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The Besok Arab

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktober 6, 1981, dimaksudkan untuk menjadi hari perayaan di Mesir. Ini menandai peringatan momen kemenangan terbesar Mesir dalam tiga konflik Arab-Israel, ketika tentara yang diunggulkan negara itu melintasi Terusan Suez pada hari-hari pembukaan 1973 Perang Yom Kippur dan mengirim pasukan Israel mundur. keren, pagi tak berawan, stadion Kairo penuh sesak dengan keluarga Mesir yang datang untuk melihat militer menopang perangkat kerasnya. Di stan peninjauan, Presiden Anwar el-Sadat,arsitek perang, menyaksikan dengan puas saat pria dan mesin berparade di hadapannya. Saya berada di dekatnya, koresponden asing yang baru tiba. Tiba-tiba, salah satu truk tentara berhenti tepat di depan tribun peninjauan tepat ketika enam jet Mirage menderu di atas dalam pertunjukan akrobatik, melukis langit dengan jejak merah panjang, kuning, ungu,dan asap hijau. Sadat berdiri, tampaknya bersiap untuk saling memberi hormat dengan satu lagi kontingen pasukan Mesir. Dia menjadikan dirinya target sempurna bagi empat pembunuh Islam yang melompat dari truk, menyerbu podium, dan membanjiri tubuhnya dengan peluru. Saat para pembunuh melanjutkan untuk apa yang tampak selamanya untuk menyemprot stand dengan api mematikan mereka, Saya mempertimbangkan sejenak apakah akan jatuh ke tanah dan berisiko diinjak-injak sampai mati oleh penonton yang panik atau tetap berjalan dan berisiko terkena peluru nyasar.. Naluri menyuruhku untuk tetap berdiri, dan rasa kewajiban jurnalistik saya mendorong saya untuk mencari tahu apakah Sadat masih hidup atau sudah mati.

Islam Reformasi

Adnan Khan

Perdana Menteri Italia, Silvio Berlusconi membual setelah peristiwa 9/11:
“…kita harus sadar akan keunggulan peradaban kita, sistem yang telah menjamin

kesejahteraan, penghormatan terhadap hak asasi manusia dan – berbeda dengan negara-negara Islam – menghormati

untuk hak agama dan politik, sebuah sistem yang memiliki nilai-nilai pemahaman tentang keragaman

dan toleransi…Barat akan menaklukkan masyarakat, seperti itu menaklukkan komunisme, bahkan jika itu

berarti konfrontasi dengan peradaban lain, yang islami, terjebak di mana itu

1,400 tahun yang lalu…”1

Dan dalam 2007 laporan yang dinyatakan oleh lembaga RAND:
“Perjuangan yang berlangsung di sebagian besar dunia Muslim pada dasarnya adalah perang

ide ide. Hasilnya akan menentukan arah masa depan dunia Muslim.”

Membangun Jaringan Muslim moderat, Institut RAND

Konsep 'islah' (pembaruan) adalah konsep yang tidak diketahui oleh umat Islam. Itu tidak pernah ada di seluruh

sejarah peradaban islam; itu tidak pernah diperdebatkan atau bahkan dipertimbangkan. Sekilas tentang klasik

Literatur Islam menunjukkan kepada kita bahwa ketika para ulama klasik meletakkan dasar-dasar ushul, dan dikodifikasi

aturan Islam mereka (fiqh) mereka hanya mencari pemahaman tentang aturan-aturan Islam untuk

terapkan. Situasi serupa terjadi ketika aturan-aturan ditetapkan untuk hadits, tafsir dan

bahasa Arab. Cendekiawan, pemikir dan intelektual sepanjang sejarah Islam menghabiskan banyak waktu

memahami wahyu Allah - Al-Qur'an dan menerapkan ayat-ayat pada realitas dan diciptakan

prinsip dan disiplin untuk memfasilitasi pemahaman. Oleh karena itu Al-Qur'an tetap menjadi dasar

studi dan semua disiplin ilmu yang berkembang selalu berlandaskan Al-Qur’an. Mereka yang menjadi

terpikat oleh filsafat Yunani seperti para filosof Muslim dan beberapa dari kalangan Mut’azilah

dianggap telah meninggalkan Islam karena Al-Qur'an tidak lagi menjadi dasar studi mereka. Jadi untuk

Muslim mana pun yang mencoba menyimpulkan aturan atau memahami sikap apa yang harus diambil atas suatu hal tertentu

masalah Al-Qur'an adalah dasar dari penelitian ini.

