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Ioslam, Ioslam polaitiúil agus Meiriceá

Léargas Arabach

An bhfuil “Bráithreachas” le Meiriceá Féideartha?

Khailil al-anani

“Níl aon seans ann cumarsáid a dhéanamh le SAM ar bith. riarachán chomh fada agus a choinníonn na Stáit Aontaithe a dearcadh seanbhunaithe ar Ioslam mar fhíorchontúirt, dearcadh a chuireann na Stáit Aontaithe sa bhád céanna leis an namhaid Zionist. Níl aon tuairimí réamhcheaptha againn maidir le muintir Mheiriceá nó SAM. an tsochaí agus a cuid eagraíochtaí cathartha agus meithleacha smaointe. Níl aon fhadhb againn cumarsáid a dhéanamh le muintir Mheiriceá ach níl aon iarrachtaí leordhóthanacha á ndéanamh chun muid a thabhairt níos gaire,” a dúirt an Dr. Issam al-Iaráin, príomhfheidhmeannach na roinne polaitíochta den Bhráithreachas Moslamach in agallamh gutháin.
Déanann focail Al-Iryan achoimre ar thuairimí na Bráithreachas Moslamach ar mhuintir Mheiriceá agus SAM. rialtas. D’aontódh baill eile den Bhráithreachas Moslamach, mar a dhéanfadh Hassan al-Banna, nach maireann, a bhunaigh an grúpa i 1928. Al- Bhreathnaigh Banna ar an Iarthar den chuid is mó mar shiombail de mheath morálta. Ghlac Salafis eile - scoil smaointeoireachta Ioslamach a bhraitheann ar sinsear mar mhúnlaí eiseamláireacha - an dearcadh céanna ar na Stáit Aontaithe, ach níl an tsolúbthacht idé-eolaíoch atá á lorg ag an mBráithreachas Moslamach in easnamh orthu. Cé go gcreideann an Bráithreachas Moslamach i rannpháirtíocht na Meiriceánaigh in idirphlé sibhialta, ní fheiceann grúpaí antoisceacha eile aon phointe idirphlé agus deir siad gurb é fórsa an t-aon bhealach chun déileáil leis na Stáit Aontaithe.

ISLAM, Daonlathas & AN SAM:

