RSS태그가 지정된 모든 항목: "알제리"

아랍의 내일

데이비드 B. 오타웨이

십월 6, 1981, 이집트에서 축하의 날이 될 예정이었습니다.. 세 번의 아랍-이스라엘 분쟁에서 이집트가 승리한 가장 위대한 순간의 기념일이었습니다., 국가의 약자 군대가 개항일에 수에즈 운하를 가로질러 진격했을 때 1973 욤 키푸르 전쟁과 이스라엘 군대가 후퇴하도록 보냈습니다.. 멋진, 구름 없는 아침, 카이로 경기장은 군대가 철물을 뽐내고 있는 모습을 보기 위해 온 이집트 가족들로 가득 찼습니다., 안와르 엘 사다트 대통령,전쟁의 건축가, 사람과 기계가 그의 앞에서 행진하는 것을 만족스럽게 지켜보았다.. 나는 근처에 있었다, 새로 도착한 외신기자.갑자기, 6대의 미라지 제트기가 곡예 공연을 펼치며 머리 위에서 포효하는 동안 군용 트럭 중 하나가 심사대 바로 앞에서 멈췄다., 긴 붉은 궤적으로 하늘을 그리다, 노란색, 자주색,그리고 녹색 연기. 사다트가 일어섰다, 또 다른 이집트 군대와 경례를 교환할 준비를 하고 있는 것 같다.. 그는 트럭에서 뛰어내린 4명의 이슬람 암살자들의 완벽한 표적이 되었습니다., 연단을 습격했다, 그리고 그의 몸을 총알로 뒤덮었습니다. 살인자들은 그들의 치명적인 불을 스탠드에 뿌리기 위해 영원할 것 같았습니다., 나는 순간적으로 땅에 부딪혀 패닉에 빠진 관중들에게 짓밟혀 죽을지, 아니면 발을 헛디디며 길 잃은 총알을 맞을지 고민했다.. 본능은 내 발에 머물라고 말했다, 저널리스트로서의 의무감으로 인해 사다트가 살았는지 죽었는지 알아보러 가야 했습니다..

자유민주주의와 정치적 이슬람: 공통점 찾기.

모스 타파 벤 헨다

이 논문은 민주주의와 이슬람 정치 이론 사이의 대화를 확립하고자 합니다.1 이들 사이의 상호 작용은 수수께끼입니다.: 예를 들어, 민주주의와 이상적인 이슬람 정치 개념 사이에 존재하는 관계를 설명하기 위해
정권, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. For example, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (at least, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. In other words, 우리는 "신정주의"에서 민주적인 것이 무엇인지 알아 내려고 노력해야 합니다.. 마지막까지, 규범적 정치 사상의 인상적인 다양성과 이슬람 전통 중, 우리는 본질적으로 Abu 'Ala Maududi와 이집트의 지식인 Sayyed Qutb로 거슬러 올라가는 폭넓은 생각의 흐름에 초점을 맞춥니다., 그것은 서구에서 비롯된 가치의 확산에 대한 가장 도전적인 반대의 기초에 놓여 있습니다.. 종교적 가치를 바탕으로, 이 추세는 자유 민주주의에 대한 정치적 모델 대안을 정교화했습니다.. 넓게 말하면, 이 이슬람 정치 모델에 포함된 민주주의 개념은 절차적이다.. 약간의 차이가 있음, 이 개념은 일부 입헌주의자와 정치학자들이 옹호하는 민주주의 이론에서 영감을 받았습니다., 특정 지점까지. For example, 그것은 대중 주권의 개념에 의존하지 않으며 종교와 정치 사이의 분리를 요구하지 않습니다.. 이 논문의 첫 번째 목표는 이러한 미니멀리즘 개념을 정교화하는 것입니다.. 우리는 이 개념을 그것의 도덕적 개념으로부터 분리하기 위해 그것을 자세히 재언급합니다. (선심 쓰는) 기초, 여기에서 고려되는 특정 이슬람 관점에서 논쟁의 여지가있는 것. 물론, 민주적 절차는 일반적으로 개인 자율성의 원칙에서 파생됩니다., 이것은 이러한 이슬람 이론에 의해 지지되지 않습니다.11 여기, 우리는 그러한 원칙이 민주적 절차를 정당화하는 데 필요하지 않다는 것을 보여줍니다..

