RSS中的所有条目 "阿尔及利亚" 类别

阿拉伯明天

大卫·B. OTTAWAY

十月 6, 1981, 本来是在埃及庆祝的一天. 它标志着埃及在三项阿以冲突中取得最伟大胜利的周年纪念日, 在开国之日,该国的失败者军队冲过苏伊士运河 1973 赎罪日战争,使以色列军队退缩. 酷, 万里无云的早晨, 开罗体育馆里挤满了埃及家庭,他们前来参观是为了看准军事力量。, 总统安瓦尔·萨达特,战争的建筑师, 人和机器在他面前游行时满意地看着. 我在附近, 刚到的外国记者, 六架幻影喷气式飞机在杂技表演中高高呼啸,其中一辆军车直接停在了检阅台前, 用长长的红色画天空, 黄色, 紫色,和绿色的烟雾. 萨达特站了起来, 显然准备与另一支埃及军队交换礼炮. 他使自己成为四名从卡车上跳下来的伊斯兰刺客的理想目标。, 冲上领奖台, 随着子弹的杀手不断地向他们的致命之火喷洒架子, 我考虑了一下是跌倒在地,冒着被惊恐的观众踩死的危险,还是保持脚步并冒着流弹的风险. 本能告诉我要站稳脚跟, 我的新闻责任感促使我去寻找萨达特是活着还是死了.

伊斯兰教, 政治伊斯兰教与美国

阿拉伯洞察力

与美国的“兄弟情谊”是否可能?

哈利勒阿纳尼

“没有机会与任何美国沟通. 只要美国坚持其长期以来将伊斯兰教视为真正危险的观点, 一种将美国与犹太复国主义敌人置于同一条船上的观点. 我们对美国人民或美国没有先入为主的观念. 社会及其民间组织和智囊团. 我们与美国人民的沟通没有问题,但没有做出足够的努力来拉近我们的距离,”博士说. 伊萨姆·伊里安, 穆斯林兄弟会政治部负责人接受电话采访.
Al-Iryan的话总结了穆斯林兄弟会对美国人民和美国的看法. 政府. 穆斯林兄弟会的其他成员会同意, 已故的哈桑·班纳也是如此, 谁在 1928. 铝- 版纳主要将西方视为道德败坏的象征. 其他萨拉菲派——一个以祖先为楷模的伊斯兰学派——对美国也持同样的看法, 但缺乏穆斯林兄弟会拥护的意识形态灵活性. 虽然穆斯林兄弟会相信让美国人参与民间对话, 其他极端组织认为对话没有意义,并认为武力是与美国打交道的唯一方式.

自由民主与政治伊斯兰: 寻找共同点.

穆斯塔法·本亨达

本文旨在建立民主和伊斯兰政治理论之间的对话。1 它们之间的相互作用令人费解: 例如, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regime, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. 例如, 穆斯林学者和活动家经常赞同对统治者负责的原则, 这是民主的一个决定性特征. 相反, 他们经常拒绝政教分离的原则, 这通常被认为是民主的一部分 (至少, 当今美国所熟知的民主). 鉴于对民主原则的这种混合评估, 确定伊斯兰政治模式背后的民主概念似乎很有趣. 换句话说, 我们应该尝试找出什么是“神民主”中的民主. 为此, 在规范性政治思想的伊斯兰传统的令人印象深刻的多样性和多元化中, 我们主要关注可追溯到 Abu ‘Ala Maududi 和埃及知识分子 Sayyed Qutb 的广泛思想潮流。8 这种特殊的思想趋势很有趣,因为在穆斯林世界, 它是对源自西方的价值观传播的一些最具挑战性的反对意见的基础. 基于宗教价值观, 这一趋势阐述了一种替代自由民主的政治模式. 广义上讲, 这种伊斯兰政治模式中包含的民主概念是程序性的. 有一些不同, 这一概念受到一些宪政主义者和政治学家所倡导的民主理论的启发。 10 它是单薄且极简主义的, 到某一点. 例如, 它不依赖于任何人民主权的概念,也不需要将宗教与政治分开. 本文的第一个目的是阐述这种极简主义的概念. 我们对它进行了详细的重述,以便将这个概念与它的道德 (自由主义的) 基础, 从这里考虑的特定伊斯兰观点来看,这是有争议的. 的确, 民主进程通常源于个人自治原则, 这些伊斯兰理论并不认可这一点。 11 这里, 我们表明,这样的原则对于证明民主进程的正当性并不是必要的.

