Všechny záznamy označené: "islamistických"

Islám a Making of státní moci

Vali Nasr Seyyed Reza

STRATEGIE PRO Zapojení politického islámu

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

ISLÁM, ISLAMISTI, A VOLEBNÍ PRINCIP NA BLÍZKÉM VÝCHODU

James Piscatori

Platforma návrhu strany Egyptského muslimského bratrstva

V pozdním létě 2007, uprostřed velkého očekávání egyptské vládnoucí elity a opoziční hnutí, Muslimské bratrstvo distribuovalo první návrh stranické platformy skupině intelektuálů a analytiků. Platforma neměla sloužit jako dokument pro existující politickou stranu, ani jako jedna z mála být založena: Bratrstvo zůstává bez právního uznání v Egyptě a egyptských vládců a díky zákonům, které přijali, se zdá, že vyhlídka na právní uznání strany založené v Bratrstvu je vzdálená. Vedení Bratrstva si však jasně přálo signalizovat, jaký druh strany by našli, pokud by jim to bylo dovoleno.

S oběhem návrhu dokumentu, hnutí otevřelo své dveře diskusi a dokonce sporné debatě o hlavních myšlenkách platformy, pravděpodobný průběh politické role Bratrstva, a budoucnost jejího vztahu s dalšími politickými silami v zemi.1 V tomto příspěvku, snažíme se odpovědět na čtyři otázky týkající se Bratrstva

párty platforma:

ISLAMICKÁ MOBILIZACE

Ziad Munson

Tento článek zkoumá vznik a růst Muslimského bratrstva v Egyptě od 30. do 50. let. Začíná to nastíněním a empirickým hodnocením možných vysvětlení růstu organizace na základě (1) teorie politického islámu a (2) koncept struktury politických příležitostí v teorii sociálního hnutí. Navrhuje se rozšíření těchto přístupů na základě údajů z organizačních dokumentů a odtajněných USA. Státní ministerstvo z období. Úspěšná mobilizace Muslimského bratrstva byla možná kvůli způsobu, jakým byla její islámská zpráva vázána na její organizační strukturu, činnosti, strategie a každodenní život Egypťanů. Analýza naznačuje, že myšlenky jsou integrovány do sociálních hnutí více způsoby, než umožňuje koncept rámování. Také rozšiřuje naše chápání toho, jak mohou organizace vznikat ve vysoce represivním prostředí.

Bude mít Turecko islamistického prezidenta??

Michael Rubin

Komentář: Dutý prsten pro demokracii

Arnaud de BORCHGRAVE

WASHINGTON, červen 24 (UPI) — The White House’s crusade for democracy, as President Bush sees it, has produced “a critical mass of events taking that (Blízký východ) region in a hopeful new direction.” And Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just toured the area, making clear at every stop whenever the United States has a choice between stability and democracy, the new ideological remedy would sacrifice stability.

Veteran Mideast hands who have dealt with five regional wars and two intifadas over the past half century shuddered. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger first among them.

“For the U.S. to crusade in every part of the world to spread democracy may be beyond our capacity,” he says. The U.S. system, he explains, “is the product of unique historical experiences, difficult to duplicate or to transplant into Muslim societies where secular democracy has seldom thrived.” If ever.

If stability had been sacrificed for democracy, the former national security adviser and secretary of State to Presidents Nixon and Ford could not have negotiated major Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements: Sinai I, Golan and Sinai II. Without the undemocratic, benign dictatorial figure of Anwar Sadat at the helm in Egypt, or without the late Syrian dictator and master terror-broker Hafez Assad, yet another page of war history would have been written.

With a democratic parliament in Egypt in 1974, presumably dominated by the popular Muslim Brotherhood, Sadat could not have made his spectacular, death-defying trip to Jerusalem — and suddenly become the most popular leader in Israel. A peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and between Jordan and Israel were possible only because absolute rulers — Sadat and the late King Hussein, led both Arab countries.

Sadat knew his courageous act of statesmanship was tantamount to signing his own death warrant. It was carried out in 1981 — by Islamist extremists — on worldwide television.

Rice proudly proclaims it is no longer a war against terrorism but a struggle for democracy. She is proud the Bush administration no longer pursues stability at the expense of democracy. But already the democracy crusade is not only encountering speed bumps, but also roadblocks on a road to nowhere.

The much-vaunted Palestinian elections scheduled for July have been postponed indefinitely.

In Lebanon, the ballot box has already been nullified by political machinations. Gen. Michael Aoun, a bright but aging prospect who came back from French exile to take on Syria’s underground machine, has already joined forces with Damascus. While denying any deal with Syria, the general’s henchmen concede he was compensated munificently for his retirement years in Paris from his post as army chief of staff and his time as premier. Aoun collected $22 million, which included compound interest.

V Egyptě, Rice, presumably attempting to confer respectability on President Hosni Mubarak’s challengers, took time out to receive a known political charlatan who has over the years been exposed as someone who forged election results as he climbed the ladder of a number of political parties under a variety of labels.