Fondúireacht Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq |

Intro ,


In ainneoin gur díospóireacht ilbhliantúil agus casta araon í, Arches Ráithiúil athscrúdú ar chúiseanna diagachta agus praiticiúla, an díospóireacht thábhachtach faoin gcaidreamh agus comhoiriúnacht idir Ioslam agus an Daonlathas, mar a léirítear i gclár oibre dóchais agus athraithe Barack Obama. Cé go gceiliúrann go leor cinnt Obama san Oifig Oval mar chatharsis náisiúnta do na SA, tá cuid eile fós nach bhfuil chomh dóchasach faoi athrú san idé-eolaíocht agus sa chur chuige sa saol idirnáisiúnta. Cé gur féidir cuid mhór den teannas agus den easpa muiníne idir an domhan Moslamach agus SAM a chur i leith an chur chuige a bhaineann le cur chun cinn an daonlathais., go tipiciúil i bhfabhar deachtóireachtaí agus réimis puipéad a íocann seirbhís liopa do luachanna daonlathacha agus cearta daonna, iarshlua na 9/11 dhaingnigh sé an amhras go fírinneach trí sheasamh Mheiriceá ar Ioslam polaitiúil. Tá balla diúltach cruthaithe aige mar a d’aimsigh worldpublicopinion.org, dá réir a 67% Creideann na hÉigiptigh go bhfuil ról “diúltach den chuid is mó” á imirt ag Meiriceá ar fud an domhain.
Mar sin bhí freagra Mheiriceá oiriúnach. Trí Obama a thoghadh, tá go leor ar fud an domhain ag súil le duine nach bhfuil chomh corraitheach a fhorbairt, ach beartas eachtrach níos cothroime i dtreo an domhain Moslamach. An tástáil le haghaidh Obama, agus muid ag plé, is é an chaoi a gcuireann Meiriceá agus a comhghuaillithe an daonlathas chun cinn. An mbeidh sé ag éascú nó ag impí?
Thairis sin, an bhfuil sé tábhachtach gur bróicéir macánta é i gcriosanna fada coinbhleachta? Ag liostáil saineolas agus léargas prolifi
c scoláirí, acadóirí, iriseoirí agus polaiteoirí le taithí, Tugann Arches Quarterly an gaol idir Ioslam agus Daonlathas agus ról Mheiriceá chun solais – chomh maith leis na hathruithe a tharla de bharr Obama., agus an talamh coitianta á lorg. Anas Altikriti, Soláthraíonn POF The Cordoba Foundation an t-athrú tosaigh don phlé seo, áit a ndéanann sé machnamh ar na dóchais agus na dúshláin atá ar chosán Obama. Tar éis Altikriti, an t-iarchomhairleoir don Uachtarán Nixon, Tairgeann an Dr Robert Crane anailís chríochnúil ar phrionsabal Ioslamach an chirt chun saoirse. Anwar Ibrahim, iar-Leas-Phríomh-Aire na Malaeisia, saibhríonn sé an plé leis na réaltachtaí praiticiúla a bhaineann le daonlathas a chur i bhfeidhm i sochaithe ceannasacha Moslamach, eadhon, san Indinéis agus sa Mhalaeisia.
Tá an Dr Shireen Hunter againn freisin, de chuid Ollscoil Georgetown, SAM, a dhéanann iniúchadh ar thíortha Moslamacha atá tite chun deiridh sa daonlathú agus sa nuachóiriú. Comhlánaíonn scríbhneoir sceimhlitheoireachta Th é, Míniú an Dr Nafeez Ahmed ar ghéarchéim na hiar-nua-aoiseachais agus an
meath an daonlathais. An Dr Daud Abdullah (Stiúrthóir Monatóir Meán an Mheánoirthir), Alan Hart (iar-chomhfhreagraí ITN agus BBC Panorama; údar Zionism: Fíor-namhaid na nGiúdach) agus Asem Sondos (Eagarthóir Sawt Al Omma na hÉigipte go seachtainiúil) díriú ar Obama agus a ról vis-à-vis an daonlathas-chur chun cinn sa domhan Moslamach, chomh maith le caidreamh SAM le hIosrael agus leis an mBráithreachas Moslamach.
Aire Gnóthaí Eachtracha Aff airs, Oileáin Mhaildíve, Déanann Ahmed Shaheed tuairimíocht ar thodhchaí an Ioslaim agus an Daonlathais; An Clr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– ball de Shinn Féin a d’fhulaing ceithre bliana sa phríosún as gníomhaíochtaí Poblachtánacha na hÉireann agus feachtasóir ar son Guildford 4 agus Birmingham 6, léiríonn sé ar an turas a thug sé go Gaza le déanaí áit ar chonaic sé tionchar na brúidiúlachta agus na héagóra a cuireadh le chéile i gcoinne na bPalaistíneach; An Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Pléann Stiúrthóir an Ionaid um Staidéar ar Radacú agus ar Fhoréigean Polaitiúil Comhaimseartha na dúshláin a bhaineann le taighde criticiúil a dhéanamh ar sceimhle polaitíochta; An Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, scríbhneoir agus drámadóir, pléann sé ionchais na síochána i Darfur; agus faoi dheireadh breathnaíonn an t-iriseoir agus gníomhaí cearta daonna Ashur Shamis go criticiúil ar dhaonlathú agus ar pholaitíocht na Moslamaigh inniu.
Tá súil againn go dtabharfaidh sé seo go léir léamh cuimsitheach agus foinse machnaimh ar cheisteanna a théann i gcion orainn go léir le linn nua dóchais..
Go raibh maith agat

Athchuairt ar an Ioslamachas

MAHA AZZAM

Tá géarchéim pholaitiúil agus slándála ag baint leis an rud ar a dtugtar an tIoslamachas, géarchéim a bhfuil a réamhshainithe le fada roimh 9/11. Thar an am atá caite 25 blianta, cuireadh béimeanna éagsúla ar conas Ioslamachas a mhíniú agus a chomhrac. Anailísithe agus lucht déanta beartas
labhair sna 1980idí agus 1990idí faoi bhunchúiseanna na míleatachta Ioslamaí mar mhíshásamh eacnamaíoch agus imeallú. Le deireanas díríodh ar athchóiriú polaitiúil mar mhodh chun an bonn a bhaint de mhealltacht an radacachais. Níos mó sa lá atá inniu ann, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Iúil 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Islamic Political Culture, Daonlathas, and Human Rights

