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ISLAMISMO, DEMOCRACIA & OS ESTADOS UNIDOS:

Fundação Córdoba

Abdullah faliq

Introdução ,


Apesar de ser um debate perene e complexo, Arches Quarterly reexamina a partir de fundamentos teológicos e práticos, o importante debate sobre a relação e compatibilidade entre o Islã e a Democracia, como ecoou na agenda de esperança e mudança de Barack Obama. Enquanto muitos celebram a ascensão de Obama ao Salão Oval como uma catarse nacional para os EUA, outros permanecem menos otimistas de uma mudança de ideologia e abordagem na arena internacional. Embora grande parte da tensão e desconfiança entre o mundo muçulmano e os EUA possa ser atribuída à abordagem de promover a democracia, tipicamente favorecendo ditaduras e regimes fantoches que defendem os valores democráticos e os direitos humanos da boca para fora, a réplica de 9/11 realmente cimentou ainda mais as dúvidas através da posição da América sobre o Islã político. Ele criou um muro de negatividade como encontrado por worldpublicopinion.org, de acordo com qual 67% dos egípcios acreditam que globalmente a América está desempenhando um papel “principalmente negativo”.
A resposta da América foi, portanto, adequada. Ao eleger Obama, muitos ao redor do mundo estão depositando suas esperanças de desenvolver um, mas uma política externa mais justa para o mundo muçulmano. O teste para Obama, enquanto discutimos, é como a América e seus aliados promovem a democracia. Estará facilitando ou impondo?
além disso, pode ser importante um corretor honesto em zonas prolongadas de confl itos? Contando com a experiência e a visão da Prolifi
c estudiosos, acadêmicos, jornalistas e políticos experientes, Arches Quarterly traz à tona a relação entre Islã e Democracia e o papel da América – bem como as mudanças trazidas por Obama, na busca do terreno comum. Anas Altikriti, o CEO da Fundação The Cordoba dá a jogada de abertura para esta discussão, onde ele reflete sobre as esperanças e desafios que repousam no caminho de Obama. Seguindo Altikriti, o ex-assessor do presidente Nixon, Dr Robert Crane oferece uma análise completa do princípio islâmico do direito à liberdade. Anwar Ibrahim, ex-vice-primeiro-ministro da Malásia, enriquece a discussão com as realidades práticas da implementação da democracia nas sociedades dominantes muçulmanas, nomeadamente, na Indonésia e na Malásia.
Temos também Dr Shireen Hunter, da Universidade de Georgetown, EUA, que explora países muçulmanos atrasados ​​em democratização e modernização. Isso é complementado pelo escritor de terrorismo, A explicação do Dr. Nafeez Ahmed sobre a crise da pós-modernidade e a
fim da democracia. Dr. Daud Abdullah (Diretor do Monitor de Mídia do Oriente Médio), Alan Hart (ex-correspondente da ITN e BBC Panorama; autor do sionismo: O verdadeiro inimigo dos judeus) e Asem Sondos (Editor do semanário Sawt Al Omma do Egito) concentrar-se em Obama e seu papel vis-à-vis a promoção da democracia no mundo muçulmano, bem como as relações dos EUA com Israel e a Irmandade Muçulmana.
Ministro de relações exteriores, Maldivas, Ahmed Shaheed especula sobre o futuro do Islã e da Democracia; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– um membro do Sinn Féin que suportou quatro anos de prisão por atividades republicanas irlandesas e um ativista do Guildford 4 e Birmingham 6, reflete sobre sua recente viagem a Gaza, onde testemunhou o impacto da brutalidade e injustiça cometida contra os palestinos; Dra Marie Breen-Smyth, Diretor do Centro para o Estudo da Radicalização e da Violência Política Contemporânea discute os desafios de pesquisar criticamente o terror político; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, escritor e dramaturgo, discute as perspectivas de paz em Darfur; e finalmente o jornalista e ativista de direitos humanos Ashur Shamis analisa criticamente a democratização e a politização dos muçulmanos hoje.
Esperamos que tudo isso seja uma leitura abrangente e fonte de reflexão sobre questões que nos afetam a todos em um novo amanhecer de esperança.
obrigada

Islamic Political Culture, Democracia, and Human Rights

Daniel E. Preço

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, Contudo, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, instituições, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; e (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 eleições. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Ao mesmo tempo, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Islã e democracia: Texto, Tradição, e história

