RSSGach Iontráil sa "Maracó" Catagóir

Amárach Arabach

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Deireadh Fómhair 6, 1981, Bhí sé i gceist go mbeadh sé ina lá ceiliúrtha san Éigipt. Ba chomóradh é an bua is mó a bhí ag an Éigipt i dtrí choimhlint Arabach-Iosraelach, nuair a chuaigh arm faoi thalamh na tíre trasna Chanáil Suez i laethanta oscailte na tíre 1973 Cogadh Yom Kippur agus chuir sé trúpaí Iosraelacha sa tóir ar chúlú. Ar fionnuar, maidin gan scamall, bhí staidiam Cairo pacáilte le teaghlaigh Éigipteacha a tháinig chun na crua-earraí míleata a fheiceáil. Ar an seastán athbhreithnithe, Uachtarán Anwar el-Sadat,ailtire an chogaidh, d'fhéach sé le sásamh agus fir agus meaisíní ag paráid os a chomhair. Bhí mé in aice láimhe, comhfhreagraí eachtrach nua-theacht.Suddenly, Stopadh ceann de na trucailí airm díreach os comhair an tseastáin athbhreithnithe díreach agus sé scaird Mirage ag ruathar lastuas i dtaibhiú androgsaineach, péinteáil an spéir le rianta fada dearg, buí, corcra,agus deatach glas. Sheas Sadat suas, de réir dealraimh ag ullmhú chun beannachtaí a mhalartú le meithle eile de thrúpaí na hÉigipte. Rinne sé sprioc foirfe dó féin do cheathrar feallmharfóirí Ioslamacha a léim as an trucail, stormed an podium, agus lán urchair ar a chorp. Mar a lean na marfóirí ar aghaidh ar feadh an chuma ar an tsíoraíocht chun an seastán a spraeáil lena tine mharfach., Rinne mé machnamh láithreach ar cé acu an mbuailfinn ar an talamh agus an baol a bheith á satailt chun báis ag lucht féachana a raibh scaoll orthu nó fanacht faoi chois agus an baol ann piléar strae a thógáil. Dúirt Instinct liom fanacht ar mo chosa, agus chuir mo chiall ar dhualgas iriseoireachta brú orm dul ag fáil amach an raibh Sadat beo nó marbh.

Ioslam, Ioslam polaitiúil agus Meiriceá

Léargas Arabach

An bhfuil “Bráithreachas” le Meiriceá Féideartha?

Khailil al-anani

“Níl aon seans ann cumarsáid a dhéanamh le SAM ar bith. riarachán chomh fada agus a choinníonn na Stáit Aontaithe a dearcadh seanbhunaithe ar Ioslam mar fhíorchontúirt, dearcadh a chuireann na Stáit Aontaithe sa bhád céanna leis an namhaid Zionist. Níl aon tuairimí réamhcheaptha againn maidir le muintir Mheiriceá nó SAM. an tsochaí agus a cuid eagraíochtaí cathartha agus meithleacha smaointe. Níl aon fhadhb againn cumarsáid a dhéanamh le muintir Mheiriceá ach níl aon iarrachtaí leordhóthanacha á ndéanamh chun muid a thabhairt níos gaire,” a dúirt an Dr. Issam al-Iaráin, príomhfheidhmeannach na roinne polaitíochta den Bhráithreachas Moslamach in agallamh gutháin.
Déanann focail Al-Iryan achoimre ar thuairimí na Bráithreachas Moslamach ar mhuintir Mheiriceá agus SAM. rialtas. D’aontódh baill eile den Bhráithreachas Moslamach, mar a dhéanfadh Hassan al-Banna, nach maireann, a bhunaigh an grúpa i 1928. Al- Bhreathnaigh Banna ar an Iarthar den chuid is mó mar shiombail de mheath morálta. Ghlac Salafis eile - scoil smaointeoireachta Ioslamach a bhraitheann ar sinsear mar mhúnlaí eiseamláireacha - an dearcadh céanna ar na Stáit Aontaithe, ach níl an tsolúbthacht idé-eolaíoch atá á lorg ag an mBráithreachas Moslamach in easnamh orthu. Cé go gcreideann an Bráithreachas Moslamach i rannpháirtíocht na Meiriceánaigh in idirphlé sibhialta, ní fheiceann grúpaí antoisceacha eile aon phointe idirphlé agus deir siad gurb é fórsa an t-aon bhealach chun déileáil leis na Stáit Aontaithe.