Daniele. Praghas

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, ach, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Teoiric pholaitiúil Ioslamach, agus staidéir ad hoc ar thíortha aonair, nach measann fachtóirí eile. Is é mo áiteamh go bhfuil na téacsanna agus traidisiúin an Ioslam, cosúil leis na reiligiúin eile, is féidir iad a úsáid chun tacú le córais agus beartais pholaitiúla éagsúla. Ní chuidíonn staidéir a bhaineann go sonrach le tír ar leith linn patrúin a aimsiú a chuideoidh linn na caidrimh éagsúla idir Ioslam agus an pholaitíocht ar fud thíortha an domhain Mhoslamaigh a mhíniú.. Uaidh sin, cur chuige nua maidir le staidéar a dhéanamh ar an
éilítear nasc idir Ioslam agus an pholaitíocht.
Molaim, trí mheastóireacht dhian ar an ngaol idir Ioslam, daonlathas, agus cearta an duine ar an leibhéal trasnáisiúnta, go bhfuil an iomarca béime á cur ar chumhacht an Ioslaim mar fhórsa polaitiúil. Úsáidim cás-staidéir chomparáideacha ar dtús, a dhíríonn ar fhachtóirí a bhaineann leis an idirghníomhú idir grúpaí agus réimis Ioslamacha, tionchair eacnamaíocha, scoilteanna eitneacha, agus forbairt na sochaí, míniú a thabhairt ar an éagsúlacht i dtionchar an Ioslaim ar an bpolaitíocht thar ocht náisiún. Áitím go bhfuil cuid mhór den chumhacht
atá curtha i leith Ioslam mar an fórsa tiomána taobh thiar de bheartais agus córais pholaitiúla i náisiúin Mhoslamacha a mhíniú níos fearr ag na fachtóirí a luadh cheana. Faighim freisin, contrártha le creideamh coiteann, gur minic a bhaineann neart méadaithe na ngrúpaí polaitiúla Ioslamacha le hiolrúchán measartha ar chórais pholaitiúla.
Tá innéacs de chultúr polaitiúil Ioslamach tógtha agam, bunaithe ar a mhéid a úsáidtear an dlí Ioslamach agus an bhfuil agus, más amhlaidh, conas,Smaointe an Iarthair, institiúidí, agus cuirtear teicneolaíochtaí i bhfeidhm, chun nádúr an chaidrimh idir Ioslam agus an daonlathas agus Ioslam agus cearta daonna a thástáil. Úsáidtear an táscaire seo in anailís staitistiúil, lena n-áirítear sampla de thrí thír is fiche ar Mhoslamacha den chuid is mó agus grúpa rialaithe de thrí cinn is fiche de náisiún forbraíochta neamh-Mhuslamach. Chomh maith le comparáid a dhéanamh
náisiúin Ioslamacha chuig náisiúin i mbéal forbartha neamh-Ioslamach, ligeann anailís staitistiúil dom tionchar na n-athróg eile a fuarthas a chuireann isteach ar leibhéil daonlathais agus ar chosaint chearta an duine aonair a rialú.. Ba cheart go mbeadh pictiúr níos réadúla agus níos cruinne ar an tionchar atá ag Ioslam ar pholaitíocht agus ar bheartais mar thoradh air.

Islamic Political Culture, Daonlathas, and Human Rights

Daniele. Praghas

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contrártha leis an

luachanna sochaithe an Iarthair, agus bíonn tionchar suntasach aige ar thorthaí tábhachtacha polaitiúla

i náisiúin Mhoslamacha. Consequently, scholars, commentators, agus rialtas

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, ach, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Teoiric pholaitiúil Ioslamach, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, nach measann fachtóirí eile. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, cosúil leis na reiligiúin eile,

is féidir iad a úsáid chun tacú le córais agus beartais pholaitiúla éagsúla. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Uaidh sin, cur chuige nua maidir le staidéar a dhéanamh ar an

éilítear nasc idir Ioslam agus an pholaitíocht.
Molaim, trí mheastóireacht dhian ar an ngaol idir Ioslam,

daonlathas, agus cearta an duine ar an leibhéal trasnáisiúnta, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, tionchair eacnamaíocha, scoilteanna eitneacha,

agus forbairt na sochaí, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamic Political Culture, Daonlathas, and Human Rights

Daniele. Praghas

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contrártha leis an

luachanna sochaithe an Iarthair, agus bíonn tionchar suntasach aige ar thorthaí tábhachtacha polaitiúla
i náisiúin Mhoslamacha. Consequently, scholars, commentators, agus rialtas
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, ach, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Teoiric pholaitiúil Ioslamach, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, nach measann fachtóirí eile. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, cosúil leis na reiligiúin eile,
is féidir iad a úsáid chun tacú le córais agus beartais pholaitiúla éagsúla. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Uaidh sin, cur chuige nua maidir le staidéar a dhéanamh ar an
éilítear nasc idir Ioslam agus an pholaitíocht.
Molaim, trí mheastóireacht dhian ar an ngaol idir Ioslam,
daonlathas, agus cearta an duine ar an leibhéal trasnáisiúnta, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, tionchair eacnamaíocha, scoilteanna eitneacha,

agus forbairt na sochaí, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, é

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

Cearta daonna, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

tábhacht intíre na bpáirtithe Ioslamacha agus a rannpháirtíocht mhéadaitheach in idirnáisiúnta

gnóthaí. Dearcadh eile is ea go méadódh an daonlathú sa domhan Moslamach

slándáil Eorpach. Bailíocht na n-argóintí seo agus argóintí eile faoi cé acu an bhfuil agus conas an

