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Ислам и стварање државне власти

сеииед вали реза наср

Ин 1979 Генерал Мухамед Зиа ул-Хак, војни владар Пакистана, прогласио да ће Пакистан постати исламска држава. Исламске вредности и норме послужиле би као темељ националног идентитета, закон, привреда, и друштвених односа, и инспирисало би све креирање политике. Ин 1980 Махатхир Мухаммад, нови премијер Малезије, увео сличан план широке основе да укочи креирање државне политике у исламске вредности, и да доведе законе и економске праксе своје земље у складу са учењем ислама. Зашто су ови владари изабрали пут „исламизације“ за своје земље? И како су својевремено секуларне постколонијалне државе постале агенти исламизације и претеча „праве“ исламске државе?
Малезија и Пакистан су од касних 1970-их до почетка 1980-их пратиле јединствен пут развоја који се разликује од искустава других држава Трећег света. У ове две земље верски идентитет је интегрисан у државну идеологију како би се циљ и процес развоја информисао са исламским вредностима.
Овај подухват је такође представио сасвим другачију слику односа између ислама и политике у муслиманским друштвима. У Малезији и Пакистану, то су биле државне институције, а не исламистички активисти (они који заговарају политичко читање ислама; познати и као ревивалисти или фундаменталисти) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, и шире како култура и религија служе потребама државне моћи и развоја. Анализа се овде ослања на теоријске расправе
у друштвеним наукама о понашању државе и улози културе и религије у томе. Важније, извлачи закључке из случајева који се испитују да би донео шире закључке од интереса за дисциплине.

ИСЛАМИСТИЧКИ ЖЕНСКИ АКТИВИЗАМ У ОКУПИРАНОЈ ПАЛЕСТИНИ

Интервјуи Кхаледа Амаиреха

Интервју са Самиром Ал-Халајка

Самеера Ал-Халаика је изабрани члан Палестинског законодавног већа. Она је била

године рођен у селу Шојух код Хеброна 1964. Дипломирала је шеријат (Исламске

Право) са Универзитета Хеброн. Радила је као новинар из 1996 до 2006 када

ушла је у Палестинско законодавно веће као изабрани члан 2006 избори.

Удата је и има седморо деце.

П: У неким западним земљама постоји општи утисак да жене добијају

инфериорног третмана унутар исламских група отпора, као што је Хамас. Да ли је ово истина?

Како се поступа са активисткињама у Хамасу?
Права и дужности муслиманки потичу пре свега из исламског шеријата или закона.

То нису добровољна или добротворна дела или гестови које добијамо од Хамаса или било кога

друго. Тако, што се тиче политичког ангажмана и активизма, жене генерално имају

иста права и дужности као и мушкарци. После свега, жене чине барем 50 посто од

друштво. У извесном смислу, они су читаво друштво јер рађају, и подићи,

нова генерација.

Стога, Могу рећи да је статус жена у Хамасу у потпуности у складу са њом

статус у самом исламу. То значи да је она пуноправни партнер на свим нивоима. Заиста, било би

неправедно и неправедно за ислама (или исламиста ако желите) жена да буде партнер у патњи

док је она искључена из процеса одлучивања. Због тога је улога жене у

Хамас је увек био пионир.

П: Да ли сматрате да је појава женског политичког активизма унутар Хамаса

природни развој који је компатибилан са класичним исламским концептима

у погледу статуса и улоге жене, или је то само неопходан одговор на

притисци модерности и захтеви политичког деловања и наставка

Израелска окупација?

Не постоји текст у исламској јуриспруденцији нити у Хамасовој повељи који спречава жене

политичко учешће. Верујем да је супротно истина — постоје бројни кур'ански стихови

и изреке пророка Мухамеда који позива жене да буду активне у политици и јавности

питања која утичу на муслимане. Али то је тачно и за жене, као што је то за мушкарце, политички активизам

није обавезно већ добровољно, и углавном се одлучује у светлу способности сваке жене,

квалификације и индивидуалне околности. Ипак, показујући бригу за јавност

питања су обавезна за сваког муслимана и муслиманку. Пророк

рекао је Мухамед: „Онај ко не показује бригу за питања муслимана није муслиман.

Штавише, Палестинске исламисткиње морају узети у обзир све објективне факторе на терену

рачуна када одлучује да ли да се укључи у политику или да се укључи у политички активизам.