ISLAM, Daonlathas & AN SAM:

Fondúireacht Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq |

Intro ,


In ainneoin gur díospóireacht ilbhliantúil agus casta araon í, Arches Ráithiúil athscrúdú ar chúiseanna diagachta agus praiticiúla, an díospóireacht thábhachtach faoin gcaidreamh agus comhoiriúnacht idir Ioslam agus an Daonlathas, mar a léirítear i gclár oibre dóchais agus athraithe Barack Obama. Cé go gceiliúrann go leor cinnt Obama san Oifig Oval mar chatharsis náisiúnta do na SA, tá cuid eile fós nach bhfuil chomh dóchasach faoi athrú san idé-eolaíocht agus sa chur chuige sa saol idirnáisiúnta. Cé gur féidir cuid mhór den teannas agus den easpa muiníne idir an domhan Moslamach agus SAM a chur i leith an chur chuige a bhaineann le cur chun cinn an daonlathais., go tipiciúil i bhfabhar deachtóireachtaí agus réimis puipéad a íocann seirbhís liopa do luachanna daonlathacha agus cearta daonna, iarshlua na 9/11 dhaingnigh sé an amhras go fírinneach trí sheasamh Mheiriceá ar Ioslam polaitiúil. Tá balla diúltach cruthaithe aige mar a d’aimsigh worldpublicopinion.org, dá réir a 67% Creideann na hÉigiptigh go bhfuil ról “diúltach den chuid is mó” á imirt ag Meiriceá ar fud an domhain.
Mar sin bhí freagra Mheiriceá oiriúnach. Trí Obama a thoghadh, tá go leor ar fud an domhain ag súil le duine nach bhfuil chomh corraitheach a fhorbairt, ach beartas eachtrach níos cothroime i dtreo an domhain Moslamach. An tástáil le haghaidh Obama, agus muid ag plé, is é an chaoi a gcuireann Meiriceá agus a comhghuaillithe an daonlathas chun cinn. An mbeidh sé ag éascú nó ag impí?
Thairis sin, an bhfuil sé tábhachtach gur bróicéir macánta é i gcriosanna fada coinbhleachta? Ag liostáil saineolas agus léargas prolifi
c scoláirí, acadóirí, iriseoirí agus polaiteoirí le taithí, Tugann Arches Quarterly an gaol idir Ioslam agus Daonlathas agus ról Mheiriceá chun solais – chomh maith leis na hathruithe a tharla de bharr Obama., agus an talamh coitianta á lorg. Anas Altikriti, Soláthraíonn POF The Cordoba Foundation an t-athrú tosaigh don phlé seo, áit a ndéanann sé machnamh ar na dóchais agus na dúshláin atá ar chosán Obama. Tar éis Altikriti, an t-iarchomhairleoir don Uachtarán Nixon, Tairgeann an Dr Robert Crane anailís chríochnúil ar phrionsabal Ioslamach an chirt chun saoirse. Anwar Ibrahim, iar-Leas-Phríomh-Aire na Malaeisia, saibhríonn sé an plé leis na réaltachtaí praiticiúla a bhaineann le daonlathas a chur i bhfeidhm i sochaithe ceannasacha Moslamach, eadhon, san Indinéis agus sa Mhalaeisia.
Tá an Dr Shireen Hunter againn freisin, de chuid Ollscoil Georgetown, SAM, a dhéanann iniúchadh ar thíortha Moslamacha atá tite chun deiridh sa daonlathú agus sa nuachóiriú. Comhlánaíonn scríbhneoir sceimhlitheoireachta Th é, Míniú an Dr Nafeez Ahmed ar ghéarchéim na hiar-nua-aoiseachais agus an
meath an daonlathais. An Dr Daud Abdullah (Stiúrthóir Monatóir Meán an Mheánoirthir), Alan Hart (iar-chomhfhreagraí ITN agus BBC Panorama; údar Zionism: Fíor-namhaid na nGiúdach) agus Asem Sondos (Eagarthóir Sawt Al Omma na hÉigipte go seachtainiúil) díriú ar Obama agus a ról vis-à-vis an daonlathas-chur chun cinn sa domhan Moslamach, chomh maith le caidreamh SAM le hIosrael agus leis an mBráithreachas Moslamach.
Aire Gnóthaí Eachtracha Aff airs, Oileáin Mhaildíve, Déanann Ahmed Shaheed tuairimíocht ar thodhchaí an Ioslaim agus an Daonlathais; An Clr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– ball de Shinn Féin a d’fhulaing ceithre bliana sa phríosún as gníomhaíochtaí Poblachtánacha na hÉireann agus feachtasóir ar son Guildford 4 agus Birmingham 6, léiríonn sé ar an turas a thug sé go Gaza le déanaí áit ar chonaic sé tionchar na brúidiúlachta agus na héagóra a cuireadh le chéile i gcoinne na bPalaistíneach; An Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Pléann Stiúrthóir an Ionaid um Staidéar ar Radacú agus ar Fhoréigean Polaitiúil Comhaimseartha na dúshláin a bhaineann le taighde criticiúil a dhéanamh ar sceimhle polaitíochta; An Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, scríbhneoir agus drámadóir, pléann sé ionchais na síochána i Darfur; agus faoi dheireadh breathnaíonn an t-iriseoir agus gníomhaí cearta daonna Ashur Shamis go criticiúil ar dhaonlathú agus ar pholaitíocht na Moslamaigh inniu.
Tá súil againn go dtabharfaidh sé seo go léir léamh cuimsitheach agus foinse machnaimh ar cheisteanna a théann i gcion orainn go léir le linn nua dóchais..
Go raibh maith agat

