RSSTotes les entrades al "germà & oest" Categoria

reforma Islàmica

Adnan Khan

El primer ministre italià, Silvio Berlusconi va presumir després dels fets de 9/11:
“...hem de ser conscients de la superioritat de la nostra civilització, un sistema que té garantit

benestar, respecte als drets humans i – en contrast amb els països islàmics – respecte

pels drets polítics i religiosos, un sistema que té els seus valors comprensió de la diversitat

i tolerància... Occident conquistarà els pobles, com si va conquerir el comunisme, encara que això

significa un enfrontament amb una altra civilització, la islàmica, enganxat on estava

1,400 fa anys..." 1

I en a 2007 informe l'institut RAND va declarar:
"La lluita en curs a gran part del món musulmà és essencialment una guerra de

idees. El seu resultat determinarà la direcció futura del món musulmà".

Construir xarxes musulmanes moderades, Institut RAND

El concepte d'"islah" (reforma) és un concepte desconegut pels musulmans. No va existir mai al llarg del

història de la civilització islàmica; mai va ser debatut ni tan sols considerat. Un cop d'ull al clàssic

La literatura islàmica ens mostra que quan els estudiosos clàssics van posar les bases d'usul, i codificat

els seus governs islàmics (fiqh) només buscaven la comprensió de les regles islàmiques per tal de

aplicar-los. Una situació similar es va produir quan es van establir les regles per al hadiz, tafseer i el

llenguatge àrab. Estudiosos, pensadors i intel·lectuals al llarg de la història islàmica van passar molt de temps

entendre la revelació d'Al·là: l'Alcorà i aplicar l'ayaat a les realitats i encunyades

principis i disciplines per tal de facilitar la comprensió. Per tant, l'Alcorà va seguir sent la base

l'estudi i totes les disciplines que van evolucionar es van basar sempre en l'Alcorà. Els que es van convertir

encisat per la filosofia grega com els filòsofs musulmans i alguns d'entre els Mut'azilah

es considerava que havien abandonat l'islam quan l'Alcorà va deixar de ser la seva base d'estudi. Així per

qualsevol musulmà que intenti deduir regles o entendre quina posició s'ha d'adoptar davant d'un determinat

L'Alcorà és la base d'aquest estudi.

El primer intent de reforma de l'islam es va produir a principis del segle XIX. Pel torn del

segle, la Ummah havia estat en un llarg període de decadència on l'equilibri de poder global va canviar

del Khilafah a la Gran Bretanya. Els problemes creixents van engolir el Khilafah mentre hi havia Europa occidental

en plena revolució industrial. La Ummah va arribar a perdre la seva comprensió prístina de l'Islam, i

en un intent de revertir la decadència que va engolir la dels Uthmani (otomans) alguns musulmans van ser enviats a la

oest, i com a resultat van quedar encisats pel que van veure. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi d'Egipte (1801-1873),

al seu retorn de París, va escriure un llibre biogràfic anomenat Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (la

Extracció d'or, o una visió general de París, 1834), lloant la seva neteja, amor pel treball, i a dalt

tota la moral social. Va declarar que hem d'imitar el que es fa a París, defensant canvis a

la societat islàmica des de la liberalització de les dones als sistemes de govern. Aquest pensament, i d'altres semblants,

va marcar l'inici de la tendència reinventadora de l'islam.