Ahrar Ahmad

Estereótipos populares no Ocidente tendem a postular uma progressiva, racional, e oeste livre contra um, opressivo, e ameaçando o Islã. Pesquisas de opinião pública conduzidas nos Estados Unidos durante a década de 1990 revelaram um padrão consistente de americanos rotulando os muçulmanos como "fanáticos religiosos" e considerando o ethos do Islã como fundamentalmente "antidemocrático". 1 Essas caracterizações
e apreensões têm, por razões óbvias, piorou significativamente desde a tragédia de 9/11. Contudo, essas percepções não são refletidas apenas na consciência popular ou nas representações da mídia grosseira. Estudiosos respeitados também contribuíram para esse clima de opinião ao escrever sobre as diferenças supostamente irreconciliáveis ​​entre o Islã e o Ocidente, o famoso “choque de civilizações” que se supõe ser iminente e inevitável, e sobre a aparente incompatibilidade entre o Islã e a democracia. Por exemplo, O professor Peter Rodman se preocupa com o fato de "sermos desafiados de fora por uma força atávica militante movida pelo ódio a todo pensamento político ocidental que remonta às antigas queixas contra a cristandade". Dr. Daniel Pipes proclama que os muçulmanos desafiam o Ocidente de forma mais profunda do que os comunistas jamais fizeram, pois “enquanto os comunistas discordam de nossas políticas, os muçulmanos fundamentalistas desprezam todo o nosso modo de vida ”. O professor Bernard Lewis adverte sombriamente sobre "a reação histórica de um antigo rival contra nossa herança judaico-cristã, nosso presente secular, e a expansão de ambos. ” Professor Amos Perlmutter pergunta: “É o Islã, fundamentalista ou não, compatível com a democracia representativa de estilo ocidental orientada para os direitos humanos? A resposta é um NÃO enfático. ” E o professor Samuel Huntington sugere com um floreio que “o problema não é o fundamentalismo islâmico, mas o próprio Islã. ” Seria intelectualmente preguiçoso e simplório descartar suas posições como baseadas apenas em rancor ou preconceito. Na verdade, se alguém ignorar algum exagero retórico, alguns de seus encargos, embora estranho para os muçulmanos, são relevantes para uma discussão sobre a relação entre o Islã e a democracia no mundo moderno. Por exemplo, a posição das mulheres ou às vezes de não muçulmanos em alguns países muçulmanos é problemática em termos da suposta igualdade legal de todas as pessoas em uma democracia. de forma similar, a intolerância dirigida por alguns muçulmanos contra escritores (por exemplo., Salman Rushdie no Reino Unido, Taslima Nasrin em Bangladesh, e o professor Nasr Abu Zaid no Egito) ostensivamente compromete o princípio da liberdade de expressão, que é essencial para uma democracia.
Também é verdade que menos de 10 do mais que 50 membros da Organização da Conferência Islâmica institucionalizaram princípios ou processos democráticos conforme entendidos no Ocidente, e isso também, apenas provisoriamente. Finalmente, o tipo de estabilidade interna e paz externa que é quase um pré-requisito para o funcionamento de uma democracia é viciado pela turbulência da implosão interna ou agressão externa evidente em muitos países muçulmanos hoje (por exemplo., Somália, Sudão, Indonésia, Paquistão, Iraque, Afeganistão, Argélia, e Bósnia).

GLOBALIZAÇÃO E ISLÃ POLÍTICO: AS BASES SOCIAIS DA FESTA DE BEM-ESTAR DA TURQUIA

Haldun Gulalp

O Islã político ganhou maior visibilidade nas últimas décadas na Turquia. Um grande número de estudantes do sexo feminino começou a demonstrar seu compromisso usando o toucado islâmico proibido nos campi universitários, e uma influente TV pró-islâmica
canais proliferaram. Este artigo enfoca o Bem-Estar (Bem-estar) Partido como o principal representante institucional do Islã político na Turquia.
O breve mandato do Partido do Bem-Estar no poder como principal parceiro da coalizão de meados de 1996 a meados de 1997 foi o culminar de uma década de crescimento constante que foi auxiliado por outras organizações e instituições islâmicas. Essas organizações e instituições
incluíram jornais e editoras que atraíram escritores islâmicos, numerosas fundações islâmicas, uma confederação sindical islâmica, e uma associação de empresários islâmicos. Essas instituições trabalharam em conjunto com, e em apoio de, O bem-estar como líder indiscutível e representante do Islã político na Turquia, mesmo que eles tivessem seus próprios objetivos e ideais particularistas, que muitas vezes divergia dos projetos políticos do Bem-Estar. Focando no Partido do Bem-Estar, então, permite uma análise da base social mais ampla sobre a qual o movimento político islâmico surgiu na Turquia. Desde a saída do Bem-Estar do poder e seu eventual fechamento, o movimento islâmico está em desordem. Este papel vai, Portanto, ser confinado ao período da Welfare Party.
Predecessor do bem-estar, o Partido da Salvação Nacional, estava ativo na década de 1970, mas foi encerrado pelo regime militar em 1980. O bem-estar foi fundado em 1983 e ganhou grande popularidade na década de 1990. Começando com um 4.4 por cento dos votos nas eleições municipais de 1984, o Partido do Bem-Estar aumentou constantemente sua exibição e multiplicou seus votos quase cinco vezes em doze anos. Isso alarmou o establishment secular da Turquia, primeiro nas eleições municipais de 1994, com 19 por cento de todos os votos em todo o país e os assentos de prefeito em Istambul e Ancara, então nas eleições gerais de 1995 quando ganhou uma pluralidade com 21.4 por cento do voto nacional. no entanto, o Partido do Bem-Estar só foi capaz de liderar um governo de coalizão em parceria com o Partido True Path de Tansu C¸ iller, de direita.