Athchuairt ar an Ioslamachas

MAHA AZZAM

Tá géarchéim pholaitiúil agus slándála ag baint leis an rud ar a dtugtar an tIoslamachas, géarchéim a bhfuil a réamhshainithe le fada roimh 9/11. Thar an am atá caite 25 blianta, cuireadh béimeanna éagsúla ar conas Ioslamachas a mhíniú agus a chomhrac. Anailísithe agus lucht déanta beartas
labhair sna 1980idí agus 1990idí faoi bhunchúiseanna na míleatachta Ioslamaí mar mhíshásamh eacnamaíoch agus imeallú. Le deireanas díríodh ar athchóiriú polaitiúil mar mhodh chun an bonn a bhaint de mhealltacht an radacachais. Níos mó sa lá atá inniu ann, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Iúil 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Challenging Authoritarianism, Coilíneachas, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. In particular, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Dá bhrí sin, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, but
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). ach, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Ar an lámh eile, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Cínte,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, an

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. ach, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, é

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

Cearta daonna, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

tábhacht intíre na bpáirtithe Ioslamacha agus a rannpháirtíocht mhéadaitheach in idirnáisiúnta

gnóthaí. Dearcadh eile is ea go méadódh an daonlathú sa domhan Moslamach

slándáil Eorpach. Bailíocht na n-argóintí seo agus argóintí eile faoi cé acu an bhfuil agus conas an

Ba cheart don AE dul i mbun is féidir a thástáil ach amháin trí staidéar a dhéanamh ar na gluaiseachtaí Islamist éagsúla agus

a gcúinsí polaitiúla, tír de réir tíre.

