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ISLAMS, DEMOKRĀTIJA & AMERIKAS SAVIENOTĀS VALSTIS:

Kordovas fonds

Abdullah Faliq |

Ievads ,


Neskatoties uz to, ka tā ir gan daudzgadīga, gan sarežģīta diskusija, Arkas ceturkšņa izdevums atkārtoti pārbauda no teoloģijas un praktiskā viedokļa, svarīgās debates par islāma un demokrātijas attiecībām un savietojamību, kā tas atskanēja Baraka Obamas cerību un pārmaiņu programmā. Lai gan daudzi atzīmē Obamas ieņemšanu Ovālajā kabinetā kā nacionālo katarsi ASV, citi joprojām ir mazāk optimistiski par ideoloģijas un pieejas maiņu starptautiskajā arēnā. Lai gan lielu daļu spriedzes un neuzticības starp musulmaņu pasauli un ASV var saistīt ar demokrātijas veicināšanas pieeju., parasti dod priekšroku diktatūrām un marionešu režīmiem, kas runā par demokrātiskām vērtībām un cilvēktiesībām, gada pēcgrūdiens 9/11 ir patiesi nostiprinājis bažas, izmantojot Amerikas nostāju pret politisko islāmu. Tas ir izveidojis negatīvisma sienu, kā to atklāja worldpublicopinion.org, saskaņā ar kuru 67% ēģiptiešu uzskata, ka Amerika globāli spēlē “galvenokārt negatīvu” lomu.
Tādējādi Amerikas reakcija ir bijusi piemērota. Ievēlot Obamu, daudzi visā pasaulē saista savas cerības attīstīt mazāk kareivīgu, bet godīgāka ārpolitika pret musulmaņu pasauli. Pārbaudījums Obamam, kā mēs apspriežam, ir tas, kā Amerika un viņas sabiedrotie veicina demokrātiju. Vai tas atvieglos vai uzspiež?
Turklāt, vai tas var būt godīgs brokeris ilgstošās konfliktu zonās? Prolifi pieredzes un ieskatu piesaistīšana
c zinātnieki, akadēmiķi, pieredzējuši žurnālisti un politiķi, Arches Quarterly atklāj islāma un demokrātijas attiecības un Amerikas lomu, kā arī Obamas radītās izmaiņas., meklējot kopīgu valodu. Anas Altikriti, Th e Cordoba Foundation izpilddirektors nodrošina šīs diskusijas ievadu, kur viņš pārdomā cerības un izaicinājumus, kas ir Obamas ceļā. Sekojot Altikriti, bijušais prezidenta Niksona padomnieks, Dr Robert Crane piedāvā rūpīgu analīzi par islāma principu par tiesībām uz brīvību. Anvars Ibrahims, bijušais Malaizijas premjerministra vietnieks, bagātina diskusiju ar demokrātijas īstenošanas praktisko realitāti musulmaņu dominējošās sabiedrībās, proti, Indonēzijā un Malaizijā.
Mums ir arī Dr Shireen Hunter, Džordžtaunas universitātē, ASV, kurš pēta musulmaņu valstis, kas atpaliek demokratizācijas un modernizācijas jomā. To papildina rakstnieks par terorismu, Dr Nafeez Ahmed skaidrojums par postmodernitātes krīzi un
demokrātijas bojāeja. Doktors Dauds Abdulla (Tuvo Austrumu mediju monitora direktors), Alans Hārts (bijušais ITN un BBC Panorama korespondents; cionisma autors: Īstais ebreju ienaidnieks) un Asem Sondos (Ēģiptes iknedēļas Sawt Al Omma redaktors) koncentrēties uz Obamu un viņa lomu demokrātijas veicināšanā musulmaņu pasaulē, kā arī ASV attiecības ar Izraēlu un Musulmaņu brālību.
Ārlietu ministrs airē, Maldīvija, Ahmeds Šahīds spekulē par islāma un demokrātijas nākotni; Cllr. Gerijs Makločlains
– Sinn Féin biedrs, kurš izturēja četrus gadus cietumā par Īrijas republikāņu aktivitātēm un Gildfordas aizstāvis 4 un Birmingema 6, atspoguļo viņa neseno braucienu uz Gazu, kur viņš bija liecinieks pret palestīniešiem vērstās brutalitātes un netaisnības ietekmei; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Radikalizācijas un mūsdienu politiskās vardarbības pētījumu centra direktore apspriež izaicinājumus kritiski pētot politisko teroru; Dr Halids al Mubaraks, rakstnieks un dramaturgs, apspriež miera izredzes Darfūrā; un visbeidzot žurnālists un cilvēktiesību aktīvists Ašurs Šamiss kritiski skatās uz musulmaņu demokratizāciju un politizāciju mūsdienās.
Mēs ceram, ka tas viss radīs visaptverošu lasījumu un pārdomu avotu par jautājumiem, kas skar mūs visus jaunā cerību rītausmā.
Paldies