Islam a Occident

Jocelyne Cesari

La immigració de musulmans a Europa, Amèrica del nord, i Austràlia i les complexes dinàmiques socioreligioses que s'han desenvolupat posteriorment han fet de l'Islam a Occident un nou camp d'investigació convincent.. L'afer Salman Rushdie, controvèrsies del hijab, els atacs al World Trade Center, i el furor per les caricatures daneses són exemples de crisis internacionals que han posat de manifest les connexions entre els musulmans d'Occident i el món musulmà global.. Aquestes noves situacions comporten reptes teòrics i metodològics per a l'estudi de l'islam contemporani, i s'ha tornat crucial que evitem essencialitzar l'islam o els musulmans i resistim a les estructures retòriques dels discursos que estan preocupats per la seguretat i el terrorisme..
En aquest article, Argumento que l'islam com a tradició religiosa és una terra incògnita. Una raó preliminar d'aquesta situació és que no hi ha consens sobre la religió com a objecte d'investigació. Religió, com a disciplina acadèmica, s'ha trencat entre històrics, sociològic, i metodologies hermenèutiques. Amb l'Islam, la situació és encara més complicada. A l'oest, l'estudi de l'islam va començar com una branca dels estudis orientalistes i, per tant, va seguir un camí separat i distintiu de l'estudi de les religions.. Tot i que la crítica de l'orientalisme ha estat fonamental per a l'aparició de l'estudi de l'islam en l'àmbit de les ciències socials., les tensions segueixen sent fortes entre els islamistes i tant els antropòlegs com els sociòlegs. El tema de l'islam i els musulmans a Occident està incrustat en aquesta lluita. Una implicació d'aquesta tensió metodològica és que els estudiants d'Islam que van començar la seva carrera acadèmica estudiant l'Islam a França, Alemanya, o Amèrica, i és difícil establir credibilitat com a estudiosos de l'islam, especialment en l'àmbit acadèmic nord-americà
context.

A Post-election Re-reading of Islamist Political Thought

Roxanne L. Euben

Barack Obama’s post-election rhetoric regarding the “Muslim world” has signaled a critical paradigm shift from his predecessor. The new president’s characterization of the United States in his inaugural address as a “nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus and nonbelievers”; his formulation, invoked in several different contexts, that America will offer a hand of friendship to a Muslim world willing to “unclench [its] fist”; the emphasis on his own mixed lineage and experience living in Muslim countries; his pledge to close the Guantánamo Bay prison camp; his interview with Al Arabiya; and the promise to address the Muslim world from a Muslim capital during his first 100 days in office, all suggest a deliberate attempt to shift away from the hardening rhetoric of a new Cold War between the West and Islam and reframe American foreign policy toward Muslim societies.1 Obama’s rhetoric has enormous symbolic importance even if it has yet to issue in dramatic departures from previous U.S. foreign policies regarding, for example, Hamas or Iran’s nuclear program. At this particular juncture, its significance lies less in the specific policies it may presage or the greater sensitivity to Muslim sensibilities it reveals than in its underlying logic: implicit in these rhetorical gestures is the understanding that, as Obama put it in his interview with Al Arabiya, “the language we use matters,” that words and categories do not simply reflect but also create the world in which we live.

Islam and the West

Preface

John J. de Gioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, política, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. De fet, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

democràcia, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World

F. Gregory Gause

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Per tant, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? En altres paraules, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; i 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition

John L. Esposito

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afganistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Turquia, Iran, Líban, Kuwait, Iemen, Jordània, Pakistan, Bangla Desh, Malàisia, Indonèsia, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, i en particular les qüestions i preguntes sorgides de l'experiència del passat recent, segueix sent fonamental per als governs, responsables polítics, i estudiants de política internacional per igual.

It’s the Policy, Stupid

John L. Esposito

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. arbust. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. malgrat això, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terrorisme, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Així, for example, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?


Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma

Shadi Hamid

nosaltres. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 i 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. malgrat això, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, i, aquí, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. Al març 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt.

International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & política

Stimson Center & Institut d'Estudis de Política

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, Egipte, India,Indonèsia, Kenya, Malàisia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Finalment, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