이슬람 정치 문화, 민주주의, 및 인권

다니엘. 가격

이슬람이 권위주의를 조장한다는 주장이 있다., 서구 사회의 가치와 모순, 이슬람 국가의 중요한 정치적 결과에 중대한 영향을 미칩니다.. 따라서, 학자, 해설자, 정부 관리들은 자유민주주의에 대한 차기 이념적 위협으로 '이슬람 근본주의'를 자주 지적한다.. 이 보기, 하지만, 주로 텍스트 분석을 기반으로 합니다., 이슬람 정치 이론, 개별 국가의 임시 연구, 다른 요인을 고려하지 않는 것. 나는 이슬람의 텍스트와 전통이, 다른 종교와 마찬가지로, 다양한 정치 시스템과 정책을 지원하는 데 사용할 수 있습니다.. 국가별 및 기술적인 연구는 이슬람 세계의 국가 전반에 걸쳐 이슬람과 정치 간의 다양한 관계를 설명하는 데 도움이 되는 패턴을 찾는 데 도움이 되지 않습니다.. 따라서, 연구에 대한 새로운 접근
이슬람과 정치의 연결이 필요하다.
나는 제안한다, 이슬람과의 관계에 대한 엄격한 평가를 통해, 민주주의, 그리고 국가적 차원의 인권, 정치적 세력으로서의 이슬람의 힘이 너무 강조되고 있다는 사실을. 나는 먼저 비교 사례 연구를 사용합니다., 이슬람 그룹과 정권 간의 상호 작용과 관련된 요소에 중점을 둡니다., 경제적 영향, 인종 분열, 사회 발전, 8개국의 정치에 대한 이슬람의 영향력의 차이를 설명하기 위해. 나는 많은 힘을 주장한다.
이슬람 국가의 정책 및 정치 시스템의 원동력으로 이슬람을 이전에 언급한 요인으로 더 잘 설명할 수 있습니다.. 나는 또한 찾는다, 일반적인 믿음에 반하는, 이슬람 정치 집단의 힘이 증가하는 것은 종종 정치 체제의 완만한 다원화와 관련이 있다는 것.
나는 이슬람 정치 문화의 지표를 구축했다, 이슬람법의 활용 정도와 활용 여부에 따라, 그렇다면, 어떻게,서양 사상, 기관, 및 기술이 구현됩니다., 이슬람과 민주주의, 이슬람과 인권 사이의 관계의 본질을 시험하기 위해. 이 지표는 통계 분석에 사용됩니다., 여기에는 23개 주로 이슬람 국가의 표본과 23개의 비무슬림 개발도상국으로 구성된 통제 그룹이 포함됩니다.. 비교할 뿐만 아니라
이슬람 국가에서 비이슬람 개발도상국으로, 통계 분석을 통해 민주주의 수준과 개인의 권리 보호에 영향을 미치는 것으로 밝혀진 다른 변수의 영향을 통제할 수 있습니다.. 결과는 정치와 정책에 대한 이슬람의 영향력에 대한 보다 현실적이고 정확한 그림이어야 합니다..

아랍 세계의 민주주의 논쟁

Ibtisam Ibrahim |

민주주의란 무엇인가?
서구 학자들은 민주주의를 개인의 시민적, 정치적 권리를 보호하는 방법으로 정의합니다.. 표현의 자유를 보장합니다, 누르다, 신앙, 의견, 소유권, 및 조립, 투표권뿐만 아니라, 공직을 공천하다. 헌팅턴 (1984) 정치체제는 가장 강력한 집단적 의사결정자가 다음을 통해 선출된다는 점에서 민주적이라고 주장한다.
후보자가 자유롭게 투표권을 놓고 경쟁하고 거의 모든 성인이 투표할 수 있는 정기 선거. 로스스타인 (1995) 민주주의는 정부의 한 형태이며 상황에 따라 변화하고 적응하는 거버넌스의 과정이라고 말합니다.. 그는 또한 민주주의에 대한 서구의 정의를 덧붙입니다. — 책임 외에도, 경쟁, 어느 정도 참여 — 중요한 시민적 및 정치적 권리를 보장합니다.. 앤더슨 (1995) 민주주의라는 용어는 후보자가 투표를 위해 자유롭게 경쟁하고 사실상 모든 성인 인구가 투표할 자격이 있는 정기 선거를 통해 가장 강력한 집단 의사 결정자가 선택되는 시스템을 의미한다고 주장합니다.. 사드 에딘 이브라힘 (1995), 이집트 학자, 아랍 세계에 적용될 수 있는 민주주의는 평화로운 통치를 가능하게 하기 위해 고안된 일련의 규칙과 제도로 본다.
경쟁 그룹 및/또는 상충되는 이해 관계 관리. 하나, 사미르 아민 (1991) 민주주의에 대한 그의 정의는 사회적 마르크스주의적 관점에 기초했다.. 그는 민주주의를 두 가지 범주로 나눕니다.: 개인의 권리와 개인의 자유에 기초한 부르주아 민주주의, 그러나 사회적 평등 없이; 그리고 사회의 모든 사람들에게 투표권과 정부와 제도적 대표자를 선출할 권리를 부여하는 정치적 민주주의.
이 섹션을 마치려면, 나는 민주주의가 무엇인지 또는 무엇이 아닌지를 정확하게 나타내는 단 하나의 민주주의 정의는 없다고 말하고 싶습니다.. 하나, 우리가 눈치 챘을 때, 위에서 언급한 대부분의 정의에는 본질적으로 유사한 요소가 있습니다. – 책임, 경쟁, 그리고 어느 정도 참여 – 서구 세계와 국제적으로 지배적이 된.

