RSSTodas as inscrições no "Marrocos" Categoria

O amanhã árabe

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Outubro 6, 1981, era para ser um dia de celebração no Egito. Ele marcou o aniversário do maior momento de vitória do Egito em três conflitos árabe-israelenses, quando o exército oprimido do país atravessou o Canal de Suez nos primeiros dias do 1973 Guerra do Yom Kippur e enviou tropas israelenses cambaleando em retirada. Em um fresco, manhã sem nuvens, o estádio do Cairo estava lotado de famílias egípcias que vieram para ver os militares exibirem seu equipamento., Presidente Anwar el-Sadat,o arquiteto da guerra, assistiu com satisfação enquanto homens e máquinas desfilavam diante dele. eu estava por perto, um correspondente estrangeiro recém-chegado., um dos caminhões do exército parou bem em frente ao estande de revisão no momento em que seis jatos Mirage rugiam no alto em uma performance acrobática, pintando o céu com longas trilhas de vermelho, amarelo, roxo,e fumaça verde. Sadat se levantou, aparentemente se preparando para trocar saudações com mais um contingente de tropas egípcias. Ele se tornou um alvo perfeito para quatro assassinos islâmicos que pularam do caminhão, invadiu o pódio, e crivou seu corpo com balas. Enquanto os assassinos continuaram pelo que pareceu uma eternidade para pulverizar a arquibancada com seu fogo mortal, Eu considerei por um instante se deveria cair no chão e correr o risco de ser pisoteado até a morte por espectadores em pânico ou permanecer em pé e arriscar levar uma bala perdida. O instinto me disse para ficar de pé, e meu senso de dever jornalístico me levou a descobrir se Sadat estava vivo ou morto.

islamismo, O Islã Político e a América

Árabes Insight

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?

khalil al-anani

“there is no chance of communicating with any U.S. administration so long as the United States maintains its long-standing view of Islam as a real danger, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna viewed the West mostly as a symbol of moral decay. Other Salafis – an Islamic school of thought that relies on ancestors as exemplary models – have taken the same view of the United States, but lack the ideological flexibility espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood believes in engaging the Americans in civil dialogue, other extremist groups see no point in dialogue and maintain that force is the only way of dealing with the United States.

ISLAMISMO, DEMOCRACIA & OS ESTADOS UNIDOS:

Fundação Córdoba

Abdullah faliq

Introdução ,


Apesar de ser um debate perene e complexo, Arches Quarterly reexamina a partir de fundamentos teológicos e práticos, o importante debate sobre a relação e compatibilidade entre o Islã e a Democracia, como ecoou na agenda de esperança e mudança de Barack Obama. Enquanto muitos celebram a ascensão de Obama ao Salão Oval como uma catarse nacional para os EUA, outros permanecem menos otimistas de uma mudança de ideologia e abordagem na arena internacional. Embora grande parte da tensão e desconfiança entre o mundo muçulmano e os EUA possa ser atribuída à abordagem de promover a democracia, tipicamente favorecendo ditaduras e regimes fantoches que defendem os valores democráticos e os direitos humanos da boca para fora, a réplica de 9/11 realmente cimentou ainda mais as dúvidas através da posição da América sobre o Islã político. Ele criou um muro de negatividade como encontrado por worldpublicopinion.org, de acordo com qual 67% dos egípcios acreditam que globalmente a América está desempenhando um papel “principalmente negativo”.
A resposta da América foi, portanto, adequada. Ao eleger Obama, muitos ao redor do mundo estão depositando suas esperanças de desenvolver um, mas uma política externa mais justa para o mundo muçulmano. O teste para Obama, enquanto discutimos, é como a América e seus aliados promovem a democracia. Estará facilitando ou impondo?
além disso, pode ser importante um corretor honesto em zonas prolongadas de confl itos? Contando com a experiência e a visão da Prolifi
c estudiosos, acadêmicos, jornalistas e políticos experientes, Arches Quarterly traz à tona a relação entre Islã e Democracia e o papel da América – bem como as mudanças trazidas por Obama, na busca do terreno comum. Anas Altikriti, o CEO da Fundação The Cordoba dá a jogada de abertura para esta discussão, onde ele reflete sobre as esperanças e desafios que repousam no caminho de Obama. Seguindo Altikriti, o ex-assessor do presidente Nixon, Dr Robert Crane oferece uma análise completa do princípio islâmico do direito à liberdade. Anwar Ibrahim, ex-vice-primeiro-ministro da Malásia, enriquece a discussão com as realidades práticas da implementação da democracia nas sociedades dominantes muçulmanas, nomeadamente, na Indonésia e na Malásia.
Temos também Dr Shireen Hunter, da Universidade de Georgetown, EUA, que explora países muçulmanos atrasados ​​em democratização e modernização. Isso é complementado pelo escritor de terrorismo, A explicação do Dr. Nafeez Ahmed sobre a crise da pós-modernidade e a
fim da democracia. Dr. Daud Abdullah (Diretor do Monitor de Mídia do Oriente Médio), Alan Hart (ex-correspondente da ITN e BBC Panorama; autor do sionismo: O verdadeiro inimigo dos judeus) e Asem Sondos (Editor do semanário Sawt Al Omma do Egito) concentrar-se em Obama e seu papel vis-à-vis a promoção da democracia no mundo muçulmano, bem como as relações dos EUA com Israel e a Irmandade Muçulmana.
Ministro de relações exteriores, Maldivas, Ahmed Shaheed especula sobre o futuro do Islã e da Democracia; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– um membro do Sinn Féin que suportou quatro anos de prisão por atividades republicanas irlandesas e um ativista do Guildford 4 e Birmingham 6, reflete sobre sua recente viagem a Gaza, onde testemunhou o impacto da brutalidade e injustiça cometida contra os palestinos; Dra Marie Breen-Smyth, Diretor do Centro para o Estudo da Radicalização e da Violência Política Contemporânea discute os desafios de pesquisar criticamente o terror político; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, escritor e dramaturgo, discute as perspectivas de paz em Darfur; e finalmente o jornalista e ativista de direitos humanos Ashur Shamis analisa criticamente a democratização e a politização dos muçulmanos hoje.
Esperamos que tudo isso seja uma leitura abrangente e fonte de reflexão sobre questões que nos afetam a todos em um novo amanhecer de esperança.
obrigada

