RSSTodas as inscrições no "Estados Unidos & Europa" Categoria

O Islã e a construção do poder do Estado

Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr

Dentro 1979 General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, o governante militar do Paquistão, declarou que o Paquistão se tornaria um estado islâmico. Os valores e normas islâmicos serviriam como base da identidade nacional, lei, economia, e relações sociais, e inspiraria toda a formulação de políticas. Dentro 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, o novo primeiro-ministro da Malásia, introduziu um plano de base ampla semelhante para ancorar a formulação de políticas estatais nos valores islâmicos, e para alinhar as leis e práticas econômicas de seu país com os ensinamentos do Islã. Por que esses governantes escolheram o caminho da “islamização” para seus países? E como os antigos estados pós-coloniais seculares se tornaram os agentes da islamização e o precursor do “verdadeiro” estado islâmico??
A Malásia e o Paquistão têm, desde o final dos anos 1970 e início dos anos 1980, seguido um caminho único para o desenvolvimento que diverge das experiências de outros estados do Terceiro Mundo. Nesses dois países, a identidade religiosa foi integrada à ideologia do Estado para informar a meta e o processo de desenvolvimento com valores islâmicos.
Este empreendimento também apresentou um quadro muito diferente da relação entre o Islã e a política nas sociedades muçulmanas. Na Malásia e Paquistão, tem sido instituições estatais em vez de ativistas islâmicos (aqueles que defendem uma leitura política do Islã; também conhecidos como revivalistas ou fundamentalistas) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, e, mais amplamente, como a cultura e a religião atendem às necessidades do poder e do desenvolvimento do Estado. A análise aqui se baseia em discussões teóricas
nas ciências sociais do comportamento do Estado e o papel da cultura e da religião nela. Mais importante, ele extrai inferências dos casos em análise para tirar conclusões mais amplas de interesse para as disciplinas.

ATIVISMO DAS MULHERES ISLAMISTA NA PALESTINA OCUPADA

Entrevistas de Khaled Amayreh

Entrevista com Sameera Al-Halayka

Sameera Al-Halayka é um membro eleito do Conselho Legislativo Palestino. Ela era

nascido na aldeia de Shoyoukh perto de Hebron em 1964. Ela tem um BA na Sharia (Islâmica

Jurisprudência) da Universidade de Hebron. Trabalhou como jornalista de 1996 para 2006 quando

ela entrou no Conselho Legislativo Palestino como membro eleito no 2006 eleições.

Ela é casada e tem sete filhos.

Q: Há uma impressão geral em alguns países ocidentais de que as mulheres recebem

tratamento inferior dentro dos grupos de resistência islâmica, such as Hamas. Is this true?

How are women activists treated in Hamas?
Rights and duties of Muslim women emanate first and foremost from Islamic Sharia or law.

They are not voluntary or charitable acts or gestures we receive from Hamas or anyone

else. Thus, as far as political involvement and activism is concerned, women generally have

the same rights and duties as men. Afinal, women make up at least 50 per cent of

society. In a certain sense, they are the entire society because they give birth to, and raise,

the new generation.

Portanto, I can say that the status of women within Hamas is in full conformity with her

status in Islam itself. This means that she is a full partner at all levels. De fato, it would be

unfair and unjust for an Islamic (or Islamist if you prefer) woman to be partner in suffering

enquanto ela é excluída do processo de tomada de decisão. Por isso o papel da mulher na

O Hamas sempre foi pioneiro.

Q: Você sente que o surgimento do ativismo político das mulheres dentro do Hamas é

um desenvolvimento natural que é compatível com os conceitos islâmicos clássicos

sobre o status e o papel das mulheres, ou é apenas uma resposta necessária para

pressões da modernidade e exigências da ação política e da contínua

ocupação israelense?

Não há texto na jurisprudência islâmica nem na carta do Hamas que impeça as mulheres de

participação política. Eu acredito que o oposto é verdade — existem inúmeros versículos do Alcorão

e ditos do Profeta Muhammed exortando as mulheres a serem ativas na política e

questões que afetam os muçulmanos. Mas também é verdade que para as mulheres, como é para os homens, political activism

is not compulsory but voluntary, and is largely decided in light of each woman’s abilities,

qualifications and individual circumstances. None the less, showing concern for public

matters is mandatory upon each and every Muslim man and woman. The Prophet

Muhammed said: “He who doesn’t show concern for the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim.”

além disso, Palestinian Islamist women have to take all objective factors on the ground into

account when deciding whether to join politics or get involved in political activism.


