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The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. Odgovarajući na, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic

Party’s (NDP) odbijanje popuštanja stiska riskira pogoršanje napetosti u vrijeme političke neizvjesnosti oko nasljeđivanja predsjednika i ozbiljnih socioekonomskih nemira. Iako će to vjerojatno biti produljeno, postupan proces, režim bi trebao poduzeti preliminarne korake za normalizaciju sudjelovanja Muslimanske braće u političkom životu. Muslimanska braća, čije su se društvene aktivnosti dugo tolerirale, ali čija je uloga u formalnoj politici strogo ograničena, osvojio neviđenu 20 posto zastupničkih mjesta u 2005 izbori. Učinili su to unatoč tome što su se natjecali za samo trećinu raspoloživih mjesta i unatoč značajnim preprekama, uključujući policijsku represiju i izbornu prijevaru. Ovim uspjehom potvrdili su svoju poziciju izuzetno dobro organizirane i duboko ukorijenjene političke snage. U isto vrijeme, ona je naglasila slabosti i legalne oporbe i vladajuće stranke. Režim se mogao kladiti da bi se skromno povećanje zastupljenosti Muslimanske braće u parlamentu moglo iskoristiti za raspirivanje straha od islamističkog preuzimanja vlasti i time poslužiti kao razlog za odugovlačenje reforme. Ako je tako, strategija je pod velikim rizikom od povratnog učinka.

Popularni stereotipi na Zapadu naginju postuliranju progresivnog, racionalan, i slobodni Zapad protiv nazadnjaka, ugnjetavački, i prijeteći islamu. Istraživanja javnog mnijenja provedena u Sjedinjenim Državama tijekom 1990-ih otkrila su dosljedan obrazac Amerikanaca koji muslimane označavaju kao "vjerske fanatike" i smatraju islamski etos temeljno "antidemokratskim".1 Ove karakterizacije

i nedoumice imaju, iz očitih razloga, značajno pogoršalo od tragedije od 9/11. Međutim, te se percepcije ne odražavaju samo u popularnoj svijesti ili grubim medijskim prikazima. Cijenjeni znanstvenici također su pridonijeli ovoj klimi mišljenja pišući o navodno nepomirljivim razlikama između islama i Zapada, famozni “sukob civilizacija” koji je navodno skori i neizbježan, te o prividnoj nespojivosti islama i demokracije. Na primjer, Profesor Peter Rodman zabrinut je da smo "izvana izazvani militantnom atavističkom silom vođenom mržnjom prema cjelokupnoj zapadnoj političkoj misli koja se vraća na prastare pritužbe protiv kršćanskog svijeta." Dr. Daniel Pipes proglašava da muslimani izazivaju Zapad dublje nego što su komunisti ikada učinili, jer “dok se komunisti ne slažu s našom politikom, fundamentalistički muslimani preziru cijeli naš način života.” Profesor Bernard Lewis mračno upozorava na “povijesnu reakciju drevnog rivala protiv našeg judeo-kršćanskog nasljeđa, naša svjetovna sadašnjost, i širenje obojega.” pita se profesor Amos Perlmutter: “Je li islam, fundamentalistički ili neki drugi, kompatibilan s predstavničkom demokracijom zapadnog stila usmjerenom na ljudska prava? Odgovor je jasno NE.” A profesor Samuel Huntington sugerira s poletom da "problem nije islamski fundamentalizam, nego sam islam«. Bilo bi intelektualno lijeno i prostodušno odbaciti njihove stavove kao temeljene samo na inatu ili predrasudama. Zapravo, ako se zanemari neko retoričko pretjerano, neke od njihovih optužbi, iako nezgodan za muslimane, relevantni su za raspravu o odnosu islama i demokracije u modernom svijetu. Na primjer, položaj žena ili ponekad nemuslimana u nekim muslimanskim zemljama je problematičan u smislu navodne pravne jednakosti svih ljudi u demokraciji. Na sličan način, netrpeljivost koju su neki muslimani usmjerili prema piscima (npr., Salman Rushdie u Velikoj Britaniji, Taslima Nasrin u Bangladešu, i profesor Nasr Abu Zaid u Egiptu) tobože ugrožava načelo slobode govora, što je bitno za demokraciju.

Također je istina da manje od 10 od više od 50 članice Organizacije islamske konferencije institucionalizirale su demokratska načela ili procese kako ih se shvaća na Zapadu, i to također, samo okvirno. Konačno, vrsta unutarnje stabilnosti i vanjskog mira koji je gotovo preduvjet za funkcioniranje demokracije pokvarena je turbulencijama unutarnje implozije ili vanjske agresije vidljive u mnogim muslimanskim zemljama danas (npr., Somalija, Sudan, Indonezija, Pakistan, Irak, Afganistana, Alžir, i Bosne).