伊斯兰教, 民主 & 美国:

科尔多瓦基金会

阿卜杜拉·法利克 |

介绍 ,


尽管这是一场长期而复杂的辩论, Arches Quarterly 从神学和实践的角度重新审视, 关于伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系和兼容性的重要辩论, 正如巴拉克奥巴马的希望和变革议程所呼应的那样. 虽然许多人庆祝奥巴马登上椭圆形办公室作为美国的全国宣泄者, 其他人对国际舞台上意识形态和方法的转变仍然不乐观. 虽然穆斯林世界和美国之间的许多紧张局势和不信任可归因于促进民主的方法, 通常偏爱专制政权和伪造政权,这些政权为民主价值观和人权提供口红, 余震 9/11 通过美国在政治伊斯兰上的立场,确实进一步加剧了担忧. 它创造了由worldpublicopinion.org发现的负面墙, 根据该 67% 的埃及人认为,全球范围内,美国正在扮演“主要消极”角色.
因此,美国的反应很贴切. 通过选举奥巴马, 世界各地的许多人都寄希望于发展一个不太好战的人, 但对穆斯林世界更公平的外交政策. 奥巴马的考验, 当我们讨论, 是美国及其盟友促进民主的方式. 它会促进还是强加?
而且, 它能否成为长期冲突地区的诚实经纪人?? 吸收 prolifi 的专业知识和洞察力
c学者, 学者, 经验丰富的记者和政治家, Arches Quarterly 揭示了伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系以及美国的角色——以及奥巴马带来的变化, 在寻求共同点. 阿纳斯·阿尔蒂克里蒂, The e Cordoba Foundation 的首席执行官为这次讨论提供了开场白, 他反思了奥巴马道路上的希望和挑战. 跟随 Altikriti, 尼克松总统的前顾问, 罗伯特·克莱恩(Robert Craneoff)博士对伊斯兰自由权原则进行了透彻的分析. 安瓦尔·易卜拉欣, 马来西亚前副总理, 通过在穆斯林占主导地位的社会中实施民主的实际现实来丰富讨论, 即, 在印度尼西亚和马来西亚.
我们也有Shireen Hunter博士, 乔治敦大学, 美国, 探索落后于民主化和现代化的穆斯林国家. 恐怖主义作家对此予以补充, 纳菲兹·艾哈迈德(Nafeez Ahmed)博士对后现代危机和
民主的灭亡. Daud Abdullah博士 (中东媒体监控总监), 艾伦·哈特 (前ITN和BBC Panorama通讯员; 犹太复国主义的作者: 犹太人的真正敌人) 和Asem Sondos (埃及《 Sawt Al Omma》杂志编辑) 专注于奥巴马及其在穆斯林世界促进民主方面的作用, 以及美国与以色列和穆斯林兄弟会的关系.
外交部长, 马尔代夫, 艾哈迈德·沙希德 (Ahmed Shaheed) 推测伊斯兰教和民主的未来; 克莱尔. 格里·麦克洛克林
– 因爱尔兰共和党活动而入狱四年的新芬党成员和吉尔福德的活动家 4 和伯明翰 6, 反映了他最近去加沙的旅行,在那里他目睹了对巴勒斯坦人的残暴和不公正的影响; 玛丽·布林-史密斯博士, 激进化和当代政治暴力研究中心主任讨论批判性研究政治恐怖的挑战; 哈立德·穆巴拉克博士, 作家和剧作家, 讨论达尔富尔和平的前景; 最后,记者和人权活动家 Ashur Shamis 批判性地审视了当今穆斯林的民主化和政治化.
我们希望所有这些都有助于在新的希望曙光中对影响我们所有人的问题进行全面的阅读和反思.
谢谢

伊斯兰教与法治

比吉特·克拉维茨
赫尔穆特·赖菲尔德

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. 同时, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.

伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权

丹尼尔(Daniele). 价钱

有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 与西方社会的价值观相矛盾, 并显着影响穆斯林国家的重要政治成果. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 政府官员经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是对自由民主国家的下一个意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要基于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和个别国家的特别研究, 不考虑其他因素. 我的论点是伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样, 可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 特定国家和描述性研究无法帮助我们找到有助于我们解释穆斯林世界各国伊斯兰教与政治之间不同关系的模式. 因此, 一种新的研究方法
伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系, 民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 过分强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我首先使用比较案例研究, 重点关注与伊斯兰团体和政权之间的相互作用有关的因素, 经济影响, 种族分裂, 和社会发展, 解释伊斯兰教对八个国家政治影响的差异. 我认为大部分的权力
归因于伊斯兰教作为穆斯林国家政策和政治制度背后的驱动力,可以通过前面提到的因素更好地解释. 我也发现, 与普遍看法相反, 伊斯兰政治团体的日益强大往往与政治体系的适度多元化有关.
我构建了一个伊斯兰政治文化指数, 基于伊斯兰法律的使用程度以及是否和, 如果是这样, 如何,西方观念, 机构, 和技术被实施, 检验伊斯兰教与民主以及伊斯兰教与人权之间关系的性质. 该指标用于统计分析, 其中包括 23 个以穆斯林为主的国家的样本和 23 个非穆斯林发展中国家的对照组. 除了比较
伊斯兰国家到非伊斯兰发展中国家, 统计分析使我能够控制已发现影响民主水平和保护个人权利的其他变量的影响. 结果应该是对伊斯兰教对政治和政策的影响的更现实和准确的描述.