Islamism revisited

MAHA Azzam

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Julho 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Desafiando o autoritarismo, Colonialismo, e Desunião: Os movimentos de reforma política islâmica de al-Afghani e Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

O declínio do mundo muçulmano precedeu a colonização européia da maioria

terras muçulmanas no último quartel do século XIX e no primeiro
quartel do século XX. Em particular, do Império Otomano
o poder e o status mundial vinham se deteriorando desde o século XVII.
Mas, mais importante para os estudiosos muçulmanos, tinha parado de se encontrar

alguns requisitos básicos de sua posição como o califado, o supremo e
entidade política soberana à qual todos os muçulmanos devem ser leais.
Portanto, alguns dos estudiosos e intelectuais muçulmanos do império chamavam
para a reforma política, mesmo antes da invasão europeia sobre
terras muçulmanas. As reformas que eles previam não eram apenas islâmicas, mas
também otomana - de dentro da estrutura otomana.

Esses reformadores perceberam o declínio do mundo muçulmano em geral,

e do Império Otomano em particular, ser o resultado de um aumento

desrespeito pela implementação da Shari`ah (A lei islâmica). Contudo, desde o

final do século XVIII, um número crescente de reformadores, às vezes suportado

pelos sultões otomanos, começou a pedir a reforma do império ao longo

linhas europeias modernas. O fracasso do império em defender suas terras e

responder com sucesso aos desafios do Ocidente apenas alimentou ainda mais esse chamado

para “modernizar” a reforma, que atingiu seu pico no movimento Tanzimat

na segunda metade do século XIX.

Outros reformadores muçulmanos pediram um meio-termo. Por um lado,

eles admitiram que o califado deveria ser modelado de acordo com o islamismo

fontes de orientação, especialmente o Alcorão e o Profeta Muhammad

ensinamentos (Sunnah), e que a ummah (a comunidade muçulmana mundial)

a unidade é um dos pilares políticos do Islã. Por outro lado, eles perceberam o

necessidade de rejuvenescer o império ou substituí-lo por um mais viável. De fato,

suas ideias criativas sobre modelos futuros incluídos, mas não se limitaram a, o

seguindo: substituindo o Império Otomano liderado pelos turcos por um império liderado pelos árabes

califado, construção de um califado muçulmano federal ou confederado, estabelecendo

uma comunidade de nações muçulmanas ou orientais, e fortalecendo a solidariedade

e cooperação entre países muçulmanos independentes sem criar

uma estrutura fixa. Estas e outras ideias semelhantes foram posteriormente referidas como

modelo da liga muçulmana, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Contudo, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, isto

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

direitos humanos, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, e

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA Kadlec

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. de forma similar, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. EUA. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Enquanto isso, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, em particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, Contudo, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Política, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Desde a 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Movimento Islâmico: Political Freedom & Democracia

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Islâmica) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, democracy. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Egito, Síria, Iraque, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

Radical Islam in the Maghreb

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Líbano, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. Dentro 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.

o 500 most influential muslims

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, pessoas cuja influência é derivada de sua prática do Islã ou do fato de serem muçulmanas. Achamos que isso fornece informações valiosas sobre as diferentes maneiras pelas quais os muçulmanos impactam o mundo, e também mostra a diversidade de como as pessoas estão vivendo como muçulmanos hoje. A influência é um conceito complicado. Seu significado deriva da palavra latina influens, que significa fluir em, apontando para uma velha ideia astrológica de que forças invisíveis (como a Lua) afetar a humanidade. As figuras desta lista têm a capacidade de afetar a humanidade também. De várias maneiras diferentes, cada pessoa nesta lista tem influência sobre a vida de um grande número de pessoas na Terra.. o 50 figuras mais influentes são perfiladas. Sua influência vem de uma variedade de fontes; no entanto, eles são unificados pelo fato de que cada um deles afeta grandes áreas da humanidade. 500 líderes em 15 categorias—Erudito, Político,Administrativo, Linhagem, Pregadores, Mulher, Juventude, Filantropia, Desenvolvimento,Ciência e Tecnologia, Artes e Cultura, Media, Radicais, Redes Islâmicas Internacionais, e Questões do Dia — para ajudá-lo a entender os diferentes tipos de maneiras pelas quais o Islã e os muçulmanos impactam o mundo hoje. Duas listas compostas mostram como a influência funciona de maneiras diferentes: InternationalIslamic Networks mostra pessoas que estão à frente de importantes redes transnacionais de muçulmanos, e Questões do Dia destaca indivíduos cuja importância se deve a questões atuais que afetam a humanidade.

TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS

Joost Lagendijk

Jan Marinus Wiersma

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union [], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, Contudo. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Desde a 11 Setembro 2001, em particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase

Yusuf Al-Qardhawi

What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?

Por “Movimento Islâmico”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heartthe latter being theweakest of beliefsso that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.

Building bridges not walls

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 Setembro 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Contudo, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.