Upaya pertama untuk mereformasi Islam terjadi pada pergantian abad ke-19.. Pada giliran

abad umat telah berada dalam periode penurunan yang panjang di mana keseimbangan kekuatan global bergeser

dari Khilafah ke Inggris. Masalah pemasangan melanda Khilafah sementara Eropa Barat masuk

di tengah revolusi industri. Umat ​​menjadi kehilangan pemahamannya yang murni tentang Islam, dan

dalam upaya untuk membalikkan penurunan yang melanda Utsmani (Ottoman) beberapa Muslim dikirim ke

Barat, dan sebagai hasilnya menjadi terpesona oleh apa yang mereka lihat. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi dari Mesir (1801-1873),

sekembalinya dari Paris, menulis buku biografi berjudul Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (Itu

Ekstraksi Emas, atau Sekilas tentang Paris, 1834), memuji kebersihan mereka, cinta pekerjaan, dan di atas

semua moralitas sosial. Dia menyatakan bahwa kita harus meniru apa yang sedang dilakukan di Paris, menganjurkan perubahan pada

masyarakat Islam dari liberalisasi perempuan ke sistem pemerintahan. Pikiran ini, dan yang lainnya suka,

menandai awal dari tren reinventing dalam Islam.

PRECISION DI GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Tujuh tahun setelah September 11, 2001 (9/11) serangan, banyak ahli percaya bahwa al-Qa'ida telah mendapatkan kembali kekuatannya dan bahwa para peniru atau afiliasinya lebih mematikan daripada sebelumnya. Perkiraan Intelijen Nasional dari 2007 menegaskan bahwa al-Qa'ida sekarang lebih berbahaya daripada sebelumnya 9/11.1 Emulator Al-Qaeda terus mengancam Barat, Timur Tengah, dan negara-negara Eropa, seperti dalam plot yang digagalkan pada bulan September 2007 di Jerman. Bruce Riedel menyatakan: Sebagian besar berkat keinginan Washington untuk pergi ke Irak daripada memburu para pemimpin al Qaeda, organisasi sekarang memiliki basis operasi yang kuat di tanah tandus Pakistan dan waralaba yang efektif di Irak barat. Jangkauannya telah menyebar ke seluruh dunia Muslim dan di Eropa . . . Osama bin Laden telah melakukan kampanye propaganda yang sukses. . . . Idenya sekarang menarik lebih banyak pengikut dari sebelumnya.
Memang benar bahwa berbagai organisasi salafi-jihadis masih bermunculan di seluruh dunia Islam. Mengapa tanggapan dengan sumber daya yang besar terhadap terorisme Islam yang kami sebut jihad global tidak terbukti sangat efektif??
Pindah ke alat "kekuatan lunak",” bagaimana dengan keberhasilan upaya Barat untuk mendukung umat Islam dalam Perang Global Melawan Teror? (GWOT)? Mengapa Amerika Serikat memenangkan begitu sedikit "hati dan pikiran" di dunia Islam yang lebih luas?? Mengapa pesan strategis Amerika tentang masalah ini bermain sangat buruk di kawasan?? Mengapa, terlepas dari ketidaksetujuan Muslim yang luas terhadap ekstremisme seperti yang ditunjukkan dalam survei dan pernyataan resmi oleh para pemimpin Muslim utama, memiliki dukungan untuk bin Ladin sebenarnya meningkat di Yordania dan di Pakistan?
Monograf ini tidak akan meninjau kembali asal-usul kekerasan Islamis. Alih-alih, ini berkaitan dengan jenis kegagalan konseptual yang secara keliru membangun GWOT dan yang membuat umat Islam enggan mendukungnya. Mereka tidak dapat mengidentifikasi dengan tindakan penanggulangan transformatif yang diusulkan karena mereka melihat beberapa keyakinan dan institusi inti mereka sebagai target dalam
usaha ini.
Beberapa tren yang sangat bermasalah mengacaukan konseptualisasi Amerika tentang GWOT dan pesan strategis yang dibuat untuk melawan Perang itu. Ini berevolusi dari (1) pendekatan politik pasca-kolonial terhadap Muslim dan negara-negara mayoritas Muslim yang sangat bervariasi dan karenanya menghasilkan kesan dan efek yang saling bertentangan dan membingungkan; dan (2) sisa ketidaktahuan umum dan prasangka terhadap Islam dan budaya subregional. Tambahkan ke kemarahan Amerika ini, takut, dan kecemasan tentang peristiwa mematikan 9/11, dan elemen tertentu yang, terlepas dari desakan kepala yang lebih dingin, meminta pertanggungjawaban umat Islam dan agama mereka atas perbuatan buruk para pemeluk agama mereka, atau yang merasa berguna untuk melakukannya karena alasan politik.