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:

(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;

(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.

Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.

Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Politički islam je posljednjih desetljeća u Turskoj dobio povećanu vidljivost. Velik broj studentica počeo je pokazivati ​​svoju predanost nošenjem zabranjenog islamskog pokrivala za glavu u sveučilišnim kampusima, i utjecajna proislamistička TV

kanali su se proširili. Ovaj rad se fokusira na dobrobit (blagostanje) Stranka kao najistaknutiji institucionalni predstavnik političkog islama u Turskoj.

Kratak boravak Stranke blagostanja na vlasti kao vodećeg koalicijskog partnera od sredine 1996. do sredine 1997. bio je vrhunac desetljeća postojanog rasta koji su potpomogle druge islamističke organizacije i institucije. Ove organizacije i ustanove

uključivao je novine i izdavačke kuće koje su privlačile islamističke pisce, brojne islamske zaklade, islamistička konfederacija radničkih sindikata, i islamističko udruženje poslovnih ljudi. Ove su institucije radile u tandemu s, i u prilog, Welfare kao neprikosnoveni vođa i predstavnik političkog islama u Turskoj, iako su imali svoje partikularističke ciljeve i ideale, koji su često odudarali od političkih projekata Welfarea. Fokusirajući se na Stranku blagostanja, zatim, omogućuje analizu šire društvene baze na kojoj je izrastao islamistički politički pokret u Turskoj. Od svrgavanja Welfarea s vlasti i njegovog konačnog zatvaranja, islamistički pokret bio je u rasulu. Ovaj će rad, stoga, ograničiti na razdoblje stranke blagostanja.

Prethodnik Welfare-a, stranka nacionalnog spasa, djelovao je 1970-ih, ali ga je zatvorio vojni režim u 1980. godine osnovan je Welfare 1983 a veliku popularnost stekao je 1990-ih. Počevši s a 4.4 posto glasova na općinskim izborima u 1984, Stranka blagostanja stalno je povećavala svoje rezultate i umnožila svoje glasove gotovo pet puta u dvanaest godina. To je prvo uznemirilo turski sekularni establišment na općinskim izborima u 1994, s 19 posto svih glasova u cijeloj zemlji i gradonačelnička mjesta u Istanbulu i Ankari, zatim na općim izborima od 1995 kada je osvojio pluralitet sa 21.4 posto nacionalnih glasova. Štoviše, Stranka blagostanja je samo nakratko mogla voditi koalicijsku vladu u partnerstvu s desničarskom Strankom pravog puta Tansua C¸ illera.

As the reader will immediately see, the present study is the only one in the series not to have a general point of reference. Instead of addressing a broad issue such as places of worship, it focuses right from the outset on a single issue: the question of mosques, which is identified as a separate issue with its own specific characteristics.

This approach faithfully reflects the current state of affairs, as we will demonstrate in the pages below. Although forms of discrimination on the basis of religion are not completely absent – in particular, cases of discrimination towards certain minority religions or religious beliefs, some of which have even come before the European courts – in no country and in no other case has the opening of places of worship taken on such a high profile in the public imagination as the question of mosques and Islamic places of worship. With the passage of time, the question of mosques has led to more and more frequent disputes, debates, conflicts and posturing, even in countries where such conflicts were previously unknown and mosques were already present. This simple fact already puts us on a road that we might define as ‘exceptionalism’ with reference to Islam: a tendency to see Islam and Muslims as an exceptional case rather than a standard one; a case that does not sit comfortably with others relating to religious pluralism, i

which therefore requires special bodies, actions and specifically targeted reactions, unlike those used for other groups and religious minorities, i (as in the present study) specific research. 8 Conflicts over mosques in Europe An example of this exceptionalism is seen in the forms of representation of Islam in various European countries, which vary from case to case but differ, posebno, with respect to the recognized practices of relations between states and religious denominations in general. The most symbolic case is the creation in various countries, such as France, Španjolska, Belgium and Italy, of collective bodies of Islamic representation, with forms that often contradict the principles of non‑interference in the internal affairs of religious communities proclaimed and enshrined for other denominations and religious minorities. Forms of exceptionalism from a legal, political and social perspective are, međutim, present in many other fields, following a pervasive trend which affects countries with the widest range of state structures and which appears to be in a phase of further growth.

