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Arabska Jutri

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktober 6, 1981, je bil v Egiptu mišljen kot dan praznovanja. Obeležili so obletnico največjega trenutka zmage Egipta v treh arabsko-izraelskih konfliktih, ko je podcenjena državna vojska v prvih dneh vdrla čez Sueški prekop 1973 Jomkipurska vojna in poslala izraelske čete v umik. Na hladnem, jutro brez oblačka, stadion v Kairu je bil nabito poln egipčanskih družin, ki so si prišle ogledat vojsko, kako postavlja svojo opremo. Na stojnici za pregled, Predsednik Anwar el-Sadat,vojni arhitekt, z zadovoljstvom gledal, kako pred njim paradirajo ljudje in stroji. Bil sem v bližini, novoprispeli tuji dopisnik.Nenadoma, eden od vojaških tovornjakov se je ustavil neposredno pred pregledovalno stojnico ravno v trenutku, ko je nad glavami v akrobatski izvedbi zarjovelo šest letal Mirage, slikanje neba z dolgimi sledmi rdeče barve, rumena, vijolična,in zeleni dim. Sadat je vstal, očitno se pripravlja na izmenjavo pozdravov s še enim kontingentom egiptovskih vojakov. Postal je odlična tarča za štiri islamistične atentatorje, ki so skočili s tovornjaka, vdrl na stopničke, in njegovo telo prerešetali s kroglami. Ko so morilci nadaljevali, kar se je zdelo večnost, škropili tribuno s svojim smrtonosnim ognjem, Za trenutek sem premišljeval, ali naj udarim ob tla in tvegam, da me panični gledalci poteptajo do smrti, ali pa ostanem na nogah in tvegam, da me bo zadela zalutala krogla.. Instinkt mi je govoril, naj ostanem na nogah, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Islam, Politični islam in America

Arabska Insight

Ali je »bratstvo« z Ameriko možno?

khalil al-anani

"Ni nobene možnosti komuniciranja z vsemi zunaj ZDA. administracije, dokler ZDA ohranjajo svoj dolgoletni pogled na islam kot resnično nevarnost, pogled, ki Združene države postavlja v isti čoln kot cionistični sovražnik. Nimamo nobenih vnaprejšnjih predstav o ameriških ljudeh ali ZDA. družbe ter njenih civilnih organizacij in možganskih trustov. Nimamo težav pri komuniciranju z ameriškim ljudstvom, vendar ni vloženih ustreznih naporov, da bi nas zbližali,” je dejal dr. Issam al-Iryan, vodja političnega oddelka Muslimanske bratovščine v telefonskem intervjuju.
Al-Iryanove besede povzemajo poglede Muslimanske bratovščine na Američane in ZDA. vlada. Drugi člani Muslimanske bratovščine bi se strinjali, tako kot pokojni Hassan al-Banna, ki je skupino ustanovil v 1928. Al- Banna je na Zahod gledal predvsem kot na simbol moralnega propada. Drugi salafisti – islamska miselna šola, ki se opira na prednike kot vzorne modele – so zavzeli enako stališče do ZDA, vendar nimajo ideološke prožnosti, ki jo zagovarja Muslimanska bratovščina. Medtem ko Muslimanska bratovščina verjame v vključitev Američanov v civilni dialog, druge skrajne skupine ne vidijo smisla v dialogu in trdijo, da je sila edini način za obravnavo Združenih držav.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Še več, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namreč, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, ZDA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

Islamism revisited

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 leta, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 julij 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Challenging Authoritarianism, kolonializem, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Še posebej, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
Ampak, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Zato, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, ampak
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamsko pravo). Vendar pa, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Po drugi strani, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Prav zares,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Vendar pa, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Islamistične opozicijske stranke in potencial za sodelovanje v EU

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Glede na vse večji pomen islamističnih gibanj v muslimanskem svetu in

način, kako je radikalizacija vplivala na svetovne dogodke od preloma stoletja, to

Pomembno je, da EU oceni svoje politike do akterjev znotraj tistega, kar je lahko ohlapno

imenovan "islamski svet". Še posebej pomembno je vprašati, ali in kako se vključiti

z različnimi islamističnimi skupinami.