Ba cheart don AE dul i mbun is féidir a thástáil ach amháin trí staidéar a dhéanamh ar na gluaiseachtaí Islamist éagsúla agus

a gcúinsí polaitiúla, tír de réir tíre.

Is téama lárnach de ghníomhaíochtaí comhbheartas eachtrach an AE é an daonlathas, mar atá leagtha

amach in Airteagal 11 den Chonradh ar an Aontas Eorpach. Go leor de na stáit a mheas i seo

nach bhfuil an tuarascáil daonlathach, nó nach bhfuil go hiomlán daonlathach. Sa chuid is mó de na tíortha seo, Ioslamach

cuireann páirtithe agus gluaiseachtaí go mór i gcoinne na réimeas atá i réim, agus

i roinnt acu is iad an bloc freasúra is mó. B’éigean do dhaonlathais Eorpacha le fada an lá

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

Political Islam in the Middle East

An bhfuil Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, isteach

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, léiríonn an tuarascáil nach gá go mbeadh Ioslam ag teacht leis an daonlathas agus

go bhfuil claonadh ann faillí a dhéanamh ar an bhfíric go bhfuil go leor tíortha sa Mheán-Oirthir

ag gabháil do chur faoi chois brúidiúil ar ghluaiseachtaí Ioslamacha, is cúis leo, Áitíonn cuid acu, a ghlacadh

airm i gcoinne an stáit, agus níos annamh, tíortha iasachta. Is é an úsáid a bhaint as foréigean polaitiúil

forleathan sa Mheánoirthear, ach níl sé mí-réasúnach ná neamhréasúnach. I go leor cásanna fiú

Tá grúpaí Ioslamacha a bhfuil cáil orthu mar gheall ar a n-úsáid foréigin athraithe go polaitiúil síochánta

páirtithe go rathúil san iomaíocht i dtoghcháin chathrach agus náisiúnta. Mar sin féin, an Ioslamach

tá athbheochan sa Mheánoirthear fós gan mhíniú go páirteach in ainneoin go bhfuil roinnt teoiricí ag iarraidh

cuntas a thabhairt ar an bhfás agus ar an tarraingt a bhfuil an-tóir air. Go ginearálta, seasann formhór na dteoiricí gur Ioslamachas é

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. U.S.. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J.. Donn, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, ach, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, An Iordáin, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Polaitíocht, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAM, ISLAMISTS, AND THE ELECTORAL PRINCIPLE I N THE MIDDLE EAST

James Piscatori

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Islamist Parties , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?

Tarek Masoud

Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. Thairis sin, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. For example, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.

The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood

Robert S.. Leiken

Steven Brooke

The Muslim Brotherhood is the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s assault forcedeeply hostile to the United States.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for electionsinstead of into the lines of jihad.” Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. These positions seem to make them moderates, the very thing the United States, short on allies in the Muslim world, seeks.
But the Ikhwan also assails U.S. beartas eachtrach, especially Washington’s support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process. Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, An Fhrainc, An Iordáin, an Spáinn, An tSiria,An Túinéis, and the United Kingdom.

Energizing US-Syria Relations: Leveraging Ancillary Diplomatic Vehicles

Benjamin E.. Cumhacht,

Andrew Akhlaghi,

Steven Rotchtin

The prospect for greater stability in the Middle East largely hinges on the ability to bring Syria into diplomatic and security discussions as a productive stakeholder, necessitating a thaw in the less than normal state of U.S. – Syrian relations. While Syria’s
importance as a keystone state to a Middle East peace process was acknowledged in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report,1 which called for a shift from disincentives to incentives in seeking constructive results, only in the past few months has there been a demonstrable shift in Washington’s disposition. Recent meetings between high-ranking U.S. officials and their counterparts in Damascus, and even the announcement of reinstating a U.S. ambassador to Syria, have led to widespread speculation in policy circles that a diplomatic thaw is afoot.
This report analyzes key trends in Syria’s domestic and regional socio-political situation that currently function to make Syria a natural ally of the United States.

From Rebel Movement to Political Party

Alastair Crooke

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. In addition, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.