Islamic Political Culture, Demokrātija, and Human Rights

Daniele. Cena

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. sekojoši, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, tomēr, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; un (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 vēlēšanas. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Islam and Democracy: Text, Tradition, and History

Ahrars Ahmads

Popular stereotypes in the West tend to posit a progressive, rational, and free West against a backward, oppressive, and threatening Islam. Public opinion polls conducted in the United States during the 1990s revealed a consistent pattern of Americans labeling Muslims as “religious fanatics” and considering Islam’s ethos as fundamentally “anti-democratic.”1 These characterizations
and misgivings have, for obvious reasons, significantly worsened since the tragedy of 9/11. Tomēr, these perceptions are not reflected merely in the popular consciousness or crude media representations. Respected scholars also have contributed to this climate of opinion by writing about the supposedly irreconcilable differences between Islam and the West, the famous “clash of civilizations” that is supposed to be imminent and inevitable, and about the seeming incompatibility between Islam and democracy. For example, Professor Peter Rodman worries that “we are challenged from the outside by a militant atavistic force driven by hatred of all Western political thought harking back to age-old grievances against Christendom.” Dr. Daniel Pipes proclaims that the Muslims challenge the West more profoundly than the communists ever did, for “while the Communists disagree with our policies, the fundamentalist Muslims despise our whole way of life.” Professor Bernard Lewis warns darkly about “the historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo–Christian heritage, our secular present, and the expansion of both.” Professor Amos Perlmutter asks: “Is Islam, fundamentalist or otherwise, compatible with human-rights oriented Western style representative democracy? The answer is an emphatic NO.” And Professor Samuel Huntington suggests with a flourish that “the problem is not Islamic fundamentalism, but Islam itself.” It would be intellectually lazy and simple-minded to dismiss their positions as based merely on spite or prejudice. Patiesībā, if one ignores some rhetorical overkill, some of their charges, though awkward for Muslims, are relevant to a discussion of the relationship between Islam and democracy in the modern world. For example, the position of women or sometimes non-Muslims in some Muslim countries is problematic in terms of the supposed legal equality of all people in a democracy. Similarly, the intolerance directed by some Muslims against writers (e.g., Salman Rushdie in the UK, Taslima Nasrin in Bangladesh, and Professor Nasr Abu Zaid in Egypt) ostensibly jeopardizes the principle of free speech, which is essential to a democracy.
It is also true that less than 10 of the more than 50 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have institutionalized democratic principles or processes as understood in the West, and that too, only tentatively. Finally, the kind of internal stability and external peace that is almost a prerequisite for a democracy to function is vitiated by the turbulence of internal implosion or external aggression evident in many Muslim countries today (e.g., Somālija, Sudāna, Indonēzija, Pakistāna, Irāka, Afganistāna, Alžīrija, and Bosnia).

GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM: THE SOCIAL BASES OF TURKEY’S WELFARE PARTY

Halduns Gulalps

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, then, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. This paper will, therefore, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, with 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Nevertheless, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

Musulmaņu arhipelāgs

Max L. Bruto

Šī grāmata ir tapusi daudzus gadus, kā autors skaidro savā priekšvārdā, lai gan lielāko daļu faktiskā teksta viņš uzrakstīja, strādājot Stratēģiskās izlūkošanas pētniecības centra vecākais zinātniskais līdzstrādnieks.. Autore ilgus gadus bija Apvienotās militārās izlūkošanas koledžas Izlūkošanas studiju skolas dekāns. Lai gan varētu šķist, ka grāmatu varētu būt sarakstījis jebkurš labs vēsturnieks vai Dienvidaustrumāzijas reģiona speciālists, šo darbu izgaismo autora vairāk nekā trīs gadu desmitus ilgas darbības nacionālajā izlūkošanas kopienā. Viņa reģionālā pieredze bieži ir izmantota īpašos Kopienas novērtējumos. Ar zināšanām par islāmu, kas ir nepārspējamas viņa vienaudžu vidū un neremdināmas alkas noteikt, kā šīs reliģijas mērķi varētu izpausties jomās, kas ir tālu no lielākās daļas politikas veidotāju uzmanības., autors ir pilnībā izmantojis šo iespēju, lai iepazīstinātu izlūkošanas kopienu un plašāku lasītāju loku ar stratēģisku izpratni par reģionu, kurā valda sekulāro un reliģisko spēku samierināšanās..
Šo publikāciju neierobežotai izplatīšanai ir apstiprinājis Office of Security Review, Aizsardzības departaments.