MESIR'S MUSLIM BROTHERS: KONFRONTASI ATAU INTEGRASI?

Riset

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. menanggapi, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, rezim harus mengambil langkah awal untuk menormalkan partisipasi Ikhwanul Muslimin dalam kehidupan politik. Saudara Muslim, yang aktivitas sosialnya telah lama ditoleransi tetapi perannya dalam politik formal sangat terbatas, memenangkan yang belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya 20 persen kursi parlemen di 2005 pemilihan. Mereka melakukannya meskipun bersaing hanya untuk sepertiga dari kursi yang tersedia dan meskipun ada banyak rintangan, termasuk represi polisi dan kecurangan pemilu. Keberhasilan ini menegaskan posisi mereka sebagai kekuatan politik yang sangat terorganisir dengan baik dan mengakar. Pada waktu bersamaan, itu menggarisbawahi kelemahan oposisi hukum dan partai yang berkuasa. Rezim mungkin telah bertaruh bahwa sedikit peningkatan dalam perwakilan parlemen Ikhwanul Muslimin dapat digunakan untuk memicu ketakutan akan pengambilalihan oleh kelompok Islam dan dengan demikian menjadi alasan untuk menghentikan reformasi.. Jika begitu, strateginya berisiko besar menjadi bumerang.

Kesinambungan organisasi Ikhwanul Muslimin di Mesir

Tess Lee Eisenhart

Sebagai gerakan oposisi tertua dan paling menonjol di Mesir, masyarakat

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimin, telah lama menjadi tantangan bagi sekuler berturut-turut
rezim dengan menawarkan visi yang komprehensif tentang negara Islam dan sosial yang luas
layanan kesejahteraan. Sejak didirikan pada 1928, persaudaraan (Ikhwan) telah berkembang di
sektor layanan keagamaan dan sosial paralel, umumnya menghindari konfrontasi langsung dengan
rezim yang berkuasa.1 Baru-baru ini selama dua dekade terakhir, Namun, Persaudaraan memiliki
mencoba-coba keberpihakan di ranah politik formal. Eksperimen ini mencapai puncaknya
pemilihan delapan puluh delapan Bruder di Majelis Rakyat pada tahun 2005—yang terbesar
blok oposisi dalam sejarah Mesir modern—dan penangkapan berikutnya terhadap hampir
1,000 Brothers.2 Kemajuan elektoral ke dalam politik arus utama memberikan banyak makanan
bagi para sarjana untuk menguji teori dan membuat prediksi tentang masa depan orang Mesir
rezim: apakah itu akan jatuh ke oposisi Islam atau tetap menjadi mercusuar sekularisme di
dunia Arab?
Tesis ini menghindar dari membuat spekulasi luas seperti itu. Sebagai gantinya, itu menjelajah

sejauh mana Ikhwanul Muslimin telah beradaptasi sebagai sebuah organisasi di masa lalu
dasawarsa.

ANTARA KEMARIN DAN HARI INI

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
Di atas dasar Al-Quran ini agar saleh sosial negara Islam pertama muncul, having unshakeable faith in dia, cermat menerapkannya, dan menyebar ke seluruh dunia, sehingga Khilafah pertama digunakan untuk mengatakan: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, Saya akan menemukannya dalam Kitab Allah. ". He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (AS), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, dan provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Konstantinopel dari timur dan mengepungnya sampai pengepungan semakin melelahkan. Kemudian datang dari barat,
terjun ke Spanyol, dengan tentara pemenangnya mencapai jantung Prancis dan menembus sejauh utara dan Italia selatan. Ini mendirikan negara yang mengesankan di Eropa Barat, berseri dengan ilmu dan pengetahuan.
Setelah itu, itu mengakhiri penaklukan Konstantinopel itu sendiri dan Kekristenan yang terbatas di dalam wilayah terlarang dari Eropa Tengah. Armada Islam berkelana ke kedalaman Laut Tengah dan Laut Merah, keduanya menjadi danau islam. Dan angkatan bersenjata negara Islam diasumsikan supremasi laut baik di Timur dan Barat, menikmati penguasaan mutlak atas darat dan laut. Negara-negara Islam ini telah bergabung dan menggabungkan banyak hal dari peradaban lain, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. Itu Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

The Kehidupan Hasan Al Banna & Syed Qutb.