To ostaja sporno tudi v EU. Nekateri menijo, da islamske vrednote to

ležijo za islamističnimi strankami preprosto niso združljive z zahodnimi ideali demokracije in

človekove pravice, medtem ko drugi zaradi naraščajočega vidika angažiranost vidijo kot realno potrebo

domačega pomena islamističnih strank in njihovega vse večjega vključevanja v mednarodne

zadeve. Druga perspektiva je, da bi se demokratizacija v muslimanskem svetu povečala

Evropska varnost. Veljavnost teh in drugih argumentov glede tega, ali in kako

EU bi se morala vključiti v preizkus le s preučevanjem različnih islamističnih gibanj in

njihove politične okoliščine, po državi.

Demokratizacija je osrednja tema skupnih zunanjepolitičnih ukrepov EU, kot je bilo položeno

v členu 11 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji. Pri tem so upoštevale številne države

Poročilo ni demokratično, ali ne povsem demokratičen. V večini teh držav, Islamistični

stranke in gibanja predstavljajo veliko nasprotovanje prevladujočim režimom, in

v nekaterih tvorijo največji opozicijski blok. Evropske demokracije so že dolgo morale

ukvarjajo se z vladnimi režimi, ki so avtoritarni, vendar je nov pritisk nov

za demokratično reformo v državah, v katerih imajo najverjetnejši upravičenci, Iz

Stališče EU, različni in včasih problematični pristopi k demokraciji in njeni

povezane vrednosti, kot so manjšinske in ženske pravice ter pravna država. Te obtožbe so

pogosto nasprotovan islamističnim gibanjem, zato je pomembno, da evropski oblikovalci politike to storijo

imeti natančno sliko o politikah in filozofijah potencialnih partnerjev.

Izkušnje iz različnih držav kažejo, da je islamistično več svobode

zabave so dovoljene, bolj zmerni so v svojih dejanjih in idejah. V veliko

primeri, ko se islamistične stranke in skupine že zdavnaj odmikajo od svojega prvotnega cilja

o ustanovitvi Islamske države, ki jo ureja islamsko pravo, in sprejeli osnovne

demokratična načela volilne konkurence za oblast, obstoj drugih političnih

tekmovalci, in politični pluralizem.

STRATEGIJE ZA UPORABO POLITIČNEGA ISLAMA

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politični islam je danes najbolj aktivna politična sila na Bližnjem vzhodu. Njegova prihodnost je tesno povezana z prihodnostjo regije. Če bi se ZDA in Evropska unija zavezali podpirati politične reforme v regiji, morali bodo izmisliti beton, skladne strategije za vključevanje islamističnih skupin. Pa vendar, ZDA. na splošno ni želel odpreti dialoga s temi gibanji. podobno, Izjema je bila sodelovanje EU z islamisti, ne pravilo. Tam, kjer obstajajo stiki na nizki ravni, služijo predvsem za zbiranje informacij, ne strateških ciljev. ZDA. EU ima številne programe, ki se ukvarjajo z gospodarskim in političnim razvojem v regiji - med njimi pobuda za partnerstvo na Bližnjem vzhodu (MEPI), korporacijo Millennium Challenge (MCC), Unija za Sredozemlje, in evropsko sosedsko politiko (ENP) - vendar pa le malo govorijo o tem, kako se izziv islamistične politične opozicije ujema s širšimi regionalnimi cilji. zunaj ZDA. Pomoč in programiranje demokracije v EU so skoraj v celoti usmerjeni bodisi k avtoritarnim vladam bodisi bodisi sekularnim skupinam civilne družbe z minimalno podporo v njihovih družbah..
Prišel je čas za ponovno oceno trenutnih politik. Od septembra septembra 11, 2001, podpiranje demokracije na Bližnjem vzhodu je dobilo večji pomen za zahodne oblikovalce politike, ki vidijo povezavo med pomanjkanjem demokracije in političnim nasiljem. Večja pozornost je bila namenjena razumevanju različic političnega islama. Nova ameriška administracija je bolj odprta za širjenje komunikacije z muslimanskim svetom. Medtem, velika večina osrednjih islamističnih organizacij - tudi Muslimanska bratovščina v Egiptu, Jordanska fronta islamske akcije (IAF), Maroška stranka pravičnosti in razvoja (PJD), islamsko ustavno gibanje Kuvajta, in jemenska stranka Islama - so podpora politični reformi in demokraciji vedno bolj osrednja sestavina njihovih političnih platform. Poleg tega, mnogi so izrazili veliko zanimanje za odpiranje dialoga s ZDA. in vlade EU.
Prihodnost odnosov med zahodnimi državami in Bližnjim vzhodom je lahko v veliki meri odvisna od stopnje, v kateri prvi vključujejo nenasilne islamistične stranke v širok dialog o skupnih interesih in ciljih. V zadnjem času se je razširilo število raziskav o povezanosti z islamisti, toda le malo jih jasno obravnava, kaj bi lahko pomenilo v praksi. Kot Zoé Nautré, gostujoči kolega na nemškem svetu za zunanje odnose, postavlja, „EU razmišlja o angažmaju, vendar ne ve, kako.“ 1 V upanju, da razpravlja razpravo, ločimo med tremi stopnjami „angažiranosti,"Vsak z različnimi sredstvi in ​​konci: stiki na nizki ravni, strateški dialog, in partnerstvo.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. rjav, amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, vendar, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMISTIČNA RADIKALIZACIJA