Democracy in Islamic Political Thought

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, iekšā 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, iekšā 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Islamic Political Culture, Demokrātija, and Human Rights

Daniele. Cena

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. sekojoši, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, tomēr, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islāmistu opozīcijas partijas un ES iesaistīšanās potenciāls

Tobijs Ārčers

Heidija Huuhtanena

Ņemot vērā islāmistu kustību pieaugošo nozīmi musulmaņu pasaulē un

veids, kā radikalizācija ir ietekmējusi globālos notikumus kopš gadsimta sākuma, to

ir svarīgi, lai ES izvērtētu savu politiku attiecībā uz dalībniekiem, kas var būt brīvi

saukta par "islāma pasauli". Īpaši svarīgi ir jautāt, vai un kā iesaistīties

ar dažādām islāmistu grupām.

Tas joprojām ir pretrunīgs pat ES ietvaros. Daži uzskata, ka islāmi to vērtē

guļ aiz islāmistu partijām ir vienkārši nesavienojami ar rietumu demokrātijas ideāliem un

cilvēktiesības, savukārt citi uzskata, ka iesaistīšanās ir reāla nepieciešamība pieaugošā pieauguma dēļ

islāmistu partiju vietējā nozīme un to pieaugošā iesaiste starptautiskajā

lietas. Vēl viena perspektīva ir tāda, ka musulmaņu pasaulē palielināsies demokratizācija

Eiropas drošība. Šo un citu argumentu derīgums par to, vai un kā

ES vajadzētu iesaistīties var pārbaudīt tikai, pētot dažādas islāmistu kustības un

viņu politiskie apstākļi, valsts pēc valsts.

Demokratizācija ir ES kopējās ārpolitikas pasākumu galvenā tēma, kā likts

pantā 11 Līgumam par Eiropas Savienību. Daudzi no štatiem, kas ņemti vērā šajā

ziņojumi nav demokrātiski, vai nav pilnībā demokrātiska. Lielākajā daļā šo valstu, islāmists

partijas un kustības veido būtisku opozīciju valdošajiem režīmiem, un

dažos veidos lielāko opozīcijas bloku. Eiropas demokrātijām jau sen ir bijis

tikt galā ar autoritāriem režīmiem, bet tā ir jauna parādība, kas jāspiež

demokrātiskām reformām valstīs, kurās varētu būt vislielākie ieguvēji, no

ES viedoklis, dažādas un dažkārt problemātiskas pieejas demokrātijai un tai

saistītās vērtības, mazākumtautību un sieviešu tiesības un tiesiskums. Šīs maksas ir

bieži vērsta pret islāmistu kustībām, tāpēc Eiropas politikas veidotājiem tas ir svarīgi

ir precīzs priekšstats par potenciālo partneru politiku un filozofiju.

Dažādu valstu pieredze liecina, ka jo vairāk brīvības ir islāmists

ballītes ir atļautas, jo mērenāki viņi ir savā rīcībā un idejās. Daudzos

gadījumos islāmistu partijas un grupas jau sen ir novirzījušās no sava sākotnējā mērķa

par islāma valsts nodibināšanu saskaņā ar islāma likumiem, un ir sākuši pieņemt pamata

demokrātiskie principi vēlēšanu konkurencei par varu, citu politisko esamību

konkurentiem, un politiskais plurālisms.

Political Islam in the Middle East

Vai Knudsens

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, iekšā

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. ASV. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