MULHERES IRANIANAS APÓS A REVOLUÇÃO ISLÂMICA

Ansiia Khaz allii


Mais de trinta anos se passaram desde o triunfo da Revolução Islâmica no Irã, ainda assim resta um uma série de questões e ambiguidades sobre a forma como a República Islâmica e as suas leis lidam com problemas contemporâneos e circunstâncias atuais, particularmente no que diz respeito às mulheres e aos direitos das mulheres. Este breve artigo irá lançar luz sobre estas questões e estudar a posição atual das mulheres em diversas esferas., comparando isso com a situação anterior à Revolução Islâmica. Dados confiáveis ​​e autenticados foram usados qualquer lugar possível. A introdução resume uma série de estudos teóricos e jurídicos que fornecem a basis for the subsequent more practical analysis and are the sources from where the data has been obtained.
The first section considers attitudes of the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards women and women’s rights, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. o third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, o relationship between women and the family, e o papel da família na limitação ou aumento dos direitos das mulheres em a República Islâmica do Irão.

smearcasting: Como os islamofóbicos espalham o medo, intolerância e desinformação

FEIRA

Julie Hollar

Jim Naureckas

Tornando a islamofobia mainstream:
Como os agressores muçulmanos transmitem seu fanatismo
Uma coisa notável aconteceu no National Book Critics Circle (NBCC) candidaturas em fevereiro 2007: O grupo normalmente intelectualizado e tolerante nomeado para melhor livro no campo da crítica um livro amplamente visto como denegrindo um grupo religioso inteiro.
A indicação de Enquanto a Europa dormia, de Bruce Bawer: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (New York Times, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, intolerância e desinformação. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. And not unlike the charges made in the classical document of anti-Semitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, some of Islamophobia’s more virulent expressionslike While Europe Sleptinclude evocations of Islamic designs to dominate the West.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, of course, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. For instance, when a Norwegian Islamic Council debates whether gay men and lesbians should be executed, one may forcefully condemn individuals or groups sharing that opinion without pulling all European Muslims into it, as did Bawer’s Pajamas Media post (8/7/08),
“European Muslims Debate: Should Gays Be Executed?”
de forma similar, extremistas que justificam suas ações violentas invocando alguma interpretação particular do Islã podem ser criticados sem implicar a enorme diversidade da população de muçulmanos ao redor do mundo. Afinal, repórteres conseguiram cobrir o atentado de Oklahoma City por Timothy McVeigh–um adepto da seita racista Identidade Cristã–sem recorrer a declarações generalizadas sobre “terrorismo cristão”. Da mesma maneira, a mídia cobriu atos de terrorismo por fanáticos que são judeus–por exemplo, o massacre de Hebron realizado por Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–sem implicar a totalidade do judaísmo.

islamismo, O Islã Político e a América

Árabes Insight

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?

khalil al-anani

“there is no chance of communicating with any U.S. administration so long as the United States maintains its long-standing view of Islam as a real danger, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna viewed the West mostly as a symbol of moral decay. Other Salafis – an Islamic school of thought that relies on ancestors as exemplary models – have taken the same view of the United States, but lack the ideological flexibility espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood believes in engaging the Americans in civil dialogue, other extremist groups see no point in dialogue and maintain that force is the only way of dealing with the United States.

Reforma Islâmica

Adnan Khan

The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi boasted after the events of 9/11:
“…we must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed

well being, respect for human rights andin contrast with Islamic countriesrespect

for religious and political rights, a system that has its values understanding of diversity

and tolerance…The West will conquer peoples, like it conquered communism, even if it

means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was

1,400 years ago…”1

And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of

ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”

Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute

The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the

history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical

Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified

their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to

apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the

Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time

understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined

principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of

study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became

smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah

were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Thus for

any Muslim attempting to deduce rules or understand what stance should be taken upon a particular

issue the Qur’an is the basis of this study.

The first attempt at reforming Islam took place at the turn of the 19th century. By the turn of the

century the Ummah had been in a lengthy period of decline where the global balance of power shifted

from the Khilafah to Britain. Mounting problems engulfed the Khilafah whilst Western Europe was in

the midst of the industrial revolution. The Ummah came to lose her pristine understanding of Islam, e

in an attempt to reverse the decline engulfing the Uthmani’s (Ottomans) some Muslims were sent to the

West, and as a result became smitten by what they saw. Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi of Egypt (1801-1873),

on his return from Paris, wrote a biographical book called Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (o

Extraction of Gold, or an Overview of Paris, 1834), praising their cleanliness, love of work, and above

all social morality. He declared that we must mimic what is being done in Paris, advocating changes to

the Islamic society from liberalising women to the systems of ruling. This thought, and others like it,

marked the beginning of the reinventing trend in Islam.

ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION

IBRAHIM KALIN

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, acadêmicos, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Islam in the West

Jocelyne Cesari

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.

ISLAMISMO, DEMOCRACIA & OS ESTADOS UNIDOS:

Fundação Córdoba

Abdullah faliq

Introdução ,


Apesar de ser um debate perene e complexo, Arches Quarterly reexamina a partir de fundamentos teológicos e práticos, o importante debate sobre a relação e compatibilidade entre o Islã e a Democracia, como ecoou na agenda de esperança e mudança de Barack Obama. Enquanto muitos celebram a ascensão de Obama ao Salão Oval como uma catarse nacional para os EUA, outros permanecem menos otimistas de uma mudança de ideologia e abordagem na arena internacional. Embora grande parte da tensão e desconfiança entre o mundo muçulmano e os EUA possa ser atribuída à abordagem de promover a democracia, tipicamente favorecendo ditaduras e regimes fantoches que defendem os valores democráticos e os direitos humanos da boca para fora, a réplica de 9/11 realmente cimentou ainda mais as dúvidas através da posição da América sobre o Islã político. Ele criou um muro de negatividade como encontrado por worldpublicopinion.org, de acordo com qual 67% dos egípcios acreditam que globalmente a América está desempenhando um papel “principalmente negativo”.
A resposta da América foi, portanto, adequada. Ao eleger Obama, muitos ao redor do mundo estão depositando suas esperanças de desenvolver um, mas uma política externa mais justa para o mundo muçulmano. O teste para Obama, enquanto discutimos, é como a América e seus aliados promovem a democracia. Estará facilitando ou impondo?
além disso, pode ser importante um corretor honesto em zonas prolongadas de confl itos? Contando com a experiência e a visão da Prolifi
c estudiosos, acadêmicos, jornalistas e políticos experientes, Arches Quarterly traz à tona a relação entre Islã e Democracia e o papel da América – bem como as mudanças trazidas por Obama, na busca do terreno comum. Anas Altikriti, o CEO da Fundação The Cordoba dá a jogada de abertura para esta discussão, onde ele reflete sobre as esperanças e desafios que repousam no caminho de Obama. Seguindo Altikriti, o ex-assessor do presidente Nixon, Dr Robert Crane oferece uma análise completa do princípio islâmico do direito à liberdade. Anwar Ibrahim, ex-vice-primeiro-ministro da Malásia, enriquece a discussão com as realidades práticas da implementação da democracia nas sociedades dominantes muçulmanas, nomeadamente, na Indonésia e na Malásia.
Temos também Dr Shireen Hunter, da Universidade de Georgetown, EUA, que explora países muçulmanos atrasados ​​em democratização e modernização. Isso é complementado pelo escritor de terrorismo, A explicação do Dr. Nafeez Ahmed sobre a crise da pós-modernidade e a
fim da democracia. Dr. Daud Abdullah (Diretor do Monitor de Mídia do Oriente Médio), Alan Hart (ex-correspondente da ITN e BBC Panorama; autor do sionismo: O verdadeiro inimigo dos judeus) e Asem Sondos (Editor do semanário Sawt Al Omma do Egito) concentrar-se em Obama e seu papel vis-à-vis a promoção da democracia no mundo muçulmano, bem como as relações dos EUA com Israel e a Irmandade Muçulmana.
Ministro de relações exteriores, Maldivas, Ahmed Shaheed especula sobre o futuro do Islã e da Democracia; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– um membro do Sinn Féin que suportou quatro anos de prisão por atividades republicanas irlandesas e um ativista do Guildford 4 e Birmingham 6, reflete sobre sua recente viagem a Gaza, onde testemunhou o impacto da brutalidade e injustiça cometida contra os palestinos; Dra Marie Breen-Smyth, Diretor do Centro para o Estudo da Radicalização e da Violência Política Contemporânea discute os desafios de pesquisar criticamente o terror político; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, escritor e dramaturgo, discute as perspectivas de paz em Darfur; e finalmente o jornalista e ativista de direitos humanos Ashur Shamis analisa criticamente a democratização e a politização dos muçulmanos hoje.
Esperamos que tudo isso seja uma leitura abrangente e fonte de reflexão sobre questões que nos afetam a todos em um novo amanhecer de esperança.
obrigada

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Ao mesmo tempo, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, ou (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.

Islamic Political Culture, Democracia, and Human Rights

Daniel E. Preço

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, Contudo, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, instituições, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; e (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD

Ibtisam Ibrahim

What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, fé, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracyin addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participationcontains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Contudo, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Contudo, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elementsaccountability, competition, and some degree of participationwhich have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

Democracia, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 eleições. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Ao mesmo tempo, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.