PREDGOVOR
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Vprašanja v zvezi s političnim islamom še naprej predstavljajo izziv za evropsko zunanjo politiko na Bližnjem vzhodu in v Severni Afriki (MENA). Ko se je politika EU v zadnjem desetletju skušala soočiti s takšnimi izzivi, se je sam politični islam razvil. Strokovnjaki opozarjajo na vse večjo kompleksnost in raznolikost trendov znotraj političnega islama. Nekatere islamistične organizacije so okrepile svojo zavezanost demokratičnim normam in se v celoti vključile v mir, mainstream nacionalne politike. Drugi ostajajo zavezani nasilnim sredstvom. In spet drugi so se usmerili k bolj tihi obliki islama, izločil iz političnega delovanja. Politični islam v regiji Bližnjega vzhoda in severne Afrike evropskim oblikovalcem politike ne predstavlja enotnega trenda. Analitična razprava se je razvila okoli koncepta "radikalizacije". To pa je sprožilo raziskave o dejavnikih, ki spodbujajo "deradikalizacijo", in obratno, "ponovna radikalizacija". Velik del kompleksnosti izhaja iz splošno razširjenega mnenja, da se vsi ti trije pojavi pojavljajo hkrati. Tudi izrazi sami so sporni. Pogosto je bilo poudarjeno, da zmerno-radikalna dihotomija ne uspe v celoti zajeti odtenkov trendov znotraj političnega islama.. Nekateri analitiki se tudi pritožujejo, da je govorjenje o "radikalizmu" ideološko obremenjeno. Na ravni terminologije, razumemo, da je radikalizacija povezana z ekstremizmom, vendar se pogledi razlikujejo glede osrednjega pomena njegove versko-fundamentalistične v primerjavi s politično vsebino, in o tem, ali je pripravljenost zateči se k nasilju implicirana ali ne.

Takšne razlike se odražajo v pogledih samih islamistov, kot tudi v dojemanju zunanjih.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Od 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Islamic Movement: Political Freedom & demokracija

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Islamska) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, demokracija. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, « Toda sledili so faraonovemu ukazu, in faraonov ukaz ni bil pravilno voden.[Surat Hud: 97] »Tako se je delal norca iz svojih ljudi, in so ga ubogali: res so bili uporniško ljudstvo (proti Alahu).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]Podrobnejši pogled na zgodovino muslimanskega naroda in islamskega gibanja v sodobnem času bi moral jasno pokazati, da je islamicid, Islamsko gibanje in Islamsko prebujenje nikoli nista cvetela ali obrodila sadov, razen v ozračju demokracije in svobode, in so ovenele in postale nerodovitne šele v času zatiranja in tiranije, ki sta teptala voljo ljudstev, ki so se oklepala islama. Takšni zatiralski režimi so vsiljevali svoj sekularizem, socializma ali komunizma na svoje narode s silo in prisilo, uporabo prikritega mučenja in javnih usmrtitev, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Egipt, Sirija, Irak, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, vrednote, essence and very existence.

Radical Islam in the Maghreb

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Libanon, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. leta 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intelektualci, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.

the 500 most influential muslims

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. The 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, ženske, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, mediji, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS

Joost Lagendijk

Jan Marinus Wiersma

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union [], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, vendar. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Od 11 september 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase

Yusuf Al-Qaradawi

What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?

By “Islamic Movement”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heartthe latter being theweakest of beliefsso that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.

Building bridges not walls

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 september 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Vendar pa, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.