothers in Arms?
Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.
The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.
The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.