RSSMae pob Entries Tagged Gyda: "Hezbollah"

Yr Arab Yfory

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

October 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, gohebydd tramor newydd gyrraedd.Suddenly, ataliodd un o dryciau'r fyddin yn union o flaen y stondin adolygu wrth i chwe jet Mirage ruo uwchben mewn perfformiad acrobatig, paentio'r awyr gyda llwybrau hir o goch, melyn, porffor,a mwg gwyrdd. Safodd Sadat i fyny, yn paratoi i gyfnewid cyfarchion â mintai arall eto o filwyr yr Aifft. Gwnaeth ei hun yn darged perffaith ar gyfer pedwar llofrudd Islamaidd a neidiodd o'r lori, ymosododd ar y podiwm, ac yn britho ei gorff â bwledi. Wrth i'r lladdwyr barhau am yr hyn a oedd yn ymddangos yn dragwyddoldeb i chwistrellu'r eisteddle â'u tân marwol, Fe wnes i ystyried am amrantiad p’un ai i daro’r llawr ac mewn perygl o gael fy sathru i farwolaeth gan wylwyr panig neu aros ar y gweill a mentro cymryd bwled strae.. Dywedodd greddf wrthyf am aros ar fy nhraed, ac roedd fy synnwyr o ddyletswydd newyddiadurol yn fy ysgogi i fynd i ddarganfod a oedd Sadat yn fyw neu'n farw.

| Medi 26, 2010 | sylwadau 0
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Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become a “western expanding strategy” that turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .
| Awst 27, 2010 | sylwadau 0
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Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

hawliau Dynol, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, a

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

| Awst 21, 2010 | sylwadau 0
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Islam gwleidyddol yn y Dwyrain Canol

yn Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, in

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

| Awst 20, 2010 | sylwadau 0
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Pleidiau Islamaidd : pam na allant fod yn ddemocrataidd

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, democracy, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

| Awst 20, 2010 | sylwadau 0
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O Symudiad Rebel i Blaid Wleidyddol

Alastair Crooke

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. In addition, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

| Awst 02, 2010 | sylwadau 0
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Heriau i Ddemocratiaeth yn y Byd Arabaidd a Mwslemaidd

Alon Ben-Meir

President Bush’s notions that democratizing Iraq will have a ripple effect on the rest ofthe Arab world, bringing prosperity and peace to the region, and that democracy is the panaceafor Islamic terrorism are unsubstantiated as well as grossly misleading. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. Mewn gwirionedd, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. In addition, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

| Chwef 26, 2010 | sylwadau 0
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Mudiadau Terfysgaeth ac Eithafol yn y Dwyrain Canol

