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El demà àrab

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Octubre 6, 1981, havia de ser un dia de celebració a Egipte. Va marcar l'aniversari de la victòria més gran d'Egipte en tres conflictes àrabs-israelians, quan l'exèrcit desfavorit del país va creuar el canal de Suez en els primers dies de la 1973 La guerra del Yom Kippur i va enviar tropes israelianes en retirada. En un fresc, matí sense núvols, l'estadi del Caire estava ple de famílies egípcies que havien vingut a veure com l'exèrcit posava el seu maquinari. A l'estand de revisió, President Anwar el-Sadat,l'arquitecte de la guerra, observava amb satisfacció com homes i màquines desfilaven davant seu. Estava a prop, un corresponsal estranger acabat d'arribar.De sobte, un dels camions de l'exèrcit es va aturar directament davant de l'estand de revisió just quan sis avions Mirage rugien per sobre en una actuació acrobàtica., pintant el cel amb llargs estels de vermell, groc, porpra,i fum verd. Sadat es va aixecar, aparentment es prepara per intercanviar salutacions amb un altre contingent de tropes egípcies. Es va convertir en un objectiu perfecte per a quatre assassins islamistes que van saltar del camió, va assaltar el podi, i va cridar el seu cos amb bales. Mentre els assassins van continuar durant el que va semblar una eternitat ruixant el suport amb el seu foc mortal., Vaig pensar per un instant si topar a terra i arriscar-me a ser trepitjat fins a la mort per espectadors en pànic o romandre a peu i arriscar-me a agafar una bala perduda.. L'instint em va dir que em mantingués de peu, i el meu sentit del deure periodístic em va impulsar a anar a saber si Sadat era viu o mort.

reforma Islàmica

Adnan Khan

El primer ministre italià, Silvio Berlusconi va presumir després dels fets de 9/11:
“...hem de ser conscients de la superioritat de la nostra civilització, un sistema que té garantit

benestar, respecte als drets humans i – en contrast amb els països islàmics – respecte

pels drets polítics i religiosos, un sistema que té els seus valors comprensió de la diversitat

i tolerància... Occident conquistarà els pobles, com si va conquerir el comunisme, encara que això

significa un enfrontament amb una altra civilització, la islàmica, enganxat on estava

1,400 fa anys..." 1

I en a 2007 informe l'institut RAND va declarar:
"La lluita en curs a gran part del món musulmà és essencialment una guerra de

idees. El seu resultat determinarà la direcció futura del món musulmà".

Construir xarxes musulmanes moderades, Institut RAND

El concepte d'"islah" (reforma) és un concepte desconegut pels musulmans. No va existir mai al llarg del

història de la civilització islàmica; mai va ser debatut ni tan sols considerat. Un cop d'ull al clàssic

La literatura islàmica ens mostra que quan els estudiosos clàssics van posar les bases d'usul, i codificat

els seus governs islàmics (fiqh) només buscaven la comprensió de les regles islàmiques per tal de

aplicar-los. Una situació similar es va produir quan es van establir les regles per al hadiz, tafseer i el

llenguatge àrab. Estudiosos, pensadors i intel·lectuals al llarg de la història islàmica van passar molt de temps

entendre la revelació d'Al·là: l'Alcorà i aplicar l'ayaat a les realitats i encunyades

principis i disciplines per tal de facilitar la comprensió. Per tant, l'Alcorà va seguir sent la base

l'estudi i totes les disciplines que van evolucionar es van basar sempre en l'Alcorà. Els que es van convertir

encisat per la filosofia grega com els filòsofs musulmans i alguns d'entre els Mut'azilah

es considerava que havien abandonat l'islam quan l'Alcorà va deixar de ser la seva base d'estudi. Així per

qualsevol musulmà que intenti deduir regles o entendre quina posició s'ha d'adoptar davant d'un determinat

L'Alcorà és la base d'aquest estudi.