이라크와 정치적 이슬람의 미래

제임스 피스 카토리

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?", where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(ㅏ) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

이슬람과 민주주의

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

이슬람 정치 문화, 민주주의, 및 인권

다니엘. 가격

이슬람이 권위주의를 조장한다는 주장이 있다., contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. 따라서, 학자, 해설자, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. 이 보기, 하지만, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, 이슬람 정치 이론, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, 다른 요인을 고려하지 않는 것. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, 다른 종교와 마찬가지로,
다양한 정치 시스템과 정책을 지원하는 데 사용할 수 있습니다.. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. 따라서, 연구에 대한 새로운 접근
이슬람과 정치의 연결이 필요하다.
나는 제안한다, 이슬람과의 관계에 대한 엄격한 평가를 통해,
민주주의, 그리고 국가적 차원의 인권, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, 경제적 영향, 인종 분열,

사회 발전, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

이슬람 야당과 EU 참여 가능성

토비 아처

하이디 후우타 넨

이슬람 세계에서 이슬람주의 운동의 중요성이 증가함에 따라

급진화가 세기의 전환 이후 세계적 사건에 영향을 미친 방식, 그것

EU가 느슨하게 허용되는 범위 내에서 행위자에 대한 정책을 평가하는 것이 중요합니다.

'이슬람 세계'라 불리는. 참여 여부와 방법을 묻는 것이 특히 중요합니다.

다양한 이슬람 단체들과.

이는 EU 내에서도 여전히 논란의 여지가 있습니다.. 어떤 사람들은 이슬람이

이슬람 정당의 배후는 서구의 민주주의 이상과 양립할 수 없다.

인권, 다른 사람들은 성장으로 인해 참여를 현실적인 필요성으로 보고 있습니다.

이슬람 정당의 국내적 중요성과 국제사회에 대한 그들의 증가하는 참여

사무. 또 다른 관점은 이슬람 세계의 민주화가 증가할 것이라는 것이다.

유럽 ​​보안. 여부와 방법에 대한 이들 및 기타 주장의 타당성

EU가 참여해야 하는 것은 다양한 이슬람주의 운동과

그들의 정치적 상황, 나라별.

민주화는 EU의 공동 외교 정책의 핵심 주제입니다., 누워서

기사에서 11 유럽 ​​연합 조약의. 이 문서에서 고려되는 많은 주

보고는 민주적이지 않다, 완전히 민주적이지 않거나. 대부분의 국가에서, 이슬람주의자

정당과 운동은 지배적인 체제에 대한 상당한 반대를 구성한다., 과

일부에서는 가장 큰 야당 블록을 형성합니다.. 유럽 ​​민주주의 국가들은 오랫동안

권위주의적인 통치 체제를 다루다, 그러나 그것을 누르는 것은 새로운 현상입니다.

가장 가능성 있는 수혜자가 있을 수 있는 주에서 민주적 개혁을 위해, ~로부터

EU의 관점, 민주주의와 민주주의에 대한 다양하고 때로는 문제가 되는 접근 방식

관련 가치, 소수자와 여성의 권리, 법치와 같은. 이러한 요금은

종종 이슬람 운동에 반대, 따라서 유럽의 정책 입안자들이

잠재적 파트너의 정책과 철학에 대한 정확한 이해.

다른 나라의 경험은 이슬람이 더 자유로워진다는 것을 암시하는 경향이 있습니다.

파티 허용, 그들의 행동과 생각이 온건할수록. 많은 곳에서

이슬람 정당과 단체가 원래의 목적에서 벗어난 지 오래입니다.

이슬람 법에 의해 통치되는 이슬람 국가를 수립하는 것, 그리고 기본을 받아들이게 되었습니다.

권력을 위한 선거 경쟁의 민주주의 원칙, 다른 정치적 존재

경쟁자, 그리고 정치적 다원주의.

중동의 정치적 이슬람

Are Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, 안에

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. 그럼에도 불구하고, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

정치적 이슬람 참여를 위한 전략

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. 비슷하게, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. 우리. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. 게다가, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

이슬람 정당 : 세 종류의 움직임

타마라 코프만

Between 1991 과 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Today, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
그럼에도 불구하고, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.

정치적 이슬람의 잘못된 측정

마틴 크레이머

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderates” 또는 “reformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.

이슬람교, 이슬람교도, 그리고 중동의 선거 원칙

제임스 피스 카토리

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

정치적 이슬람과 유럽 외교

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

"무슬림 민주주의의 부상”

발리 나스 르

A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Instead, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, 인도네시아, 말레이시아, 파키스탄 (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Islamic law) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

마그레브의 급진 이슬람

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, 레바논, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. ~ 안에 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.