Um arquipélago muçulmano

Max L. Bruto

Este livro foi elaborado por muitos anos, como o autor explica em seu Prefácio, embora ele tenha escrito a maior parte do texto real durante seu ano como pesquisador sênior do Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. O autor foi por muitos anos Reitor da Escola de Estudos de Inteligência do Joint Military Intelligence College.. Mesmo que possa parecer que o livro poderia ter sido escrito por qualquer bom historiador ou especialista regional do Sudeste Asiático, este trabalho é iluminado pelas mais de três décadas de serviço do autor na Comunidade de Inteligência nacional. Sua experiência regional freqüentemente tem sido aplicada a avaliações especiais para a Comunidade. Com um conhecimento do Islã incomparável entre seus pares e uma sede insaciável de determinar como os objetivos desta religião podem funcionar em áreas distantes do foco da atenção da maioria dos legisladores., o autor aproveitou ao máximo esta oportunidade para familiarizar a Comunidade de Inteligência e um público mais amplo com uma apreciação estratégica de uma região em meio à reconciliação das forças seculares e religiosas.
Esta publicação foi aprovada para distribuição irrestrita pelo Office of Security Review, Departamento de Defesa.

Democracy in Islamic Political Thought

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, dentro 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, dentro 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Islamic Political Culture, Democracia, and Human Rights

Daniel E. Preço

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, Contudo, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, isto

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

direitos humanos, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, e

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

Political Islam in the Middle East

São Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, dentro

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA Kadlec

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. de forma similar, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. EUA. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Enquanto isso, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

Islamist Parties : participation without power

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. In Egypt, a Irmandade Muçulmana (MB) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

Resolvendo o dilema islâmico da América: Lições do Sul e Sudeste Asiático

Shadi Hamid
EUA. esforços para promover a democracia no Oriente Médio foram paralisados ​​por muito tempo pelo "dilema islâmico": em teoria, nós queremos democracia, mas, na prática, medo de que os partidos islâmicos sejam os principais beneficiários de qualquer abertura política. A manifestação mais trágica disso foi o desastre argelino de 1991 e 1992, quando os Estados Unidos permaneceram em silêncio enquanto militares firmemente seculares cancelaram as eleições depois que um partido islâmico conquistou a maioria parlamentar. Mais recentemente, o governo Bush recuou de sua "agenda de liberdade" depois que os islâmicos se saíram surpreendentemente bem nas eleições em toda a região, incluindo no Egito, Arábia Saudita, e os territórios palestinos.
Mas até mesmo nosso medo dos partidos islâmicos - e a recusa resultante em se envolver com eles - tem sido inconsistente, valendo para alguns países, mas não para outros. Quanto mais um país é visto como vital para os interesses de segurança nacional dos Estados Unidos, menos dispostos os Estados Unidos estão em aceitar grupos islâmicos com um papel político proeminente lá. Contudo, em países vistos como menos relevantes estrategicamente, e onde menos está em jogo, os Estados Unidos ocasionalmente adotam uma abordagem mais matizada. Mas é precisamente onde mais está em jogo que reconhecer um papel para os islâmicos não violentos é mais importante, e, aqui, A política americana continua a falhar.
Em toda a região, os Estados Unidos apoiaram ativamente regimes autocráticos e deram luz verde para campanhas de repressão contra grupos como a Irmandade Muçulmana Egípcia, o movimento político mais antigo e influente da região. Em março 2008, durante o que muitos observadores consideram ser o pior período de repressão anti-Fraternidade desde 1960, A secretária de Estado Condoleezza Rice dispensou um $100 redução da ajuda militar ao Egito, exigida pelo Congresso. A situação na Jordânia é semelhante. O governo Bush e o congresso democrata saudaram o país como um "modelo" de reforma árabe precisamente ao mesmo tempo em que vêm desenvolvendo novas maneiras de manipular o processo eleitoral para limitar a representação islâmica, e assim como realizou eleições atormentadas por alegações generalizadas de fraude absoluta
e rigging.1 Isso não é uma coincidência. Egito e Jordânia são os únicos dois países árabes que assinaram tratados de paz com Israel. além disso, eles são vistos como cruciais para os EUA. esforços para combater o Irã, estabilizar o Iraque, e combater o terrorismo.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, em particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, Contudo, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Política, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.