El primer intent de reforma de l'islam es va produir a principis del segle XIX. Pel torn del

segle, la Ummah havia estat en un llarg període de decadència on l'equilibri de poder global va canviar

del Khilafah a la Gran Bretanya. Els problemes creixents van engolir el Khilafah mentre hi havia Europa occidental

en plena revolució industrial. La Ummah va arribar a perdre la seva comprensió prístina de l'Islam, i

en un intent de revertir la decadència que va engolir la dels Uthmani (otomans) alguns musulmans van ser enviats a la

oest, i com a resultat van quedar encisats pel que van veure. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi d'Egipte (1801-1873),

al seu retorn de París, va escriure un llibre biogràfic anomenat Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (la

Extracció d'or, o una visió general de París, 1834), lloant la seva neteja, amor pel treball, i a dalt

tota la moral social. Va declarar que hem d'imitar el que es fa a París, defensant canvis a

la societat islàmica des de la liberalització de les dones als sistemes de govern. Aquest pensament, i d'altres semblants,

va marcar l'inici de la tendència reinventadora de l'islam.

PRECISIÓ EN LA GUERRA GLOBAL AL ​​TERROR:

sherifa Zuhur

Set anys després del setembre 11, 2001 (9/11) atacs, molts experts creuen que Al-Qaida ha recuperat força i que els seus imitadors o afiliats són més letals que abans. L'estimació de la Intel·ligència Nacional 2007 va afirmar que Al-Qaida és més perillós ara que abans 9/11.1 Els emuladors d'Al-Qaida continuen amenaçant Occident, Orient Mitjà, i les nacions europees, com a la trama frustrada al setembre 2007 a Alemanya. Bruce Riedel afirma: Gràcies en gran part a l'afany de Washington per anar a l'Iraq en lloc de perseguir els líders d'Al Qaeda., l'organització compta ara amb una sòlida base d'operacions als badlands del Pakistan i una franquícia efectiva a l'oest de l'Iraq.. El seu abast s'ha estès pel món musulmà i per Europa . . . Osama bin Laden ha realitzat una campanya de propaganda reeixida. . . . Les seves idees atrauen ara més seguidors que mai.
És cert que encara estan sorgint diverses organitzacions salafistes-jihadistes arreu del món islàmic. Per què les respostes amb molts recursos al terrorisme islamista que anomenem jihad global no han demostrat ser extremadament efectives?
Passant a les eines del "poder suau,Què passa amb l'eficàcia dels esforços occidentals per reforçar els musulmans en la Guerra Global contra el Terror (quota)? Per què els Estats Units han guanyat tan pocs "cors i ments" al món islàmic més ampli?? Per què els missatges estratègics nord-americans sobre aquest tema juguen tan malament a la regió?? Per què, malgrat l'àmplia desaprovació musulmana de l'extremisme tal com es mostra a les enquestes i declaracions oficials de líders musulmans clau, ha augmentat el suport a Bin Ladin a Jordània i al Pakistan?
Aquesta monografia no revisarà els orígens de la violència islamista. Es tracta, en canvi, d'un tipus de fracàs conceptual que construeix erròniament el GWOT i que desanima els musulmans a donar-hi suport.. No poden identificar-se amb les contramesures transformadores proposades perquè discerneixen algunes de les seves creences i institucions bàsiques com a objectius en
aquest esforç.
Diverses tendències profundament problemàtiques confonen les conceptualitzacions nord-americanes del GWOT i els missatges estratègics dissenyats per lluitar contra aquesta guerra.. Aquests evolucionen a partir de (1) enfocaments polítics postcolonials dels musulmans i les nacions de majoria musulmana que varien molt i, per tant, produeixen impressions i efectes conflictius i confusos.; i (2) la ignorància generalitzada residual i els prejudicis cap a l'islam i les cultures subregionals. Afegeix a aquesta ira americana, por, i ansietat pels esdeveniments mortals de 9/11, i determinats elements que, malgrat les instàncies dels caps més freds, responsabilitzar els musulmans i la seva religió per les feines dels seus correligionaris, o que consideren útil fer-ho per motius polítics.