Is téama lárnach de ghníomhaíochtaí comhbheartas eachtrach an AE é an daonlathas, mar atá leagtha

amach in Airteagal 11 den Chonradh ar an Aontas Eorpach. Go leor de na stáit a mheas i seo

nach bhfuil an tuarascáil daonlathach, nó nach bhfuil go hiomlán daonlathach. Sa chuid is mó de na tíortha seo, Ioslamach

cuireann páirtithe agus gluaiseachtaí go mór i gcoinne na réimeas atá i réim, agus

i roinnt acu is iad an bloc freasúra is mó. B’éigean do dhaonlathais Eorpacha le fada an lá

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. U.S.. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J.. Donn, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, ach, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, An Iordáin, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Polaitíocht, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Gluaiseacht Ioslamach: Political Freedom & Daonlathas

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Ioslamach) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, daonlathas. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, An Éigipt, An tSiria, An Iaráic, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

Radical Islam in the Maghreb

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Liobáin, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. I 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.

an 500 Moslamaigh is mó tionchair

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

Is é an foilseachán atá agat i do lámha an chéad cheann de shraith is súil againn a bheidh ann a thabharfaidh léargas ar ghluaiseachtaí agus ar chroitheadh ​​​​an Domhain Mhuslamach.. Rinneamar ár ndícheall aird a tharraingt ar dhaoine a bhfuil tionchar acu mar Mhoslamaigh, Is é sin, daoine a bhfuil a dtionchar díorthaithe óna chleachtadh Ioslam nó ón bhfíric gur Moslamach iad. Is dóigh linn go dtugann sé seo léargas luachmhar ar na bealaí éagsúla a mbíonn tionchar ag na Moslamaigh ar an domhan, agus taispeánann sé freisin an éagsúlacht sa chaoi a bhfuil daoine ag maireachtáil mar Mhoslamaigh sa lá atá inniu ann. Coincheap casta is ea an tionchar. Tagann a bhrí ón bhfocal Laidine influens a chiallaíonn sreabhadh isteach, ag tagairt do sheansmaoineamh astrological a fheiceann fórsaí nach bhfacthas riamh (cosúil leooon) difear don chine daonna. Tá an cumas ag na figiúirí ar an liosta seo dul i bhfeidhm ar an daonnacht freisin. Ar bhealaí éagsúla tá tionchar ag gach duine ar an liosta seo ar shaol líon mór daoine ar domhan. Tá an 50 déantar próifíliú ar na figiúirí is mó tionchair. Tagann a dtionchar ó fhoinsí éagsúla; Mar sin féin tá siad aontaithe ag an bhfíric go bhfuil tionchar acu ar fad raon ollmhór na daonnachta. Táimid tar éis briste suas ansin an 500 ceannairí isteach 15 catagóirí - Scoláireach, Polaitiúil,Riaracháin, Líneáil, Preachers, Mná, An Óige, Daonchairdeas, Forbairt,Eolaíocht agus Teicneolaíocht, Na hEalaíona agus Cultúr, Meáin, Radacaigh, Líonraí Ioslamacha Idirnáisiúnta, agus Ceisteanna an Lae - chun cabhrú leat tuiscint a fháil ar na cineálacha éagsúla bealaí a mbíonn tionchar ag Ioslam agus ag Moslamaigh ar an domhan inniu. Léiríonn dhá liosta ilchodacha an chaoi a n-oibríonn tionchar ar bhealaí éagsúla: Léiríonn Líonraí Idirnáisiúnta Ioslamacha daoine atá chun tosaigh ar líonraí trasnáisiúnta tábhachtacha Moslamaigh, agus cuireann Eagrán an Lae béim ar dhaoine aonair a bhfuil tábhacht acu mar gheall ar cheisteanna reatha a bhaineann leis an gcine daonna.

TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS

LAGENDIJK JOOST

JAN MARINUS WIERSMA

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union [], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, ach. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 Meán Fómhair 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase

Yusuf Al-Qardhawi

What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?

By “Gluaiseacht Ioslamach”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heartthe latter being theweakest of beliefsso that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.

Building bridges not walls

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 Meán Fómhair 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. ach, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.