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Islam, Islam politik dan Amerika

Wawasan Arab

Adakah "Persaudaraan" dengan Amerika Mungkin?

khalil al-anani

“Tiada peluang untuk berkomunikasi dengan mana-mana A.S. pentadbiran selagi Amerika Syarikat mengekalkan pandangan lamanya tentang Islam sebagai bahaya sebenar, pandangan yang meletakkan Amerika Syarikat senasib dengan musuh Zionis. Kami tidak mempunyai tanggapan sedia ada mengenai rakyat Amerika atau A.S. masyarakat dan organisasi sivik dan badan pemikirnya. Kami tidak mempunyai masalah untuk berkomunikasi dengan rakyat Amerika tetapi tiada usaha yang mencukupi sedang dibuat untuk mendekatkan kami,” kata Dr. Issam al-Iryan, ketua jabatan politik Ikhwanul Muslimin dalam temu bual telefon.
Kata-kata Al-Iryan merumuskan pandangan Ikhwanul Muslimin terhadap rakyat Amerika dan A.S. kerajaan. Ahli Ikhwanul Muslimin yang lain akan bersetuju, begitu juga dengan almarhum Hassan al-Banna, yang mengasaskan kumpulan di 1928. Al- Banna melihat Barat kebanyakannya sebagai simbol keruntuhan moral. Salafi yang lain - sebuah mazhab Islam yang bergantung kepada nenek moyang sebagai model teladan - telah mengambil pandangan yang sama tentang Amerika Syarikat, tetapi tidak mempunyai fleksibiliti ideologi yang dianuti oleh Ikhwanul Muslimin. Sementara Ikhwanul Muslimin percaya dalam melibatkan Amerika dalam dialog sivil, kumpulan pelampau lain tidak melihat sebarang titik dalam dialog dan mengekalkan kuasa itu adalah satu-satunya cara untuk berurusan dengan Amerika Syarikat.

ISLAM, DEMOKRASI & USA:

Yayasan Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq

Pengenalan ,


Walaupun ia menjadi perdebatan tahunan dan kompleks, Arches Quarterly dikaji semula dari landasan teologi dan praktikal, perdebatan penting mengenai hubungan dan keserasian antara Islam dan Demokrasi, seperti yang digemakan dalam agenda harapan dan perubahan Barack Obama. Walaupun banyak yang meraikan kenaikan Obama ke Oval Office sebagai katarsis nasional untuk AS, yang lain tetap kurang optimis terhadap perubahan ideologi dan pendekatan di arena antarabangsa. Walaupun banyak ketegangan dan ketidakpercayaan antara dunia Islam dan AS boleh dikaitkan dengan pendekatan mempromosikan demokrasi, biasanya menggemari pemerintahan diktator dan boneka yang memberi nilai-nilai demokratik dan hak asasi manusia, gempa susulan dari 9/11 telah benar-benar memperkuat keraguan melalui kedudukan Amerika mengenai Islam politik. Ini telah mewujudkan tembok negatif seperti yang dijumpai oleh worldpublicopinion.org, mengikut yang 67% orang Mesir percaya bahawa secara global Amerika memainkan peranan "terutamanya negatif".
Oleh itu, tindak balas Amerika begitu tepat. Dengan memilih Obama, banyak di seluruh dunia menaruh harapan mereka untuk membangun yang kurang berperang, tetapi dasar luar yang lebih adil terhadap dunia Islam. Ujian untuk Obama, seperti yang kita bincangkan, adalah bagaimana Amerika dan sekutunya mempromosikan demokrasi. Adakah ia akan memudahkan atau memaksakan?
Lebih-lebih lagi, bolehkah ia menjadi broker yang jujur ​​di zon konflik yang berpanjangan? Menyenaraikan kepakaran dan wawasan prolifi
c cendekiawan, ahli akademik, wartawan dan ahli politik berpengalaman, Arches Quarterly menyoroti hubungan antara Islam dan Demokrasi dan peranan Amerika - serta perubahan yang dibawa oleh Obama, dalam mencari jalan bersama. Anas Altikriti, Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif Th e Cordoba Foundation memberikan gambaran awal untuk perbincangan ini, di mana ia merefleksikan harapan dan cabaran yang ada di jalan Obama. Mengikuti Altikriti, bekas penasihat Presiden Nixon, Dr Robert Crane memberikan analisis menyeluruh mengenai prinsip Islam mengenai hak kebebasan. Anwar Ibrahim, bekas Timbalan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, memperkayakan perbincangan dengan realiti praktikal melaksanakan demokrasi dalam masyarakat dominan Muslim, iaitu, di Indonesia dan Malaysia.
Kami juga mempunyai Dr Shireen Hunter, Universiti Georgetown, USA, yang meneroka negara-negara Islam yang ketinggalan dalam pendemokrasian dan pemodenan. Ini dilengkapkan oleh penulis keganasan, Penjelasan Dr Nafeez Ahmed mengenai krisis pasca-kemodenan dan
kematian demokrasi. Dr Daud Abdullah (Pengarah Pemantau Media Timur Tengah), Alan Hart (bekas wartawan ITN dan BBC Panorama; pengarang Zionisme: Musuh Yahudi Sebenar) dan Asem Sondos (Penyunting Sawt Al Omma Mesir setiap minggu) tumpukan perhatian kepada Obama dan peranannya dalam mempromosikan demokrasi di dunia Islam, serta hubungan AS dengan Israel dan Ikhwanul Muslimin.
Menteri Luar Negeri menyiarkan, Maldives, Ahmed شہید membuat spekulasi mengenai masa depan Islam dan Demokrasi; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– seorang anggota Sinn Féin yang menjalani hukuman penjara selama empat tahun kerana aktiviti Republik Ireland dan kempen untuk Guildford 4 dan Birmingham 6, mencerminkan perjalanannya ke Gaza baru-baru ini di mana dia menyaksikan kesan kekejaman dan ketidakadilan yang berlaku terhadap rakyat Palestin; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Pengarah Pusat Kajian Radikalisasi dan Kekerasan Politik Kontemporari membincangkan cabaran meneliti keganasan politik secara kritis; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, penulis dan penulis drama, membincangkan prospek keamanan di Darfur; dan akhirnya wartawan dan aktivis hak asasi manusia Ashur Shamis memandang kritis terhadap pendemokrasian dan politikisasi umat Islam hari ini.
Kami berharap semua ini dapat membuat pembacaan yang komprehensif dan sumber untuk refleksi terhadap isu-isu yang mempengaruhi kita semua di awal harapan.
Terima kasih