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. En resposta, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 eleccions. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Al mateix temps, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Llegeix Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Des de la seva fundació a 1928, the Brotherhood (germà) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, malgrat això, la Germandat té
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
règim: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. En canvi, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

ENTRE Ahir I AVUI

HASAN AL-BANNA

El primer Estat Islàmic
Sobre la base d'aquest virtuós ordre social corànic va sorgir el primer estat islàmic, tenir una fe inquebrantable en això, aplicant-lo minuciosament, i difondre'l per tot el món, així que deia el primer Khilafah: ‘Si jo hauria de perdre el plom d'un camell, Ho trobaria al Llibre d'Al·là.'. Va lluitar contra els que es van negar a pagar el zakah, respecte com a apòstats perquè havien enderrocat un dels pilars d'aquest orde, dient: ‘Per Al·là, si es van negar em lliurarien una pista que lliurarien a l'apòstol d'Al·là (PBUH), Jo lluitaria amb ells tan bon punt tingués un espasa a la mà!'Per la unitat, en tots els seus significats i manifestacions, va impregnar aquesta nova nació propera.
La unitat social completa va sorgir de fer universal l'ordre alcorà i el seu llenguatge, tot plegat polític la unitat estava sota l'ombra de l'Amir Al-Mumineen i sota l'estendard del Khilafah a la capital.
El fet que la ideologia islàmica fos una de descentralització de les forces armades, les hisendes estatals, i els governadors provincials no van ser cap obstacle per a això, ja que tots actuaven segons un únic credo i un unit i control integral. Els principis alcorànics van dissipar i acabar amb la idolatria supersticiosa que predominava a la península aràbiga i Pèrsia. Van desterrar el judaisme enganyós i el van limitar a una província estreta, posar fi a la seva autoritat religiosa i política. Van lluitar amb el cristianisme de tal manera que la seva influència va ser molt disminuït als continents asiàtic i africà, limitada només a Europa sota la guàrdia dels bizantins Imperi a Constantinoble. Així, l'estat islàmic es va convertir en el centre del domini espiritual i polític interior els dos continents més grans. Aquest estat va persistir en els seus atacs contra el tercer continent, agredint Constantinoble des de l'est i assetjant-lo fins que el setge es va fer cansat. Llavors hi va arribar des de l'oest,
enfonsant-se a Espanya, amb els seus soldats victoriosos arribant al cor de França i penetrant fins al nord i el sud d'Itàlia. Va establir un estat imponent a l'Europa occidental, radiant de ciència i coneixement.
Després, va posar fi a la pròpia conquesta de Constantinoble i al cristianisme confinat dins de l'àrea restringida d'Europa central. Les flotes islàmiques es van aventurar a les profunditats del Mediterrani i del mar Roig, tots dos es van convertir Llacs islàmics. I així les forces armades de l'estat islàmic van assumir la supremacia dels mars tant a l'est i oest, gaudint d'un domini absolut sobre terra i mar. Aquestes nacions islàmiques ja s'havien combinat i va incorporar moltes coses d'altres civilitzacions, però van triomfar amb la força de la seva fe i la solidesa del seu sistema sobre els altres. Els van arabitzar, o ho va aconseguir fins a cert punt, i eren capaç d'oblidar-los i convertir-los a l'esplendor, bellesa i vitalitat de la seva llengua i religió. la Els musulmans eren lliures d'adoptar qualsevol cosa beneficiosa d'altres civilitzacions, en la mesura que no ha tingut efectes adversos sobre la seva unitat social i política.

The Lives of Hasan al Banna & Syed Qutb.

The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al Muslimeen) was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in the Egyptian town of al- Isma’iliyyah in 1928. The son of an Azharite scholar, who earned his livelihood by repairing watches, Hasan al-Banna showed from his early
school-days an inclination and great zeal for calling people to Islamic values and traditions. His strong sense of religiosity and spiritual awareness drove him to join the Hasafiyyah tariqah, one of many Sufi tariqahs that were widespread in Egypt at that time. Even though he was not formally associated with this tariqah after he founded the Ikhwan, he, nevertheless, maintained a good relation with it, as indeed with other Islamic organizations and religious personalities, and persisted in reciting the litanies (awrad, pl. of wird) of this tariqah until his last days. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .

In the Shadow of an Arab Caesar: Sayyid Qutb and the Radicalization of Modern Islamic Fundamentalism

Research

“We are the umma of the believers, living within a jahili society. As a community of believers we should see ourselves in a state of war with the state and the society. The territory we dwell in is the House of War.”1 These were the words of Sayyid Qutb in an Egyptian military court in April, 1966 before he and two of his companions were sentenced to death by hanging. The offense; conspiring against the government and plotting its overthrow, the evidence used by the state prosecutors in the trial, besides ‘confessions,’ a book, Qutb’s final piece of literature, Ma‘alim fi al-Turuq, Signposts.2 This study does not set out to be a thorough analysis of the political and religious ideology of Sayyid Qutb. Rather it is an attempt to identify the political and social climate in Egypt as the primary motivation which led to the development of Qutb’s radical interpretations of Islam. Notions of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism dominated the political discourse of Qutb’s Egypt and hearts and minds were enraptured by promises of its populist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This chapter in Arab history from the early 1950’s until the late 1960’s is etched in historical memory as the era of pan-Arabism. malgrat això, it was also a vital period in the evolution of fundamentalist Islam into its more radical form which first expressed itself in the 1970’s and is until today at the base of radical fundamentalist Islamic thought worldwide. This piece will
demonstrate the principal role played by Sayyid Qutb in this transformation and reveal that radical interpretations of Islam were given impetus to develop in Egypt during this period due to the nature of Nasser’s regime

EGYPT: SECURITY, POLÍTIC, AND ISLAMIST CHALLENGES

sherifa Zuhur

This monograph addresses three issues in contemporary Egypt: failures of governance and political development, the continued strength of Islamism, and counter terrorism. It is easier to tackle their contours in Egypt if they are considered separately. They are not, malgrat això, separate or independent; continuing to treat them as mutually exclusive conditions will lead to further crisis down the road.
The Egyptian government forged a truce with its most troublesome Islamist militants in 1999. malgrat això, violence emerged again from new sources of Islamist militancy from 2003 into 2006. All of the previously held conclusions about the role of state strength
versus movements that led to the truce are now void as it appears that “al-Qa’idism” may continue to
plague the country or, indeed, the region as a whole.
In consequence, an important process of political liberalization was slowed, and in 3 per 4 anys, if not earlier, Egypt’s political security and stability will be at risk. Widespread economic and political discontent might push that date forward. A més, continuing popular support for moderate Islamism could lead to a situation where the current peace could erode if a
comprehensive peace settlement to the Palestinian- Arab-Israeli conflict is achieved, and if various other
factors were to come into play.

LA METAMORFOSI DELS GERMANS MUSULMANS EGIPCI

Mona El-Ghobashy

El petit apartament de Jihane al-Halafawi a sobre d'una barberia a Alexandria és molt gran

ordenada, un oasi fresc en una sufocant tarda d'estiu. Les fulles de les plantes s'enfronten
cortines ondulant amb la brisa del proper Mediterrani. Mentre ella entra
el saló amb una safata plena de pastissos i te, al-Halafawi és la imatge d'un amable
mare egípcia, un somriure genuí adorna el seu rostre juvenil. Però quan aquest cinquanta anys
mare de sis fills i àvia van anunciar la seva candidatura al Parlament d'Egipte
eleccions a la tardor 2000, l'estat va preparar una força de seguretat massiva fora dels col·legis electorals;
els esquerrans la van rebutjar com un "front" per al seu marit; i feministes estatals dedicades a la
l'empoderament electoral de les dones va callar. Quan Halafawi va superar el seu partit al govern
rival a la primera volta, malgrat l'aparell, el Ministeri de l'Interior va intervenir ràpidament
i va cancel·lar els resultats amb el pretext de respectar una sentència judicial anterior que ajornava
les eleccions.
El districte d'Al-Raml d'Alexandria va quedar sense representació parlamentària durant dos anys