ИРАНКЕ ПОСЛЕ ИСЛАМСКЕ РЕВОЛУЦИЈЕ

Ансииа Кхаз Аллии


Прошло је више од тридесет година од тријумфа Исламске револуције у Ирану, ипак остају а број питања и нејасноћа о начину на који се Исламска Република и њени закони баве савремени проблеми и актуелне околности, посебно у погледу жена и женских права. Овај кратки рад ће расветлити ова питања и проучити тренутни положај жена у различитим сферама, поредећи ово са ситуацијом пре Исламске револуције. Коришћени су поуздани и проверени подаци где год је могуће. Увод сумира низ теоријских и правних студија које обезбеђују основа за накнадну практичнију анализу и извори су одакле су подаци добијени.
Први део разматра ставове руководства Исламске Републике Иран према женама и женска права, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, тхе relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

размазивање: Како исламофоби шире страх, нетрпељивост и дезинформације

ФАИР

Јулие Холлар

Јим Наурецкас

Претварање исламофобије у мејнстрим:
Како муслимански башари емитују своју нетрпељивост
Невероватна ствар се догодила у Националном кругу критичара књиге (НБЦЦ) номинације у фебруару 2007: Обично високооштра и толерантна група номинована је за најбољу књигу у области критике, књига за коју се нашироко сматра да оцрњује читаву верску групу.
Номинација Бруцеа Бавера Док је Европа спавала: Како радикални ислам уништава Запад изнутра није прошло без контроверзи. Бивши кандидат Елиот Вајнбергер осудио је књигу на годишњем скупу НБЦЦ-а, називајући то „расизмом као критиком“ (Нев Иорк Тимес, 2/8/07). Председник одбора НБЦЦ-а Џон Фриман написао је на блогу групе (Критична маса, 2/4/07): ''Ја никада нисам био
више посрамљен избором него што сам био са филмом Док је Европа спавала Бруса Бавера…. Њена хипервентилирана реторика упућује од стварне критике до исламофобије.''
Иако на крају није освојио награду, Док је Европа спавала признање у највишим књижевним круговима било је амблематично за интеграцију исламофобије, не само у америчком издаваштву већ иу ширим медијима. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, нетрпељивост и дезинформације. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. И не за разлику од оптужби изнетих у класичном документу антисемитизма, Протоколи сионских мудраца, неки од најопаснијих израза исламофобије–као Док је Европа спавала–укључују евокације исламских дизајна да доминирају Западом.
Исламске институције и муслимани, наравно, треба да буде подвргнут истој врсти испитивања и критике као и било ко други. На пример, када Норвешки исламски савет расправља о томе да ли геј мушкарце и лезбејке треба погубити, неко може насилно осудити појединце или групе које деле то мишљење без увлачења свих европских муслимана у то, као што је објавила Баверова пиџама медија (8/7/08),
„Дебата о европским муслиманима: Треба ли погубити гејеве?”
Слично томе, екстремисти који своје насилне акције оправдавају позивањем на неку посебну интерпретацију ислама могу бити критиковани без имплицирања енормно разнолике популације муслимана широм света. После свега, Новинари су успели да прате бомбашки напад Тимотија Меквеја у Оклахома Ситију–присталица расистичке секте хришћанског идентитета–без прибегавања генерализованим изјавама о „хришћанском тероризму“. исто тако, медији су пратили терористичке акте фанатика који су Јевреји–на пример масакр у Хеброну који је извршио Барух Голдштајн (Ектра!, 5/6/94)–без имплицирања целине јудаизма.

Ислам, Политички ислам и Америка

Араб Инсигхт

Да ли је могуће „братство“ са Америком?

халил ал-анани

„Нема шансе да комуницирамо са било којом САД. администрацију све док Сједињене Државе задрже своје дугогодишње виђење ислама као стварне опасности, гледиште које Сједињене Државе ставља у исти чамац као и ционистички непријатељ. Немамо унапред створене идеје о америчком народу или САД. друштво и његове грађанске организације и трустови мозгова. Немамо проблема у комуникацији са америчким народом, али се не улажу адекватни напори да нас зближе,“, рекао је др. Иссам ал-Ириан, шеф политичког одељења Муслиманске браће у телефонском интервјуу.
Ал-Ирианове речи сумирају ставове Муслиманског братства о америчком народу и САД. влада. Остали чланови Муслиманског братства би се сложили, као што би покојни Хасан ал-Бана, који је основао групу у 1928. Ал- Бана је Запад посматрао углавном као симбол моралног пропадања. Друге селефије – исламска школа мишљења која се ослања на претке као узорне моделе – заузели су исти став о Сједињеним Државама, али недостаје идеолошка флексибилност коју заступају Муслиманска браћа. Док Муслиманска браћа верују у укључивање Американаца у грађански дијалог, друге екстремистичке групе не виде смисао у дијалогу и тврде да је сила једини начин да се изборе са Сједињеним Државама.