Islāmistu partijas : līdzdalība bez varas

Malika Zeghal

Pēdējo divu desmitgažu laikā, sociālās un politiskās kustības, kas savu ideoloģiju pamato ar atsaucēm uz islāmu, ir centušās kļūt par likumīgām politiskām partijām daudzās Tuvo Austrumu un Ziemeļāfrikas valstīs.. Dažām no šīm islāmistu kustībām ir atļauts likumīgi piedalīties vēlēšanu sacensībās. Viena no pazīstamākajām ir Turcijas Taisnīguma un attīstības partija (AKP), gadā ieguva parlamenta vairākumu 2002 un kopš tā laika ir vadījis valdību. Marokas Taisnīguma un attīstības partija (PJD) ir likumīga kopš vidus- 1990s un komandē ievērojamu vietu bloku parlamentā. Ēģiptē, musulmaņu brālība (MB) nekad nav bijis pilnvarots dibināt politisko partiju, taču, neskatoties uz valsts represijām, tā veiksmīgi startējusi kā nomināli neatkarīgie kandidāti gan valsts, gan pašvaldību vēlēšanās.
Kopš 90. gadu sākuma, šī tendence ir gājusi roku rokā ar oficiālu ierobežotas politiskās liberalizācijas politiku. Kopā, abas tendences ir izraisījušas debates par to, vai šīs kustības ir apņēmušās ievērot “demokrātiju”. Ir izveidojusies plaša literatūra, lai uzsvērtu paradoksus, kā arī iespējamos riskus un ieguvumus, iesaistot islāmistu partijas vēlēšanu procesā.. Galvenā paradigma, kas atrodama šajā rakstā, ir vērsta uz sekām, kas var rasties, ja islāmisti izmantos demokrātiskus instrumentus., un cenšas noteikt “patiesos” nodomus, ko islāmisti izpaudīs, ja viņi nonāks pie varas.

Amerikas islāmistu dilemmas atrisināšana: Mācības no Dienvidāzijas un Dienvidaustrumāzijas

Šadi Hamids
ASV. centienus veicināt demokrātiju Tuvajos Austrumos jau sen ir paralizējusi "islāmistu dilemma": teorētiski, mēs gribam demokrātiju, bet, praksē, baidās, ka islāmistu partijas būs galvenās ieguvējas no jebkādas politiskās atvēršanas. Traģiskākā tā izpausme bija Alžīrijas sagrāve 1991 un 1992, kad ASV klusēja, kamēr nelokāmie militārie spēki atcēla vēlēšanas pēc tam, kad islāmistu partija ieguva parlamenta vairākumu. Nesen, Buša administrācija atkāpās no savas "brīvības dienaskārtības" pēc tam, kad islāmistiem bija pārsteidzoši labi panākumi vēlēšanās visā reģionā, tostarp Ēģiptē, Saūda Arābija, un palestīniešu teritorijas.
Bet pat mūsu bailes no islāmistu partijām un no tā izrietošā atteikšanās ar tām sadarboties ir bijušas pretrunīgas., attiecas uz dažām valstīm, bet ne uz citām. Jo vairāk valsts tiek uzskatīta par būtisku Amerikas nacionālās drošības interesēm, jo mazāk Amerikas Savienotās Valstis ir vēlējušās pieņemt islāmistu grupējumus, kuriem tur ir ievērojama politiskā loma. Tomēr, valstīs, kas tiek uzskatītas par stratēģiski mazāk nozīmīgām, un kur uz spēles likts mazāk, ASV laiku pa laikam ir izvēlējušās niansētāku pieeju. Bet tieši tad, ja uz spēles ir likts vairāk, vissvarīgākais ir atzīt nevardarbīgo islāmistu lomu, un, šeit, Amerikas politika joprojām ir neveiksmīga.
Visā reģionā, Amerikas Savienotās Valstis ir aktīvi atbalstījušas autokrātiskos režīmus un devušas zaļo gaismu represiju kampaņām pret tādām grupām kā Ēģiptes Musulmaņu brālība, vecākā un ietekmīgākā politiskā kustība reģionā. Martā 2008, laikā, ko daudzi novērotāji uzskata par vissliktāko pret brālību vērsto represiju periodu kopš 1960., Valsts sekretāre Kondolīza Raisa atteicās no a $100 miljonu Kongresa pilnvarotā militārās palīdzības samazināšana Ēģiptei. Līdzīga situācija ir arī Jordānijā. Buša administrācija un Demokrātu kongress ir apsveikuši valsti kā arābu reformu "modeli" tieši tajā pašā laikā, kad tā ir izstrādājusi jaunus veidus, kā manipulēt ar vēlēšanu procesu, lai ierobežotu islāmistu pārstāvību., un tieši tāpat kā tajā notika vēlēšanas, ko nomoka plaši izplatīti apgalvojumi par tiešu krāpšanu
un takelāžas.1 Tā nav nejaušība. Ēģipte un Jordānija ir vienīgās divas arābu valstis, kas ir parakstījušas miera līgumus ar Izraēlu. Turklāt, tie tiek uzskatīti par ļoti svarīgiem ASV. centieni pretoties Irānai, stabilizēt Irāku, un apkarot terorismu.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Neitans Dž. Brūns, Amrs Hamzavijs,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, tomēr, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Džordana, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.