s al-Halafawi i el seu equip legal van lluitar contra l'estat als tribunals. Finalment, al juny 2002,
una sentència del Tribunal Administratiu Suprem va obligar el Ministeri de l'Interior a celebrar la
eleccions parcials.El dia de les eleccions, les forces de seguretat van bloquejar les carreteres que conduïen als col·legis electorals,
va arrestar l'equip legal d'al-Halafawi i 101 dels seus partidaris, periodistes maltractats, i
es va fer al costat mentre els treballadors del sector públic que van arribar amb autobús des de fora del districte la van votar

rival. Inusualment, el informatiu de les sis es va interrompre aquella tarda per anunciar el
victòria contundent dels dos governants Partit Nacional Democràtic (NDP) candidats a la
eleccions parcials Raml.1
L'experiència d'Al-Halafawi és una peça dramàtica d'una història més gran, la història de la

grup del qual forma part: la Societat de Germans Musulmans (Jamaat al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimun).2 Over the past quarter-century, the Society of Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan)
has morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic organization led by
anointed elders into a modern, multivocal political association steered by educated,

savvy professionals not unlike activists of the same age in rival Egyptian political
parties. Seventy-seven years ago, the Muslim Brothers were founded in the provincial
city of Ismailiyya by the charismatic disciplinarian and shrewd organizer Hasan al-
Banna (1906–49).

The History of the Muslim Brotherhood

Michelle Paison

We in the West !nd it incomprehensible that theological ideas still in”ame the minds of men, stirring up messianic passions that can leave societies in ruin. We had assumed that this was no longer possible,that human beings had learned to separate religious questions from political ones, that political theology died in 16h-century Europe. We were wrong.1Islam is no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a total framework for all aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life in the Muslim world. Although Islam has continuously demonstrated the theme of resurgence throughout its history in response to the internal and external forces that challenge Muslim faith and society, the assertion of Islamism has strongly reemerged. Discontent is evident through the gradual movement towards Islamist ideology, whether or not the idea ofIslam strongly resonates among the populous. Individuals, despondentfrom the suppression of alternatives from oppressive regimes, look towards change. Organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, provide clear examples of the greater trend developing throughout the region ofthe Middle East and North Africa. #e political power and social in”uenceheld by the Brotherhood capitalizes on the Arab Republic of Egypt’s failureto support its peoples. Subsequently the dissatis!ed population turns to a movement that has the ability to provide the necessary services for survival;Islamism. #is increasing development is pushing moderate, mainstream Islam into the realm of radicalism through means of desperation.Part of the emergence of neorevivalism, the Muslim Brotherhood,established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, saw the Islamic community at a critical crossroads and insisted that Muslims would !nd strength in the totalself-su$ciency of Islam.

The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood

Amr Al-Chobaki


The Muslim Brotherhood managed to maintain its organizational existence since its establishment in 1928, by the late Hasan Al-Banna. Throughout eight decades, it has managed to exist as a religious movement as well as a political and social organization. This, on one hand, helped it to be sufficiently strong to be distinguished from other political powers, but also made it weak and feeble in some other ways.

The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement is similar to other Egyptian political movements, as it was established at the time of the royal regime and a semi-liberal era. It clashed with the government during the time of President `Abd Al-Nasser, adapted to the regime of President Sadat, and tended to fluctuate in its relationship with President Mubarak, however, the relationship was based on partial elimination, just like the state during the age of President `Abd Al-Nasser. Moreover, it has been outlawed for most of its history; since 1954 until the present time (i.e. more than half a century).

The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to be both a witness and a party in the political and cultural dispute in Egypt and the Arab countries, throughout different historical periods; Egypt in the time of the royal regime and in the time of the republic with its three stages. This dispute was about issues of identity and cultural belonging, the relationship between the religion – on one hand – and politics, the East and the West on the other hand, as well as the coming and the inherited. The Muslim Brotherhood had a flexible political and intellectual reference that gave it a comprehensive conception of Islam.

Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Dr. Israel Elad Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last twoyears has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up fordissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to takeinitiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a politicalorganization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks.Western governments, including the government of the United States, are consideringthe MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advancedemocracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Couldthe Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), twoIslamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules ofliberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with,respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handledthe ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the pasttwo years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to newcircumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has itreacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign? How has itnavigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forceson the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? Towhat extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt toward liberaldemocracy?