Even Mubarak’s enemies concede Ayman Nour fabricated and forged the signatures of as many as 1,187 citizens to conform to regulations to legalize his Ghad (Tomorrow) party. His career is dotted with phony academic credentials, plagiarism, a staged assassination attempt on himself, charges of embezzlement by his Saudi media employer, and scads of document forgeries.

Rice had canceled a previous trip to Egypt to protest the indictment and jailing of Nour pending trial. And before Rice’s most recent accolade, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had also gone out of her way to praise Egypt’s master political con man. Makes you wonder what kind of political reporting is coming out of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.

With this double-headed endorsement by the United States, Nour is losing what little favor he still has in Egypt. He is now seen as a U.S. stooge, to add to a long list of failings.

Muslimské bratrstvo, which is outlawed but tolerated since it renounced terrorism, is more representative of Egyptian opinion than Nour. There is also the Kifaya (Enough) movement that groups Egypt’s leading intellectuals. But they declined to meet with Rice.

The United States is seen throughout the Arab world as synonymous with Israel. This automatically limits the Bush administration’s ability to win friends and influence people. Those making the most out of U.S. pressure to democratize are organizations listed by the United States as “terrorist.” Both Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon are now mining opportunities both above and underground. Islamic legislators in Jordan petitioned King Abdullah to allow Jordanian Hamas leaders, evicted six years ago, to come home. The king listened impassively.

It took Europe 500 years to reach the degree of political maturity witnessed by the recent collapse of the European Union’s plans for a common constitution. Winston Churchill said democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried. But Churchill also said, “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.” This still applies in the souks of the Arab world, from Marrakech to Muscat.

Problém egyptského Muslimského bratrstva

Jeffrey Azarva

Samuel Tadros

On June 20, 2007, Spojené státy. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research convened ameeting ofU.S. intelligence officials to weigh the prospect of formal engagement with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,1known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin. The session was the result of several years of discussion aboutengaging the group considered by many to be the fountainhead of Sunni fundamentalism.Although the Bush administration established a diplomatic quarantine of the Brotherhood afterSeptember 11, 2001, members of the U.S. House of Representatives held several meetings in Egyptin the spring of 2007—almost three months before the State Department meeting—with MuhammadSaad al-Katatni, an independent member of the Egyptian parliament and the head of its Brotherhoodaffiliatedbloc. On April 5, 2007, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) broke with conventionand met with Katatni at the Egyptian parliament building and at the residence ofU.S. ambassador to Egypt Francis J. Ricciardone. Pak, on May 27, 2007, a four-member U.S. congressionaldelegation led by Representative David Price (D-N.C.) met with Katatni in Cairo.Following Hoyer’s visit, Spojené státy. Embassy in Cairo dismissed Egyptian criticism that his meetingspresaged a reversal of U.S. policy.2 In November 2007, Ricciardone also played down themeetings when he claimed that U.S. contacts with nominally independent Brotherhood members did“not imply American endorsement of the views of the individual parliamentarians or their politicalaffiliates.”3 Despite this reassurance, the meetings with Katatni are indicative of opinion leaders, bothinside and outside the U.S. vláda, warming inevitable. Yet while the movement, established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, constitutes the most organizedand well-funded opposition in the country today—the byproduct of both its charitable services and da’wa (literally“call to God,” or preaching) network that operate outside state control—any examination of its rhetoricand political platforms shows U.S. outreach to be premature. Despite its professed commitment to pluralismand the rule of law, the Brotherhood continues to engage in dangerous doublespeak when it comes to the mostfundamental issues of democracy.

Democracy Protecting Itself from Itself?

Ebru Erdem

Studies on government in Muslim societies and in the Middle East in particular have mostly focused on authoritarianism. They sought to answer why authoritarianism is the most often observed regime type, and why it persists. Recent work has looked at the role of elections and elected bodies under authoritarianism, explaining why they exist and what purposes they serve (Blaydes 2008; Lust-Okar 2006). The goal of this paper is to shift the spotlight onto the judiciary, and to the political role of high courts in Muslim societies with different levels of authoritarianism.Judiciaries and the judicial processes in Muslim societies have not caught much scholarly attention. Much of the work in this area has revolved around Shari’a. Shari’a law, incorporation of the Shari’a into western style judicial systems and legal codes, conflicts between western and Shari’a inspired codes of family law, and especially the impact of the latter on women’s rights are some of the extensively studied topics concerning the judicial processes in these societies. Na druhou stranu, work on judiciary as a political institution in the Muslim world is scarce, notable exceptions being Moustafa (2003) and Hirschl (2004). Judiciaries may take different institutional forms, be based on different legal traditions, or vary in the level of independence they enjoy, but they are still a political institutions.Why study the judiciary in the Muslim World? Is a focus on the judiciary meaningful given the dominance of the executives in countries with authoritarian regimes? The justification for a focus on the judiciary has different dimensions. From a rational choice-institutionalist perspective: if an institution exists, there must be a reason for it, and we think that investigating the raison d’être of the judiciaries will provide interesting insights about political processes and executive strategies. From an institutional-design perspective, the shape that an institution takes2is related to the strategies of the actors negotiating over that institution, and we would like to use the observed variance in judicial institutions and powers across countries and time periods to learn about different aspects of political bargains that scholars have studied in other political realms. From a democratic development perspective, the establishment of the checks and balances is central to a functioning and sustainable democracy, and we would argue that studying the judiciary is central to understanding the prospects towards establishment of rule of law and a credible commitment to democracy (Weingast 1997).