Anthony H. Cordesman

Prin fod terfysgaeth a rhyfela anghymesur yn nodweddion newydd o gydbwysedd milwrol y Dwyrain Canol, ac Islamaidd
go brin mai eithafiaeth yw’r unig ffynhonnell o drais eithafol. Mae yna lawer o wahaniaethau ethnig a sectyddol difrifol
yn y Dwyrain Canol, ac mae'r rhain wedi arwain ers amser maith at drais achlysurol o fewn gwladwriaethau penodol, ac weithiau i sifil mawr
gwrthdaro. Mae'r rhyfeloedd cartref yn Yemen a Gwrthryfel Dhofar yn Oman yn enghreifftiau, fel y mae hanes hir sifil
rhyfel yn Libanus ac ataliad treisgar Syria o grwpiau gwleidyddol Islamaidd a oedd yn gwrthwynebu cyfundrefn Hafez al-
Asad. Grym cynyddol Sefydliad Rhyddhad Palestina (PLO) arweiniodd at ryfel cartref yn yr Iorddonen ym mis Medi
1970. Chwyldro Iran yn 1979 yn cael ei ddilyn gan ymladd gwleidyddol difrifol, ac ymdrech i allforio theocratic
chwyldro a helpodd i sbarduno Rhyfel Iran-Irac. Mae Bahrain a Saudi Arabia ill dau wedi cael gwrthdaro sifil rhwng eu
Arweiniodd Sunni oedd yn rheoli elites a Shi’ites gelyniaethus ac arweiniodd y gwrthdaro hyn at drais sylweddol yn achos Saudi Arabia.
Yno hefyd, fodd bynnag, wedi bod yn hanes hir o eithafiaeth Islamaidd treisgar yn y rhanbarth, weithiau'n cael ei annog gan
cyfundrefnau a ddaeth yn ddiweddarach yn darged yr union Islamyddion yr oeddent yn eu cefnogi i ddechrau. Ceisiodd Sadat ddefnyddio Islamaidd
symudiadau yn wrthwynebol i'w wrthwynebiad seciwlar yn yr Aipht yn unig i gael ei lofruddio gan un symudiad o'r fath ar ei ol
cytundeb heddwch ag Israel. Roedd Israel yn meddwl ei bod yn ddiogel noddi symudiadau Islamaidd ar ôl hynny 1967 fel cownter i'r
PLO, dim ond i weld ymddangosiad cyflym o grwpiau treisgar gwrth-Israel. Gogledd a De Yemen oedd lleoliad
coups a rhyfeloedd cartref ers y 1960au cynnar, a rhyfel cartref yn Ne Yemen a arweiniodd at y cwymp yn y pen draw
o'i gyfundrefn a'i chyfuniad â Gogledd Yemen yn 1990.
Arweiniodd cwymp y shah at feddiant Islamaidd yn Iran, ac ysgogwyd gwrthwynebiad i'r goresgyniad Sofietaidd yn Afghanistan
adwaith Islamaidd sy'n dal i ddylanwadu ar y Dwyrain Canol a'r byd Islamaidd cyfan. Roedd yn rhaid i Saudi Arabia ddelio â
gwrthryfel yn y Grand Mosg ym Mecca yn 1979. Rhannodd cymeriad crefyddol y gwrthryfel hwn lawer o elfennau
o'r symudiadau a gododd ar ôl i'r Sofietiaid dynnu'n ôl o Afghanistan a Rhyfel y Gwlff yn 1991.
Ymdrechion Algeriaidd i atal buddugoliaeth pleidiau gwleidyddol Islamaidd mewn etholiad democrataidd yn 1992 yn cael eu dilyn gan
rhyfel cartref sydd wedi para byth ers hynny. Ymladdodd yr Aifft frwydr hir a llwyddiannus i raddau helaeth gyda'i Islamaidd ei hun
eithafwyr yn y 1990au, ond nid yw yr Aifft ond wedi llwyddo i atal y fath symudiadau yn hytrach na'u dileu
nhw. Yng ngweddill y Byd Arabaidd, helpodd y rhyfeloedd cartref yn Kosovo a Bosnia i greu cadres eithafol Islamaidd newydd.
Roedd Saudi Arabia yn dioddef o ddau ymosodiad terfysgol mawr o'r blaen 2001. Tarodd yr ymosodiadau hyn at Warchodlu Cenedlaethol
Canolfan hyfforddi a barics USAF yn Al Khobar, ac ymddengys fod o leiaf un yn ganlyniad Islamaidd
eithafwyr. Moroco, Libya, Tunisia, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, ac mae Yemen i gyd wedi gweld Islamaidd llinell galed
symudiadau yn dod yn fygythiad cenedlaethol difrifol.
Er nad yw'n rhan uniongyrchol o'r rhanbarth, mae'r Swdan wedi ymladd rhyfel cartref 15 mlynedd o hyd sydd wedi costio mwy na dau yn ôl pob tebyg
miliwn o fywydau, ac yr oedd y rhyfel hwn wedi cael ei gefnogi gan elfenau Islamaidd llinell galed yn y gogledd Arabaidd. Mae Somalia hefyd wedi
wedi bod yn lleoliad rhyfel cartref ers hynny 1991 sydd wedi caniatáu i gelloedd Islamaidd weithredu yn y wlad honno.a