Egipte: Background and U.S. Relations

jeremy M. Agut

In the last year, Egyptian foreign policy, particularly its relationship with the United States, hasbenefitted substantially from both a change in U.S. policy and from events on the ground. TheObama Administration, as evident in the President’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, has elevatedEgypt’s importance to U.S. foreign policy in the region, as U.S. policymakers work to revive theArab-Israeli peace process. In choosing Cairo as a venue for the President’s signature address tothe Muslim world, Egyptians feel that the United States has shown their country respectcommensurate with its perceived stature in the Arab world.At the same time, continuing tensions with Iran and Hamas have bolstered Egypt’s position as amoderating force in the region and demonstrated the country’s diplomatic utility to U.S. foreignpolicy. Based on its own interests, Egypt has opposed Iranian meddling in the Levant and in Gazaand has recently expanded military cooperation with Israel in order to demonstrate resolve againstfurther Iranian provocations, such as arming Hamas or allowing Hezbollah to operate on Egyptiansoil. a més, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead (desembre 2008 to January 2009) highlighted theneed to moderate Hamas’s behavior, attain Palestinian unity, and reach a long-term Israel-Hamascease-fire/prisoner exchange, goals which Egypt has been working toward, albeit with limitedsuccess so far.Indications of an improved bilateral relationship have been clearly evident. Over the last sixmonths, there has been a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s June2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington in August 2009,his first visit to the United States in over five years. Following President Obama’s June visit, thetwo governments held their annual strategic dialogue. Several months earlier, the United Statespledged to expand trade and investment in Egypt.Despite the appearance of a more positive atmosphere, inherent tensions and contradictions inU.S.-Egyptian relations remain. For U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress, the question ofhow to simultaneously maintain the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship born out of the CampDavid Accords and the 1979 peace treaty while promoting human rights and democracy in Egyptis a major challenge with no clear path. As Egyptian opposition figures have grown more vocal inrecent years over issues such as leadership succession, corruption, and economic inequality, andthe regime has subsequently grown more repressive in its response to increased calls for reform,activists have demanded that the United States pressure Egypt to create more breathing space fordissent. The Egyptian government has resisted any U.S. attempts to interfere in its domesticpolitics and has responded harshly to overt U.S. calls for political reform. Al mateix temps, as theIsraeli-Palestinian situation has further deteriorated, Egypt’s role as a mediator has provedinvaluable to U.S. foreign policy in the region. Egypt has secured cease-fire agreements andmediated negotiations with Hamas over prisoner releases, cease-fire arrangements, and otherissues. Since Hamas is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and calls forIsrael’s destruction, neither Israel nor the United States government directly negotiates with itsofficials, using Egypt instead as a go-between. With the Obama Administration committed topursuing Middle East peace, there is concern that U.S. officials may give a higher priority toEgypt’s regional role at the expense of human rights and democratic reforms.

VIATGES ENTRE ELS VEINS MUSULMANS D'EUROPA

Joost Lagendijk

Jan Marinus Wiersma

“Un anell d'amics al voltant de la Unió […], del Marroc a Rússia”. Així és com, a la tarda 2002, l'aleshores president de la Comissió Europea, Romano Prodi, va descriure el repte clau que s'enfronta Europa després de l'ampliació prevista de 2004. El procés d'adhesió havia agafat impuls, i els antics països comunistes de l'Europa central s'havien estabilitzat i es transformaven en democràcies. L'adhesió a la UE no estava directament a l'agenda dels països més enllà de l'horitzó de l'ampliació, malgrat això. Com podria Europa evitar que es formin noves línies divisòries a les seves fronteres?? Com podria la Unió Europea garantir l'estabilitat, seguretat i pau al llarg del seu perímetre? Aquestes preguntes eren potser més rellevants per als veïns del sud de la UE. Des de 11 setembre 2001, en particular, les nostres relacions amb el món islàmic han estat impregnades d'un sentit d'urgència. L'evolució política als nostres països veïns islàmics a la vora del Mediterrani podria tenir un impacte enorme en la seguretat europea. Tot i que la zona és a prop, la distància política és gran. Enmig d'un llenguatge amenaçador sobre un "xoc de civilitzacions", la UE va arribar ràpidament a la conclusió que la conciliació i la cooperació, més que enfrontament, constituïa la millor estratègia per tractar amb els seus veïns del sud.

BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL

ANTHONY Bubalo

GREG Fealy

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. avui, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : islamisme, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers

Shibley Telhami


The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,", com va dir l'antic secretari d'estat adjunt Edward Djerejianonce, va portar els Estats Units a retrocedir. Fins i tot a l'administració Clinton, El secretari d'Estat Warren Christopher es va centrar inicialment en la democràcia en la seva política a l'Orient Mitjà, però ràpidament va deixar de banda la qüestió quan l'administració es va traslladar a negociar la negociació palestino-israeliana a l'ombra dels grups islamistes militants.,especialment Hamàs.