全球反恐战争中的精准:

Sherifa Zuhur

九月之后的七年 11, 2001 (9/11) 攻击, 许多专家认为,基地组织已经恢复了力量,其模仿者或分支机构比以前更具杀伤力. 国家情报估计 2007 断言基地组织现在比以前更危险 9/11.1 基地组织的模仿者继续威胁西方, 中东, 和欧洲国家, 就像在九月被挫败的情节一样 2007 在德国. 布鲁斯·里德尔说: 很大程度上要归功于华盛顿急于进入伊拉克而不是追捕基地组织的领导人, 该组织现在在巴基斯坦的荒地拥有坚实的业务基础,并在伊拉克西部拥有有效的特许经营权. 它的影响力遍及整个穆斯林世界和欧洲 . . . 奥萨马·本·拉登开展了一场成功的宣传活动. . . . 他的想法现在吸引了比以往更多的追随者.
确实,各种萨拉菲圣战组织仍在整个伊斯兰世界中出现. 为什么对我们称之为全球圣战的伊斯兰恐怖主义的大量资源反应没有证明非常有效?
转向“软实力”工具,” 西方在全球反恐战争中支持穆斯林的努力效果如何? (长城汽车)? 为什么美国在更广泛的伊斯兰世界中赢得如此少的“民心”? 为什么美国在这个问题上的战略信息在该地区发挥如此糟糕? 为什么, 尽管穆斯林普遍反对极端主义,正如主要穆斯林领导人的调查和官方言论所示, 约旦和巴基斯坦对本拉登的支持实际上有所增加?
本专着不会重新审视伊斯兰暴力的起源. 相反,它关注的是一种错误地构建 GWOT 并阻止穆斯林支持它的概念上的失败. 他们无法认同提议的变革性对策,因为他们将自己的一些核心信念和制度视为目标
这种努力.
几个严重成问题的趋势混淆了美国对 GWOT 的概念化以及为打这场战争而制定的战略信息. 这些演变自 (1) 对穆斯林和穆斯林占多数的国家的后殖民政治方法差异很大,因此产生了相互矛盾和令人困惑的印象和效果; 和 (2) 对伊斯兰教和次区域文化的普遍无知和偏见. 增加美国人的愤怒, 恐惧, 和对致命事件的焦虑 9/11, 和某些元素, 尽管有冷静的头脑的敦促, 让穆斯林和他们的宗教为他们的同教者的罪行负责, 或出于政治原因认为这样做有用的人.

辩论阿拉伯世界的民主

易卜生·易卜拉欣|

什么是民主?
西方学者将民主定义为保护个人公民权利和政治权利的方法. 它提供言论自由, 按, 信仰, 观点, 所有权, 和组装, 以及投票权, 提名和寻求公职. 亨廷顿 (1984) 认为一个政治制度是民主的,因为它最强大的集体决策者是通过以下方式选出的
定期选举,候选人自由竞争选票,几乎所有成年人都有投票权. 罗斯坦 (1995) 指出民主是一种政府形式和一种治理过程,可以根据情况改变和适应. 他还补充说,西方对民主的定义 — 除了问责, 竞赛, 一定程度的参与 — 包含对重要公民权利和政治权利的保障. 安德森 (1995) 认为民主一词是指通过定期选举选出最有权势的集体决策者的制度,在该制度中,候选人可以自由竞争选票,并且几乎所有成年人都有资格投票. 萨德·埃丁·易卜拉欣 (1995), 埃及学者, 将可能适用于阿拉伯世界的民主视为一套旨在通过和平方式进行治理的规则和制度
管理竞争团体和/或利益冲突. 然而, 萨米尔·阿明 (1991) 将他的民主定义建立在社会马克思主义的观点之上. 他把民主分为两类: 以个人权利和个人自由为基础的资产阶级民主, 但没有社会平等; 和政治民主,赋予社会上所有人投票和选举其政府和机构代表的权利,这将有助于获得他们平等的社会权利.
结束本节, 我想说,没有一个单一的民主定义可以准确地表明它是什么或不是什么. 然而, 正如我们注意到的, 上面提到的大多数定义都有基本的相似元素 – 问责制, 竞赛, 和一定程度的参与 – 已在西方世界和国际上占据主导地位.

伊斯兰教与民主

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

挑战威权主义, 殖民主义, 和不团结: 阿富汗和里达的伊斯兰政治改革运动

艾哈迈德·阿里·塞勒姆

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. In particular, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
所以, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, but
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). 然而, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. 的确,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, 这

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. 然而, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




埃及处于临界点 ?