Islamism revisited

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 tahun, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Julai 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Islamic Political Culture, Demokrasi, and Human Rights

Daniele. Harga

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, namun begitu, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

Islamic Political Culture, Demokrasi, and Human Rights

Daniele. Harga

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, namun begitu, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamic Political Culture, Demokrasi, and Human Rights

Daniele. Harga

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, namun begitu, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Parti Pembangkang Islam dan Potensi Penglibatan EU

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Memandangkan semakin pentingnya gerakan Islam di dunia Islam dan

cara radikalisasi telah mempengaruhi peristiwa global sejak permulaan abad ini, ia

adalah penting bagi EU untuk menilai dasar-dasarnya terhadap aktor dalam apa yang boleh longgar

dinamakan 'dunia Islam'. Ia amat penting untuk bertanya sama ada dan bagaimana untuk melibatkan diri

dengan pelbagai kumpulan Islam.

Ini masih menjadi kontroversi walaupun di dalam EU. Ada yang merasakan bahawa nilai Islam itu

terletak di belakang parti Islamis semata-mata tidak serasi dengan cita-cita demokrasi barat dan

hak manusia, manakala yang lain melihat penglibatan sebagai satu keperluan yang realistik disebabkan oleh peningkatan

kepentingan domestik parti Islam dan penglibatan mereka yang semakin meningkat dalam antarabangsa

hal ehwal. Perspektif lain ialah pendemokrasian di dunia Islam akan meningkat

keselamatan Eropah. Kesahihan hujah-hujah ini dan lain-lain mengenai sama ada dan bagaimana

EU sepatutnya terlibat hanya boleh diuji dengan mengkaji pergerakan Islam yang berbeza dan

keadaan politik mereka, negara demi negara.

Pendemokrasian ialah tema utama tindakan dasar luar biasa EU, seperti yang diletakkan

keluar dalam Artikel 11 Perjanjian mengenai Kesatuan Eropah. Banyak negeri dipertimbangkan dalam hal ini

laporan tidak demokratik, atau tidak demokratik sepenuhnya. Di kebanyakan negara ini, Islamis

parti dan gerakan merupakan penentangan yang ketara terhadap rejim yang ada, dan

dalam sesetengahnya mereka membentuk blok pembangkang terbesar. Demokrasi Eropah telah lama terpaksa

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

Political Islam in the Middle East

Adakah Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, dalam

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Namun, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. A.S.. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. Sebagai tambahan, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. Coklat, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Gerakan Islam, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Akibatnya, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, namun begitu, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politik, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAM, ISLAMISTS, AND THE ELECTORAL PRINCIPLE I N THE MIDDLE EAST

James Piscatori

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Islamist Parties , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?

Tarek Masoud

Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. Lebih-lebih lagi, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. Sebagai contoh, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.

The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood

Robert S. Leiken

Steven Brooke

The Muslim Brotherhood is the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s assault forcedeeply hostile to the United States.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for electionsinstead of into the lines of jihad.” Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. These positions seem to make them moderates, the very thing the United States, short on allies in the Muslim world, seeks.
But the Ikhwan also assails U.S. dasar luar, especially Washington’s support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process. Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, Perancis, Jordan, Sepanyol, Syria,Tunisia, and the United Kingdom.

Energizing US-Syria Relations: Leveraging Ancillary Diplomatic Vehicles

Benjamin E. Kuasa,

Andrew Akhlaghi,

Steven Rotchtin

The prospect for greater stability in the Middle East largely hinges on the ability to bring Syria into diplomatic and security discussions as a productive stakeholder, necessitating a thaw in the less than normal state of U.S. – Syrian relations. While Syria’s
importance as a keystone state to a Middle East peace process was acknowledged in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report,1 which called for a shift from disincentives to incentives in seeking constructive results, only in the past few months has there been a demonstrable shift in Washington’s disposition. Recent meetings between high-ranking U.S. officials and their counterparts in Damascus, and even the announcement of reinstating a U.S. ambassador to Syria, have led to widespread speculation in policy circles that a diplomatic thaw is afoot.
This report analyzes key trends in Syria’s domestic and regional socio-political situation that currently function to make Syria a natural ally of the United States.

From Rebel Movement to Political Party

Alastair Crooke

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. Sebagai tambahan, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.