What Happened to the “Arab Street?“

Neha Sahgal

Why do opposition movements engage in protest under some circumstances but not inothers? Why did the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt organize large scale protest during the 2005regime initiated political reforms while remaining largely off the streets during the United States’led war in Iraq in 2003? There is a common notion among Western public opinion and policymakers that United States’ policies in the Middle East have led to greater political activismamong Islamic fundamentalists. Dosud, while citizens around the world protested the war in Iraq,Egypt remained largely quiet. The lack of protest and other acts of opposition were surprisinggiven the history of Arab-anti colonial struggle, the 1950s street politics in Egypt that broughtNasser to power and the flourishing civil society organizations in the region exemplified byIslamist parties, non governmental organizations and professional syndicates. Co je důležitější,with the 2005 regime initiated political opening in Egypt, the country’s largest oppositionmovement, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organized high levels of protests anddemonstrations exposing undemocratic practices of the current government and seeking greaterpolitical freedom. Rok 2005, was marked by a “wave of contention” in Egypt standing instark contrast to the lack of mobilization against the Iraq war. Clearly, Muslim Brotherhoodprotest activity is guided by factors other than the prevalence of “anti-Americanism.”Scholars of contentions politics have developed and tested various theories that explainand predict protest behavior. Strain and breakdown theories explain protest as an outcome ofeconomic conditions while resource mobilization theories have stressed the role of material andorganizational constraints in organizing protest. Yet others have argued that protests are spurredby structural changes, například, divisions or breakdown in the government. In this paper, Iargue that explaining the protest behavior of one group should take into account the group’sinteraction with other opposition actors. Opposition groups operate in a dense network of allies,adversaries as well as counter movements. Therefore their strategies influence each other intangible ways. I present an analysis of how the 2005 political opening in Egypt led to changes inlegal parties such as al-Ghad and al-Wafd that were allowed to contest presidential andparliamentary elections. Dále, the new movement Kifaya, originally formed to expressopposition to the Iraq war, also gained momentum as an anti-Mubarak, pro-democracy alliance.The changes in the parties that were allowed to contest elections and the emergence of newmovements altered the socio-political context for the “officially banned, yet tolerated,” MuslimBrotherhood. The Brotherhood tried to reassert itself as the main voice of political opposition inthe country by organizing greater protest activity and in this way established similarity with legalopposition parties. While legal opposition parties remain weak and ineffective in Egypt, andnewer opposition movements are still small in their membership, they may still influence eachothers’ strategies in tangible ways.

Muslimské bratrstvo Jordánska a Jama'at-i-Islam z Pákistánu

Neha Sahgal

Studium islamistického aktivismu je v teorii sociálního hnutí novinkou. Stipendium Socialmovement ignorovalo islamistická hnutí kvůli jejich jedinečné povaze založené na víře. Nedávno vědci rozpoznali, že procesy sporu, které konceptualizuje teorie sociálního hnutí, lze aplikovat na islamistický aktivismus k hledání teoretických vylepšení v obou oblastech studia., Zkoumám variace ve strategiích, kterými se řídí islamistická hnutí v reakci na vládní politiku. Státy se řídily různými politikami, které řídily vlnu islamistické opozice vůči jejich moci. Některé státy zvolily uživatelsky represivní prostředky (Egypt, Jordánsko předtím 1989), zatímco ostatní, v různých dobách své historie používali akomodační politiku (Jordan poté 1989, Pákistán, Malajsie). Zkoumám dopady vládního přizpůsobení na strategie islamistického hnutí. Tvrdím, že přizpůsobení může mít různé dopady na strategie islamistického hnutí v závislosti na povaze uplatňovaných akomodačních politik.. Vlády uplatňovaly ve svém slabém vztahu s islamistickou opozicí dva různé typy akomodační politiky – islamizaci a liberalizaci.. Islamizace se pokouší kooptovat hnutí prostřednictvím větší religiozity ve státě a společnosti. Liberalizace umožňuje hnutím provozovat své aktivity jak na státní, tak na celospolečenské úrovni, aniž by nutně zvyšovala religiozitu státu1. Islamizace oslabuje islamisty, zatímco liberalizace je posiluje tím, že poskytuje sféru vlivu.