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DEIVIDS B. OTAVEJA

Oktobris 6, 1981, bija paredzēta kā svinību diena Ēģiptē. Tā atzīmēja gadadienu kopš Ēģiptes grandiozākā uzvaras brīža trīs arābu un Izraēlas konfliktos, kad valsts zemākā armija šķērsoja Suecas kanālu tā atklāšanas dienās 1973 Jomkipuras karā un nosūtīja Izraēlas karaspēku atkāpjoties. Uz vēsuma, bez mākoņiem rīts, Kairas stadions bija pārpildīts ar ēģiptiešu ģimenēm, kas bija ieradušās, lai apskatītu militāros spēkus. Uz apskates stenda, prezidents Anvars el-Sadats,kara arhitekts, ar gandarījumu vēroja, kā viņa priekšā defilēja vīri un mašīnas. Es biju tuvumā, tikko ieradies ārzemju korespondents.Pēkšņi, viena no armijas kravas automašīnām apstājās tieši pretī apskates stendam, kamēr sešas Mirage lidmašīnas rūca virs galvas akrobātiskā priekšnesumā, krāsojot debesis ar garām sarkanām takām, dzeltens, violets,un zaļie dūmi. Sadats piecēlās, acīmredzot gatavojas apmainīties salūtam ar vēl vienu Ēģiptes karaspēka kontingentu. Viņš padarīja sevi par ideālu mērķi četriem islāmistu slepkavām, kas izlēca no kravas automašīnas, iebruka tribīnē, un apbēra viņa ķermeni ar lodēm.Kamēr slepkavas turpināja kādu mūžību apsmidzināt stendu ar savu nāvējošo uguni., Uz mirkli apsvēru, vai trāpīt zemē un riskēt, ka panikā esošie skatītāji mani samīdīs līdz nāvei, vai arī palikt kājās un riskēt saņemt nomaldījušos lodi. Instinkts lika man palikt uz kājām, un mana žurnālista pienākuma apziņa mudināja mani doties noskaidrot, vai Sadats ir dzīvs vai miris.

Egypt at the Tipping Point ?

Deivids B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubaraks, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 to 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.