Ikhwanul Muslimin (Ikhwan al Muslimin) didirikan oleh Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) di kota al . Mesir- Ismailiyah dalam 1928. Putra seorang ulama Azhari, yang mencari nafkah dengan memperbaiki jam tangan, Hasan al-Banna menunjukkan sejak awal
masa sekolah merupakan kecenderungan dan semangat besar untuk menyeru orang kepada nilai-nilai dan tradisi Islam. Rasa religiusitas dan kesadaran spiritualnya yang kuat mendorongnya untuk bergabung dengan tarekat Hasafiyyah, salah satu dari sekian banyak tarekat sufi yang tersebar luas di Mesir saat itu. Meskipun dia tidak secara resmi terkait dengan tarekat ini setelah dia mendirikan Ikhwan, dia, namun demikian, menjaga hubungan baik dengannya, seperti halnya dengan organisasi-organisasi Islam dan tokoh-tokoh agama lainnya, dan bertahan dalam melafalkan litani (penghargaan, tolong. kemauan) dari tarekat ini sampai hari-hari terakhirnya. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .

Dalam Shadow dari Caesar Arab: Sayyid Quthb dan Radikalisasi Fundamentalisme Islam Modern

Riset

“We are the umma of the believers, living within a jahili society. As a community of believers we should see ourselves in a state of war with the state and the society. The territory we dwell in is the House of War.”1 These were the words of Sayyid Qutb in an Egyptian military court in April, 1966 before he and two of his companions were sentenced to death by hanging. The offense; conspiring against the government and plotting its overthrow, the evidence used by the state prosecutors in the trial, besides ‘confessions,’ a book, Qutb’s final piece of literature, Ma‘alim fi al-Turuq, Signposts.2 This study does not set out to be a thorough analysis of the political and religious ideology of Sayyid Qutb. Rather it is an attempt to identify the political and social climate in Egypt as the primary motivation which led to the development of Qutb’s radical interpretations of Islam. Notions of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism dominated the political discourse of Qutb’s Egypt and hearts and minds were enraptured by promises of its populist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This chapter in Arab history from the early 1950’s until the late 1960’s is etched in historical memory as the era of pan-Arabism. Namun, it was also a vital period in the evolution of fundamentalist Islam into its more radical form which first expressed itself in the 1970’s and is until today at the base of radical fundamentalist Islamic thought worldwide. This piece will
demonstrate the principal role played by Sayyid Qutb in this transformation and reveal that radical interpretations of Islam were given impetus to develop in Egypt during this period due to the nature of Nasser’s regime

MESIR: KEAMANAN, POLITIK, Dan Islamis TANTANGAN

Sherifa Zuhur

This monograph addresses three issues in contemporary Egypt: failures of governance and political development, kekuatan terus Islamisme, and counter terrorism. It is easier to tackle their contours in Egypt if they are considered separately. Mereka tidak, Namun, terpisah atau independen; continuing to treat them as mutually exclusive conditions will lead to further crisis down the road.
The Egyptian government forged a truce with its most troublesome Islamist militants in 1999. Namun, violence emerged again from new sources of Islamist militancy from 2003 ke 2006. All of the previously held conclusions about the role of state strength
versus movements that led to the truce are now void as it appears that “al-Qa’idism” may continue to
wabah negara atau, memang, wilayah secara keseluruhan.
Karena itu, an important process of political liberalization was slowed, dan dalam 3 untuk 4 tahun, if not earlier, Egypt’s political security and stability will be at risk. Widespread economic and political discontent might push that date forward. Selain, continuing popular support for moderate Islamism could lead to a situation where the current peace could erode if a
comprehensive peace settlement to the Palestinian- Arab-Israeli conflict is achieved, dan jika berbagai lainnya
faktor adalah untuk ikut bermain.