Will Politics Tame Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood?

NEIL MacFARQUHAR


CAIRO, Dec. 7 – When stumping through the port city of Alexandria, whose crumbling mansions and rickety tram lines evoke long-faded glory, Sobhe Saleh of the Muslim Brotherhood vowed he had a different vision for Egypt’s future.

“If Islam were applied, no one would be hungry,” he roared recently to a crowd of fully veiled women ululating with joy. “Islam is a religion of construction. Islam is a religion of investment. Islam is a religion of development.”

Religion, in fact, should profoundly alter both Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy, said Mr. Saleh, a 52-year-old lawyer with a clipped helmet of steel-gray hair.

“If Islam were applied, the television would not show us prostitution and people lacking all decency!” he declared. “If Islam were applied, Iraq could not have been invaded, Israel could not occupy Jerusalem, and aggression could not have been used to humiliate Muslims everywhere!”

A long-expected day of reckoning is at hand in Egyptian politics now that the Brotherhood, an illegal organization with a violent past, is entering the corridors of power for the first time in significant numbers.

The outcome of the freest election in more than 50 years could determine whether political Islam will turn Egypt into a repressive, anti-American theocracy or if Islamic parties across the Arab world will themselves be transformed by participating in mainstream politics.

No sudden earthquake is expected. But initial results from the final round of voting on Wednesday showed that the Brotherhood had gained at least 12 more seats to bring its total to 88, with seven races from all three rounds still unsettled, according to a spokesman. That is five times the 17 seats the group won in 2000.

Democratization and Islamic Politics:

YOKOTA Takayuki�

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratizationand Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizbal-Wasaṭ).Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic politicalorganizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. On the other hand,this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continueto act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, however, Islamic political parties are oftensuspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as ajustification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood(Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is amainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Someof the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order tobreak this stalemate.There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platformof the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principlesof the Wasat Party as follows: democracy, sharī‘a (Islamic law), rights of women, and Muslim-Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups thathave appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004]discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the WasatParty from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology andactivities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As theseearlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s,I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratizationmovement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, suchas the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews withits members.

ISLAMISM IN SOUTHERN EGYPT

James Toth

For years, religious violence and terrorism in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypthave splashed across the headlines and surged across the screen, announcing yet anotherround of senseless death and destruction. While Arabists and Islamicists attemptto pick their way carefully through the ideological and intellectual minefields to makesense of what is happening, the wider public generally disregards their insights andinstead sticks to what it knows best: deeply ingrained prejudices and biases. Egyptian,Arab, Muslim—all are painted in a very unfavorable light. Even in Egypt, manybystanders show the same sorry prejudices. In the end, people simply blame the brutalityon inexplicable backward religious ideas and then move on.Yet comprehending terrorism and violence in places such as Egypt by recourse toan unnuanced religious fundamentalism is generally acknowledged not only to begthe question of why these events actually happen, but also to lead to misunderstandingsand misperceptions, and perhaps even to exacerbating existing tensions.1 Mostscholars agree that such seemingly “irrational” social behavior instead needs to beplaced in its appropriate context to be properly understood, and hence made rational.Analyzing these actions, then, involves situating this violence and destruction in theireconomic, political, and ideological milieu as these have developed historically, forthis so-called Islamic terrorism does not merely arise, ex nihilo, out of a timeless void.What follows, then, is one case study of one portion of the Islamic movement as itemerged principally in southern Egypt and as it was revealed through anthropologicalfieldwork conducted in one of this region’s major cities. This account takes a completelydifferent direction from that of stigmatizing this movement as a sordid collectionof terrorist organizations hell bent on the senseless destruction of Egypt and itsIslamic civilization.2 Because this view is somewhat at odds with the perceptions oflocal spectators, Egyptians in Cairo, and non–Egyptians inside and outside the country,I go to some length not only to discuss the movement itself but also to shed lighton why it might have received such negative publicity.