This situation, together with the increasingly evident emergence into the public arena of the dynamics of a conflict involving Islam (a kind of conflict in which the construction of mosques is the most frequent and widespread cause of disagreement), led to a desire to analyse recent cases of conflict, including clashes in countries that are regarded as peripheral within the European Union (MI) ili

that lie beyond its borders. Zbog ovog razloga, we have chosen, contrary to the usual practice, to pay closest attention to the least studied and analysed countries, for which scientific literature is least abundant. Setting off on this supposition, we believe that meaningful data for the interpretation of broader dynamics may emerge from an extensive analysis of the frequency and pervasiveness of these conflicts, which are also affecting countries with a long history of immigration and are more generally affecting the relationship between Islam and Europe.For this reason we conducted a set of empirical investigations across seven European countries that are among the least studied and least known in this respect. We selected three Mediterranean countries which in certain respects vary greatly from one another: two countries in similar situations, where there is new immigration from Muslim countries and the memory of ancient historical domination (Spain and Italy); and one in which there is new immigration

from Muslim countries along with a significant historical Islamic presence (the memory of Turkish Ottoman domination) that poses a number of problems (Greece). Also chosen were two countries which have a very significant historical Islamic presence but which also face a number of new problems (Austria and Bosnia‑Herzegovina); the Nordic country with the largest Islamic presence (Sweden); and a central European country which has a long history of immigration and a particular institutional nature (Belgija). The last of these is also notable for its markedly local management of conflicts, which from a methodological perspective makes it an interesting control group.

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. Trenutno, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. Doista, the non-Muslims of the East and the West

now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.

Nadalje, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, Arapski, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. Na primjer, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and

Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?

There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.

This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Rather, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.

Ova knjiga nastajala je mnogo godina, kako autor objašnjava u svom Predgovoru, iako je većinu stvarnog teksta napisao tijekom godine u kojoj je bio viši znanstveni suradnik u Centru za strateška obavještajna istraživanja. Autor je bio dugogodišnji dekan Škole za obavještajne studije na Združenom vojnom obavještajnom učilištu. Iako se može činiti da je knjigu mogao napisati bilo koji dobar povjesničar ili regionalni stručnjak za jugoistočnu Aziju, ovo je djelo osvijetljeno autorovim više od tri desetljeća službe unutar nacionalne obavještajne zajednice. Njegova regionalna stručnost često se primjenjivala na posebne procjene za Zajednicu. S poznavanjem islama bez premca među svojim vršnjacima i neutaživom žeđu za određivanjem kako bi se ciljevi ove religije mogli odvijati u područjima daleko od fokusa trenutne pažnje većine kreatora politike, autor je maksimalno iskoristio ovu priliku da upozna obavještajnu zajednicu i šire čitateljstvo sa strateškom procjenom regije u jeku pomirenja sekularnih i vjerskih snaga.

Ured za sigurnosnu provjeru odobrio je ovu publikaciju za neograničenu distribuciju, Ministarstvo obrane.

Demokracija je zaokupljala arapske političke mislioce od zore moderne arapske renesanse prije otprilike dva stoljeća. Od tad, koncept demokracije se promijenio i razvio pod utjecajem raznih društvenih i političkih razvoja. Rasprava o demokraciji u arapskoj islamskoj literaturi može se pratiti unatrag do Rifa'a Tahtawija, otac egipatske demokracije prema Lewisu Awadu,[3] koji je nedugo nakon povratka u Kairo iz Pariza objavio svoju prvu knjigu, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, u 1834. Knjiga je sažela njegova zapažanja o manirama i običajima modernih Francuza,[4] i hvalio koncept demokracije kako ju je vidio u Francuskoj i kako je svjedočio njezinoj obrani i ponovnom utvrđivanju kroz 1830 Revolucija protiv kralja Charlesa X.[5] Tahtawi je pokušao pokazati da je demokratski koncept koji je objašnjavao svojim čitateljima kompatibilan s islamskim zakonom. Usporedio je politički pluralizam s oblicima ideološkog i jurisprudencijalnog pluralizma koji je postojao u islamskom iskustvu:

Vjerska sloboda je sloboda vjerovanja, mišljenja i sekte, pod uvjetom da nije u suprotnosti s osnovama vjere . . . Isto bi se odnosilo na slobodu političke prakse i mišljenja vodećih administratora, koji nastoje tumačiti i primjenjivati ​​pravila i odredbe u skladu sa zakonima svojih zemalja. Kraljevi i ministri imaju dopuštenje u području politike da slijede različite rute koje na kraju služe jednoj svrsi: dobra uprava i pravosuđe.[6] Jedan važan orijentir u ovom pogledu bio je doprinos Khairuddina At-Tunisija (1810- 99), vođa reformnog pokreta 19. stoljeća u Tunisu, WHO, u 1867, formulirao opći plan reforme u knjizi pod naslovom Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- povratak (Ravni put do reformskih vlada). Glavna preokupacija knjige bila je bavljenje pitanjem političke reforme u arapskom svijetu. Apelirajući na političare i znanstvenike svoga vremena da traže sva moguća sredstva kako bi se poboljšao položaj

zajednicu i razvijati njenu uljuđenost, upozorio je opću muslimansku javnost da se kloni iskustava drugih naroda na temelju zablude da su svi spisi, izumi, iskustva ili stavove nemuslimana treba odbaciti ili zanemariti.

Khairuddin je nadalje pozvao na kraj apsolutističke vladavine, koje je optuživao za ugnjetavanje nacija i uništenje civilizacija.

Od 2007, Pakistan, though not on the verge of becoming a failed state, nonetheless has been gripped by a series of interrelated crises. As the contributors to this volume demonstrate, Pakistan’s current travails have deep and tangled historical roots. They also demonstrate that Pakistan’s domestic situation historically has been influenced by, and has affected developments in neighboring countries as well as those farther afield.

The origins of many of Pakistan’s troubles today lie not just in the circumstances in which the state of Pakistan emerged, but in the manner in which various domestic political forces have defined and sought to advance their competing visions of the state since independence. Over the years, successive national political leaders, the military, and other actors have appropriated the symbols, institucija, tools of statecraft, and even the rhetoric of Pakistan’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in order to advance their own narrow agendas.

As the contributors emphasize, much of the present turmoil in Pakistan dates from the late 1970s, when the rise to power of General Zia ul Haq and his Islamization program intersected with the momentous events of 1979, most importantly, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The 18 essays comprising this volume examine the tight interplay between these domestic and regional factors, discuss the key domestic and foreign policies adopted during the Zia years, and disclose the heavy cost that Pakistan and its people have borne as a consequence. Taken together, the essays present a grim, tragic account of the past 30 years — of a country’s founding creed violated, much of its resources misspent, and its social fabric rent. And they suggest an uncertain future. U isto vrijeme, međutim, they point hopefully, if not confidently, to what Pakistan’s fragile civilian government must seek to reclaim and can achieve — provided that its leaders prove to be moderate, resourceful, and determined, and that the West (especially the United States) implements policies which support rather than undermine them.

In his Eid-ul-Azha Message to the Nation on October 24, 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared: “My message to you all is of hope, courage and confidence. Let us mobilize all our resources in a systematic and organized way and tackle the grave issues that confront us with grim determination and discipline worthy of a great nation.” More than a half-century has elapsed since Jinnah made this statement, yet the issues facing Pakistan are no less grave. One hopes that the current and next generation of Jinnah’s successors, together with Pakistan’s friends will be able to summon the necessary will and bolster the state’s capacity to deal with these issues effectively.

AMERICA BEGINS A NEW MILLENNIUM AS ONE OF THE MOST RELIGIOUSLY diverse nations of all time. Nowhere else in the world do so many people—offered a choice free from government influence—identify with such a wide range of religious and spiritual communities. Nowhere else has the human search for meaning been so varied. In America today, there are communities and centers for worship representing all of the world’s religions.

The American landscape is dotted with churches, temples, synagogues, and mosques. Zen Buddhist zendos sit next to Pentecostal tabernacles. Hasidic Jews walk the streets with Hindu swamis. Most amazing of all, relatively little conflict has occurred among religions in America. This fact, combined with a high level of tolerance of each other’s beliefs and practices, has let America produce people of goodwill ready to try to resolve any tensions that might emerge. The Faith in America series celebrates America’s diverse religious heritage.

People of faith and ideals who longed for a better world have created a unique society where freedom of religious expression is a keynote of culture. The freedom that America offers to people of faith means that not only have ancient religions found a home

ovdje, but that newer ways of expressing spirituality have also taken root. From huge churches in large cities to small spiritual communities in towns and villages, faith in America has never been stronger. The paths that different religions have taken through

American history is just one of the stories readers will find in this series. Like anything people create, religion is far from perfect. Međutim, its contribution to the culture and its ability to help people are impressive, and these accomplishments will be found in all the books in the series. U međuvremenu, awareness and tolerance of the different paths our neighbors take to the spiritual life has become an increasingly important part of citizenship in America.

Danas, more than ever, America as a whole puts its faith in freedom—the freedom to believe.