Исламска реформација

Аднан Кхан

The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi boasted after the events of 9/11:
“…we must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed

well being, respect for human rights andin contrast with Islamic countriesrespect

for religious and political rights, a system that has its values understanding of diversity

and tolerance…The West will conquer peoples, као да је победио комунизам, чак и ако је

значи обрачун са другом цивилизацијом, онај исламски, заглавио тамо где је био

1,400 године…”1

И у а 2007 пријавио је институт РАНД:
„Борба која је у току у већем делу муслиманског света је у суштини рат

идеје. Његов исход ће одредити будући правац муслиманског света.”

Изградња умерених муслиманских мрежа, РАНД Институте

Концепт 'ислах' (реформа) је концепт непознат муслиманима. Никада није постојао у целом

историја исламске цивилизације; о томе се никада није расправљало нити се чак разматрало. Летимичан поглед на класику

Исламска књижевност нам показује да када су класични учењаци поставили темеље усул, и кодификована

њихове исламске владавине (фикх) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to

apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the

Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time

understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined

principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of

study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became

smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah

were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Тако за

сваки муслиман који покушава да изведе правила или схвати какав став треба заузети према одређеном

питање Кур'ана је основа ове студије.

Први покушај реформисања ислама десио се на прелазу из 19. века. До скретања на

века Уммет је био у дугом периоду опадања где се глобална равнотежа снага променила

од Хилафета у Британију. Све већи проблеми захватили су Хилафет док је западна Европа била унутра

усред индустријске револуције. Уммет је изгубио своје исконско разумевање ислама, и

у покушају да преокрене пад који је захватио Османије (Османлије) неки муслимани су послати у

Запад, и као резултат тога били су запањени оним што су видели. Рифа'а Рафи' ал-Тахтави из Египта (1801-1873),

по повратку из Париза, написао биографску књигу под називом Такхлис ал-ибриз ила талкхис Бариз (The

Екстракција злата, или Преглед Париза, 1834), хвалећи њихову чистоћу, љубав према послу, и изнад

сав друштвени морал. Изјавио је да морамо опонашати оно што се ради у Паризу, заговарајући промене у

исламско друштво од либерализације жена до система владавине. Ова мисао, и другима се свиђа,

означио је почетак новог тренда у исламу.

ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION

IBRAHIM KALIN

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Islam in the West

Јоцелине Цесари

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Абдуллах Фалик |

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Штавише, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, Наиме, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, сад, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Хенри Сиегман


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Биргит Кравиетз
Хелмут Реифелд

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Истовремено, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.

Islamic Political Culture, Демократија, and Human Rights

Даниеле. Цена

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, however, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Схерифа зухур

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (ГВОТ)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; и (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD

Ибтисам Ибрахим

What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, вера, opinion, власништво, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracyin addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participationcontains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Саад Еддин Ибрахим (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Међутим, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Међутим, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elementsaccountability, competition, and some degree of participationwhich have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

Демократија, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (МБ), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (НДП) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Иако ће ово вероватно бити продужено, постепени процес, режим треба да предузме прелиминарне кораке да нормализује учешће браће Муслимана у политичком животу. Муслиманска браћа, чије су друштвене активности дуго биле толерисане али је улога у формалној политици строго ограничена, освојио невиђено 20 одсто посланичких места у 2005 избори. Они су то урадили упркос томе што су се такмичили за само трећину расположивих места и упркос значајним препрекама, укључујући полицијску репресију и изборну превару. Овај успех је потврдио њихову позицију као изузетно добро организоване и дубоко укорењене политичке снаге. Истовремено, наглашавала је слабости и легалне опозиције и владајуће странке. Режим би се могао кладити да би скромно повећање парламентарне заступљености браће Муслимана могло бити искоришћено за подстицање страха од исламистичког преузимања власти и тиме послужити као разлог за одуговлачење реформи. Ако је тако, стратегија је у великом ризику од повратних резултата.