大卫·B. 奥特韦
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, 霍斯尼·穆巴拉克(Hosni Mubarak), to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 至 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

穆斯林世界民族主义的根源

沙比尔·艾哈迈德(Shabir Ahmed)

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. 的确, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Furthermore, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, 阿拉伯, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. 例如, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Rather, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.

一个穆斯林群岛

最大L. 毛

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.

伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权

丹尼尔(Daniele). 价钱

有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 矛盾的

西方社会的价值观, 并显着影响重要的政治结果
在穆斯林国家. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 和政府
官员们经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是下一个
对自由民主国家的意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要是基于
关于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和特别研究
个别国家, 不考虑其他因素. 这是我的争论
伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样,
可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 国家
具体的和描述性的研究并不能帮助我们找到有帮助的模式
我们解释伊斯兰教与政治之间的不同关系
穆斯林世界的国家. 因此, 一种新的研究方法
伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系,
民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 太多了
强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我先来
使用比较案例研究, 关注与相互作用相关的因素
伊斯兰团体和政权之间, 经济影响, 种族分裂,

和社会发展, 解释影响的差异

八个国家的伊斯兰教政治.

伊斯兰反对党和欧盟参与的潜力

托比·阿切尔

海蒂·休塔宁(Heidi Huuhtanen)

鉴于伊斯兰运动在穆斯林世界和

自世纪之交以来,激进化对全球事件的影响方式, 它

对于欧盟来说,在可以松散的范围内评估其对参与者的政策很重要

被称为“伊斯兰世界”. 询问是否以及如何参与尤为重要

与各种伊斯兰团体.

即使在欧盟内部,这仍然存在争议. 有些人认为伊斯兰价值观

落后于伊斯兰政党与西方的民主理想和

人权, 而其他人则将参与视为现实的必要性,因为日益增长的

伊斯兰政党在国内的重要性及其日益参与国际事务

事务. 另一种观点是,穆斯林世界的民主化将会增加

欧洲安全. 这些和其他关于是否以及如何

欧盟是否应该参与只能通过研究不同的伊斯兰运动和

他们的政治环境, 逐个国家.

民主化是欧盟共同外交政策行动的中心主题, 铺设

在文章中 11 欧盟条约. 在此考虑的许多州

举报不民主, 或不完全民主. 在这些国家中的大多数, 伊斯兰主义者

政党和运动构成了对现行政权的重大反对, 和

在一些地区,他们形成了最大的反对派集团. 欧洲民主国家长期以来不得不

处理专制的统治政权, 但这是一个新现象

在最有可能受益者可能拥有的国家进行民主改革, 来自

欧盟的观点, 不同的,有时是有问题的民主方法及其

相关值, 例如少数民族和妇女权利和法治. 这些费用是

经常反对伊斯兰运动, 因此,对于欧洲政策制定者来说,重要的是

准确了解潜在合作伙伴的政策和理念.

来自不同国家的经验往往表明,更自由的伊斯兰主义者

允许聚会, 他们的行动和想法越温和. 在许多

伊斯兰政党和团体早已偏离了最初的目标

建立一个受伊斯兰法律管辖的伊斯兰国家, 并开始接受基本的

选举权力的民主原则, 其他政治的存在

竞争对手, 和政治多元化.

中东的政治伊斯兰教

是努森

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, 在

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

回顾一些用来解释中东伊斯兰复兴的主要理论

(数字 1). 简单来说, 报告表明,伊斯兰教不必与民主和

有一种趋势是忽视许多中东国家已经

参与了对伊斯兰运动的残酷镇压, 导致他们, 有人争辩, 占用

反对国家的武器, 更罕见的是, 外国. 使用政治暴力是

广泛分布于中东, 但既不不合逻辑也不非理性. 在很多情况下甚至

以使用暴力而闻名的伊斯兰团体已转变为和平的政治组织

政党成功参加市政和全国选举. 尽管如此, 伊斯兰主义者

尽管有许多理论试图

说明它的增长和受欢迎的吸引力. 一般来说, 大多数理论认为伊斯兰主义是

对相对剥夺的反应, 尤其是社会不平等和政治压迫. 选择

理论在宗教本身和宗教的范围内寻求伊斯兰复兴的答案

强大的, 宗教象征的唤起潜力.

结论主张超越“悲观与厄运”的方法,即

将伊斯兰主义描绘成一种非法的政治表达和对西方的潜在威胁 (“老的

伊斯兰主义”), 以及对当前伊斯兰主义民主化的更细致入微的理解

现在正在整个中东发生的运动 (“新伊斯兰主义”). 这个

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

社会中较贫穷的阶层,但也属于中产阶级.