POLITICAL ISLAM and the West

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Iran, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Egipte, Indonèsia,Jordània, Kuwait, Líban,Malàisia, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Construir ponts no murs

Àlex Glennie

Des dels atemptats terroristes de 11 setembre 2001 hi ha hagut una explosió d'interès per l'islamisme polític a l'Orient Mitjà i al nord d'Àfrica (MENA) regió. Fins fa força poc,Els analistes s'han centrat comprensiblement en aquells actors que operen a l'extrem violent de l'espectre islamista, inclosa Al-Qaeda, els talibans, alguns dels partits sectaris a l'Iraq i grups polítics amb braços armats com Hamàs als Territoris Palestins Ocupats (OPT)i Hezbollah al Líban. No obstant això, això ha enfosquit el fet que a tota la regió MENA la política contemporània està sent impulsada i modelada per una col·lecció molt més diversa de moviments islamistes "principals". Els definim com a grups que participen o busquen participar en els processos polítics legals dels seus països i que han evitat públicament l'ús de la violència per ajudar a assolir els seus objectius a nivell nacional., fins i tot quan són discriminats o reprimits. Aquesta definició inclouria grups com els Germans Musulmans a Egipte., el Partit de la Justícia i el Desenvolupament (PJD) al Marroc i el Front d'Acció Islàmica (IAF) a Jordània. Aquests moviments o partits islamistes no violents sovint representen l'element més ben organitzat i més popular de l'oposició als règims existents a cada país., i com a tal, hi ha hagut un interès creixent per part dels responsables polítics occidentals pel paper que poden tenir en la promoció de la democràcia a la regió.. No obstant això, les discussions sobre aquest tema sembla que s'han estancat sobre la qüestió de si seria oportú relacionar-se amb aquests grups d'una base més sistemàtica i formal., Aquesta actitud està en part lligada a una falta de voluntat justificada per legitimar grups que podrien tenir opinions antidemocràtiques sobre els drets de les dones., pluralisme polític i una sèrie d'altres qüestions. També reflecteix consideracions pragmàtiques sobre els interessos estratègics de les potències occidentals a la regió MENA que es veuen amenaçats per la creixent popularitat i influència dels islamistes.. Per la seva banda, Els partits i moviments islamistes han mostrat una clara reticència a establir vincles més estrets amb aquelles potències occidentals les polítiques de les quals s'oposen fermament a la regió., sobretot per por de com reaccionen els règims repressius en els quals operen. L'enfocament d'aquest projecte en els moviments polítics islamistes no violents no s'ha d'interpretar malament com a suport implícit a les seves agendes polítiques.. Comprometre's amb una estratègia de compromís més deliberat amb els principals partits islamistes implicaria riscos i compromisos significatius per als responsables polítics nord-americans i europeus.. malgrat això, assumim la posició que la tendència d'ambdues parts a veure el compromís com un joc de suma zero "tot o res" no ha estat útil, i ha de canviar si vol sorgir un diàleg més constructiu al voltant de la reforma a l'Orient Mitjà i el nord d'Àfrica.

ISLAM, DEMOCRÀCIA & ELS ESTATS UNITS D'AMÈRICA

Fundació Còrdova


In spite of it being both a perennial anda complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practicalgrounds, l'important debat sobre la relació i la compatibilitat entre l'islam i la democràcia, tal com es fa ressò a l'agenda d'esperança i canvi de Barack Obama. Mentre que molts celebren l'ascens d'Obama a l'Oficina Oval com a catarsi nacional dels EUA, othersremain less optimistic of a shift in ideologyand approach in the international arena.While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA canbe attributed to the approach of promotingdemocracy, typically favoring dictatorshipsand puppet regimes that pay lip-service todemocratic values and human rights, the aftershockof 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivingsfurther through America’s position onpolitical Islam. It has created a wall of negativityas found by worldpublicopinion.org,segons el qual 67% of Egyptians believethat globally America is playing a “mainlynegative” role.America’s response has thus been apt. Byelecting Obama, many around the world arepinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent,but fairer foreign policy towards theMuslim world. La prova per a Obama, mentre comentem,és com Amèrica i els seus aliats promouen la democràcia. Serà facilitador o imposant?A més, can it importantly be an honestbroker in prolonged zones of conflicts?