Prin fod terfysgaeth a rhyfela anghymesur yn nodweddion newydd o gydbwysedd milwrol y Dwyrain Canol, ac go brin mai Islamicextremiaeth yw unig ffynhonnell trais eithafol. Mae llawer o wahaniaethau ethnig a sectyddol difrifol yn y Dwyrain Canol, ac mae'r rhain wedi arwain ers amser maith at drais achlysurol o fewn gwladwriaethau penodol, ac weithiau i wrthdaro sifil mawr. Mae'r rhyfeloedd cartref yn Yemen a Gwrthryfel Dhofar yn Oman yn enghreifftiau, felly hefyd hanes hir rhyfel cartref yn Libanus a Syria yn atal grwpiau gwleidyddol Islamaidd a oedd yn gwrthwynebu cyfundrefn Hafez al-Asad yn dreisgar.. Grym cynyddol Sefydliad Rhyddhad Palestina (PLO) arweiniodd at ryfel cartref yn yr Iorddonen ym Medi 1970. Chwyldro Iran yn 1979 yn cael ei ddilyn gan ymladd gwleidyddol difrifol, ac ymdrech i allforio chwyldro theocratic a helpodd i sbarduno Rhyfel Iran-Irac. Mae Bahrain a Saudi Arabia ill dau wedi cael gwrthdaro sifil rhwng yr elites sy’n rheoli Sunni a Shi’ites gelyniaethus ac arweiniodd y gwrthdaro hyn at drais sylweddol yn achos Saudi Arabia., fodd bynnag, wedi bod yn hanes hir o eithafiaeth Islamaidd treisgar yn y rhanbarth, weithiau annog byregimes a ddaeth yn ddiweddarach yn darged yr union Islamists yr oeddent yn eu cefnogi i ddechrau. Ceisiodd Sadat ddefnyddio symudiadau Islamaidd i wrthwynebu ei wrthwynebiad seciwlar yn yr Aifft dim ond i gael ei lofruddio gan un mudiad o'r fath ar ôl cytundeb ei heddwch ag Israel. Roedd Israel yn meddwl ei bod yn ddiogel noddi symudiadau Islamaidd ar ôl hynny 1967 fel cownter i'r PLO, dim ond i weld ymddangosiad cyflym o grwpiau treisgar gwrth-Israel. Gogledd a De Yemen oedd lleoliad coups a rhyfeloedd cartref ers y 1960au cynnar, a rhyfel cartref yn Ne Yemen a arweiniodd yn y pen draw at ddymchwel ei threfn a'i huno â Gogledd Yemen yn 1990. Arweiniodd cwymp y shah at feddiant Islamaidd yn Iran, ac ysgogodd gwrthwynebiad i oresgyniad y Sofietiaid yn Afghanistan adwaith Islamaidd sy'n dal i ddylanwadu ar y Dwyrain Canol a'r byd Islamaidd cyfan. Bu'n rhaid i Saudi Arabia ddelio â gwrthryfel yn y Grand Mosg ym Mecca yn 1979. Roedd cymeriad crefyddol y gwrthryfel hwn yn rhannu llawer o elfennau o'r symudiadau a gododd ar ôl i'r Sofietiaid dynnu'n ôl o Afghanistan a Rhyfel y Gwlff ym 1991. Ymdrechion Algeria i atal buddugoliaeth pleidiau gwleidyddol Islamaidd mewn etholiad democrataidd yn 1992 yn cael eu dilyn gan ryfel cartref sydd wedi para byth ers hynny. Ymladdodd yr Aifft frwydr hir a llwyddiannus i raddau helaeth gyda'i heithafwyr Islamicaidd ei hun yn y 1990au, ond nid yw'r Aifft ond wedi llwyddo i atal symudiadau o'r fath yn hytrach na'u dileu. Yng ngweddill y Byd Arabaidd, helpodd y rhyfeloedd cartref yn Kosovo a Bosnia i greu cadres eithafol Islamaidd newydd. Dioddefodd Saudi Arabia o ddau ymosodiad terfysgol mawr o'r blaen 2001. Tarodd yr ymosodiadau hyn mewn canolfan Hyfforddi Gwarchodlu Cenedlaethol a barics USAF yn Al Khobar, ac ymddengys fod o leiaf un yn ganlyniad Islamicextremists. Moroco, Libya, Tunisia, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, ac mae Yemen i gyd wedi gweld symudiadau Islamaidd llinell galed yn dod yn fygythiad cenedlaethol difrifol. Er nad ydynt yn rhan uniongyrchol o'r rhanbarth, mae'r Swdan wedi ymladd rhyfel cartref 15 mlynedd o hyd sydd fwy na thebyg wedi costio dros ddwy filiwn o fywydau, ac yr oedd y rhyfel hwn wedi cael ei gefnogi gan elfenau Islamaidd llinell galed yn y gogledd Arabaidd. Mae Somalia hefyd wedi bod yn lleoliad rhyfel cartref ers hynny 1991 mae hynny wedi caniatáu i gelloedd Islamaidd weithredu yn y wlad honno.

| Chwef 13, 2010 | sylwadau 0
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