METAMORFOSIS SAUDARA MUSLIM MESIR

Mona El-Ghobashy

Jihane al-Halafawi’s small apartment above a barbershop in Alexandria is exceedingly

orderly, a cool oasis on a sweltering summer afternoon. Plant leaves brush up against
curtains undulating with the breeze from the nearby Mediterranean. As she walks into
the living room with a tray full of cakes and tea, al-Halafawi is the picture of a kindly
Egyptian mother, a genuine smile gracing her youthful face. But when this fifty-yearold
mother of six and grandmother announced her candidacy for Egypt’s parliamentary
elections in fall 2000, the state geared up amassive security force outside polling stations;
leftists shrugged her off as a “front” for her husband; and state feminists dedicated to the
electoral empowerment of women were silent.When Halafawi outperformed her rulingparty
rival in the first round, despite rigging, the Interior Ministry promptly stepped in
and canceled the results on the pretext of respecting an earlier court ruling postponing
the elections.
Alexandria’s al-Raml district went without parliamentary representation for two years

s al-Halafawi and her legal team battled the state in the courts. Akhirnya, in June 2002,
a Supreme Administrative Court ruling compelled the Interior Ministry to hold the
by-elections.On election day, security forces blockaded roads leading to polling stations,
arrested al-Halafawi’s legal team and 101 of her supporters, roughed up journalists, dan
stepped aside as public-sector workers bused in from outside the district voted for her

rival. Unusually, the six o’clock news was interrupted that evening to announce the
sweeping victory of the two ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates in the
Raml by-elections.1
Al-Halafawi’s experience is one dramatic piece of a larger story, the story of the

group of which she is a part: the Society of Muslim Brothers (Jamaat al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimun).2 Over the past quarter-century, the Society of Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan)
has morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic organization led by
anointed elders into a modern, multivocal political association steered by educated,

savvy professionals not unlike activists of the same age in rival Egyptian political
parties. Seventy-seven years ago, the Muslim Brothers were founded in the provincial
city of Ismailiyya by the charismatic disciplinarian and shrewd organizer Hasan al-
Banna (1906–49).

The History of the Muslim Brotherhood

Michelle Paison

We in the West !nd it incomprehensible that theological ideas still in”ame the minds of men, stirring up messianic passions that can leave societies in ruin. We had assumed that this was no longer possible,that human beings had learned to separate religious questions from political ones, that political theology died in 16h-century Europe. We were wrong.1Islam is no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a total framework for all aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life in the Muslim world. Although Islam has continuously demonstrated the theme of resurgence throughout its history in response to the internal and external forces that challenge Muslim faith and society, the assertion of Islamism has strongly reemerged. Discontent is evident through the gradual movement towards Islamist ideology, whether or not the idea ofIslam strongly resonates among the populous. Individuals, despondentfrom the suppression of alternatives from oppressive regimes, look towards change. Organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, provide clear examples of the greater trend developing throughout the region ofthe Middle East and North Africa. #e political power and social in”uenceheld by the Brotherhood capitalizes on the Arab Republic of Egypt’s failureto support its peoples. Subsequently the dissatis!ed population turns to a movement that has the ability to provide the necessary services for survival;Islamism. #is increasing development is pushing moderate, mainstream Islam into the realm of radicalism through means of desperation.Part of the emergence of neorevivalism, the Muslim Brotherhood,established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, saw the Islamic community at a critical crossroads and insisted that Muslims would !nd strength in the totalself-su$ciency of Islam.

The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood

Amr Al-Chobaki


The Muslim Brotherhood managed to maintain its organizational existence since its establishment in 1928, by the late Hasan Al-Banna. Throughout eight decades, it has managed to exist as a religious movement as well as a political and social organization. This, on one hand, helped it to be sufficiently strong to be distinguished from other political powers, but also made it weak and feeble in some other ways.

The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement is similar to other Egyptian political movements, as it was established at the time of the royal regime and a semi-liberal era. It clashed with the government during the time of President `Abd Al-Nasser, adapted to the regime of President Sadat, and tended to fluctuate in its relationship with President Mubarak, however, the relationship was based on partial elimination, just like the state during the age of President `Abd Al-Nasser. Moreover, it has been outlawed for most of its history; since 1954 until the present time (i.e. more than half a century).

The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to be both a witness and a party in the political and cultural dispute in Egypt and the Arab countries, throughout different historical periods; Egypt in the time of the royal regime and in the time of the republic with its three stages. This dispute was about issues of identity and cultural belonging, the relationship between the religion – on one hand – and politics, the East and the West on the other hand, as well as the coming and the inherited. The Muslim Brotherhood had a flexible political and intellectual reference that gave it a comprehensive conception of Islam.

Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Dr. Israel Elad Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last twoyears has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up fordissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to takeinitiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a politicalorganization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks.Western governments, including the government of the United States, are consideringthe MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advancedemocracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Couldthe Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), twoIslamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules ofliberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with,respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handledthe ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the pasttwo years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to newcircumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has itreacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign? How has itnavigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forceson the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? Towhat extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt toward liberaldemocracy?

Will Politics Tame Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood?

NEIL MacFARQUHAR


CAIRO, Dec. 7 – When stumping through the port city of Alexandria, whose crumbling mansions and rickety tram lines evoke long-faded glory, Sobhe Saleh of the Muslim Brotherhood vowed he had a different vision for Egypt’s future.

“If Islam were applied, no one would be hungry,” he roared recently to a crowd of fully veiled women ululating with joy. “Islam is a religion of construction. Islam is a religion of investment. Islam is a religion of development.”

Religion, in fact, should profoundly alter both Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy, said Mr. Saleh, a 52-year-old lawyer with a clipped helmet of steel-gray hair.

“If Islam were applied, the television would not show us prostitution and people lacking all decency!” he declared. “If Islam were applied, Iraq could not have been invaded, Israel could not occupy Jerusalem, and aggression could not have been used to humiliate Muslims everywhere!”

A long-expected day of reckoning is at hand in Egyptian politics now that the Brotherhood, an illegal organization with a violent past, is entering the corridors of power for the first time in significant numbers.

The outcome of the freest election in more than 50 years could determine whether political Islam will turn Egypt into a repressive, anti-American theocracy or if Islamic parties across the Arab world will themselves be transformed by participating in mainstream politics.

No sudden earthquake is expected. But initial results from the final round of voting on Wednesday showed that the Brotherhood had gained at least 12 more seats to bring its total to 88, with seven races from all three rounds still unsettled, according to a spokesman. That is five times the 17 seats the group won in 2000.

Democratization and Islamic Politics:

YOKOTA Takayuki�

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratizationand Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizbal-Wasaṭ).Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic politicalorganizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. On the other hand,this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continueto act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, however, Islamic political parties are oftensuspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as ajustification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood(Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is amainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Someof the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order tobreak this stalemate.There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platformof the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principlesof the Wasat Party as follows: democracy, sharī‘a (Islamic law), rights of women, and Muslim-Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups thathave appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004]discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the WasatParty from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology andactivities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As theseearlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s,I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratizationmovement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, suchas the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews withits members.

ISLAMISM IN SOUTHERN EGYPT

James Toth

For years, religious violence and terrorism in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypthave splashed across the headlines and surged across the screen, announcing yet anotherround of senseless death and destruction. While Arabists and Islamicists attemptto pick their way carefully through the ideological and intellectual minefields to makesense of what is happening, the wider public generally disregards their insights andinstead sticks to what it knows best: deeply ingrained prejudices and biases. Egyptian,Arab, Muslim—all are painted in a very unfavorable light. Even in Egypt, manybystanders show the same sorry prejudices. In the end, people simply blame the brutalityon inexplicable backward religious ideas and then move on.Yet comprehending terrorism and violence in places such as Egypt by recourse toan unnuanced religious fundamentalism is generally acknowledged not only to begthe question of why these events actually happen, but also to lead to misunderstandingsand misperceptions, and perhaps even to exacerbating existing tensions.1 Mostscholars agree that such seemingly “irrational” social behavior instead needs to beplaced in its appropriate context to be properly understood, and hence made rational.Analyzing these actions, then, involves situating this violence and destruction in theireconomic, political, and ideological milieu as these have developed historically, forthis so-called Islamic terrorism does not merely arise, ex nihilo, out of a timeless void.What follows, then, is one case study of one portion of the Islamic movement as itemerged principally in southern Egypt and as it was revealed through anthropologicalfieldwork conducted in one of this region’s major cities. This account takes a completelydifferent direction from that of stigmatizing this movement as a sordid collectionof terrorist organizations hell bent on the senseless destruction of Egypt and itsIslamic civilization.2 Because this view is somewhat at odds with the perceptions oflocal spectators, Egyptians in Cairo, and non–Egyptians inside and outside the country,I go to some length not only to discuss the movement itself but also to shed lighton why it might have received such negative publicity.