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Islam, Politik Islam dan Amerika

Arab Insight

Apakah "Persaudaraan" dengan Amerika Mungkin??

khalil al-anani

"Tidak ada kesempatan untuk berkomunikasi dengan AS. administrasi selama Amerika Serikat mempertahankan pandangannya lama Islam sebagai bahaya nyata, pandangan yang menempatkan Amerika Serikat di kapal yang sama dengan musuh Zionis. Kami tidak memiliki gagasan yang terbentuk sebelumnya tentang orang-orang Amerika atau AS. masyarakat dan organisasi sipil serta lembaga pemikirnya. Kami tidak memiliki masalah berkomunikasi dengan orang-orang Amerika tetapi tidak ada upaya yang memadai untuk mendekatkan kami,” kata Dr. Issam al-Iryan, kepala departemen politik Ikhwanul Muslimin dalam sebuah wawancara telepon.
Kata-kata Al-Iryan merangkum pandangan Ikhwanul Muslimin tentang rakyat Amerika dan AS. pemerintah. Anggota Ikhwanul Muslimin lainnya akan setuju, seperti mendiang Hassan al-Banna, yang mendirikan grup di 1928. Al- Banna memandang Barat sebagian besar sebagai simbol kerusakan moral. Salafi lain – sebuah aliran pemikiran Islam yang mengandalkan nenek moyang sebagai model teladan – telah mengambil pandangan yang sama tentang Amerika Serikat., tetapi tidak memiliki fleksibilitas ideologis yang dianut oleh Ikhwanul Muslimin. Sementara Ikhwanul Muslimin percaya untuk melibatkan Amerika dalam dialog sipil, kelompok ekstremis lain tidak melihat gunanya dialog dan mempertahankan bahwa kekuatan adalah satu-satunya cara untuk berurusan dengan Amerika Serikat.

Islamisme revisited

MAHA Azzam

Ada krisis politik dan keamanan sekitarnya apa yang disebut sebagai Islamisme, krisis yang pendahulunya lama mendahului 9/11. Selama masa lalu 25 tahun, ada penekanan yang berbeda tentang bagaimana menjelaskan dan memerangi Islam. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Juli 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Islam dan Demokrasi

ITAC

Jika seseorang membaca pers atau mendengarkan komentator pada hubungan internasional, sering dikatakan - dan bahkan lebih sering tersirat tapi tidak mengatakan - bahwa Islam tidak kompatibel dengan demokrasi. Di tahun sembilan puluhan, Samuel Huntington memicu badai api intelektual ketika dia menerbitkan The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, di mana dia menyajikan ramalannya untuk dunia – ditulis besar-besaran. Di ranah politik, dia mencatat bahwa sementara Turki dan Pakistan mungkin memiliki beberapa klaim kecil untuk “legitimasi demokratis” semua negara lain “… negara-negara Muslim sangat non-demokratis.: monarki, sistem satu partai, rezim militer, kediktatoran pribadi atau beberapa kombinasi dari ini, biasanya bertumpu pada keluarga terbatas, klan, atau basis suku”. Premis yang mendasari argumennya adalah bahwa mereka tidak hanya 'tidak seperti kita', mereka sebenarnya bertentangan dengan nilai-nilai demokrasi esensial kita. Dia percaya, seperti yang dilakukan orang lain, bahwa sementara gagasan demokratisasi Barat sedang ditentang di bagian lain dunia, konfrontasi paling menonjol di daerah-daerah di mana Islam adalah agama yang dominan.
Argumen juga telah dibuat dari sisi lain. Seorang sarjana agama Iran, merenungkan krisis konstitusional awal abad kedua puluh di negaranya, menyatakan bahwa Islam dan demokrasi tidak kompatibel karena orang tidak setara dan badan legislatif tidak diperlukan karena sifat inklusif hukum agama Islam. Posisi serupa diambil baru-baru ini oleh Ali Belhadj, seorang guru sekolah menengah Aljazair, pengkhotbah dan (pada konteks ini) ketua FIS, ketika dia menyatakan "demokrasi bukan konsep Islam". Mungkin pernyataan paling dramatis tentang hal ini adalah pernyataan Abu Musab al-Zarqawi ., pemimpin pemberontak Sunni di Irak yang, ketika dihadapkan dengan prospek pemilihan, mencela demokrasi sebagai "prinsip jahat".
Namun menurut beberapa cendekiawan Muslim, demokrasi tetap menjadi cita-cita penting dalam Islam, dengan peringatan bahwa itu selalu tunduk pada hukum agama. Penekanan pada tempat terpenting syariah adalah elemen dari hampir setiap komentar Islam tentang pemerintahan, moderat atau ekstremis. Hanya jika penguasa, yang menerima otoritasnya dari Tuhan, membatasi tindakannya pada “pengawasan administrasi syariah” apakah dia harus dipatuhi. Jika dia melakukan selain ini, dia adalah seorang non-Muslim dan Muslim berkomitmen untuk memberontak melawan dia. Di sinilah letak pembenaran untuk sebagian besar kekerasan yang telah melanda dunia Muslim dalam perjuangan seperti yang terjadi di Aljazair selama tahun 90-an.

Budaya Politik Islam, Demokrasi, dan Hak Asasi Manusia

Daniel E. Harga

Telah berpendapat bahwa Islam memfasilitasi otoriterisme, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Karenanya, sarjana, komentator, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, Namun, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Karenanya, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Budaya Politik Islam, Demokrasi, dan Hak Asasi Manusia

Daniel E. Harga

Telah berpendapat bahwa Islam memfasilitasi otoriterisme, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Karenanya, sarjana, komentator, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, Namun, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Karenanya, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Politik Islam di Timur Tengah

Apakah Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. Laporan ini memberikan penekanan khusus untuk Timur Tengah, di

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: demokrasi dan kekerasan politik. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Namun, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

STRATEGI UNTUK MELAKUKAN POLITIK ISLAM

Shadi HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politik Islam adalah kekuatan politik yang paling aktif di Timur Tengah hari ini. masa depan adalah terkait erat dengan daerah. Jika Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa berkomitmen untuk mendukung reformasi politik di daerah, mereka akan perlu untuk merancang beton, koheren strategi untuk melibatkan kelompok-kelompok Islam. Belum, Amerika Serikat. secara umum telah bersedia untuk membuka dialog dengan gerakan-gerakan ini. Demikian pula, keterlibatan Uni Eropa dengan Islam telah pengecualian, tidak aturan. Dimana tingkat rendah ada kontak, mereka terutama melayani tujuan pengumpulan-informasi, tidak strategis tujuan. Amerika Serikat. dan Uni Eropa memiliki sejumlah program yang menangani pembangunan ekonomi dan politik di wilayah ini - di antara mereka di Timur Tengah Inisiatif Kemitraan (MEPI), Millennium Challenge Corporation (PKS), Uni untuk Mediterania, dan Kebijakan Lingkungan Eropa (EPP) - Namun mereka memiliki sedikit untuk mengatakan tentang bagaimana tantangan oposisi Islam politik pas dengan tujuan regional yang lebih luas. AS. dan Uni Eropa demokrasi bantuan dan program diarahkan hampir seluruhnya baik pemerintah otoriter sendiri atau kelompok-kelompok masyarakat sipil sekuler dengan dukungan minimal dalam masyarakat mereka sendiri.
Waktu yang matang untuk penilaian ulang kebijakan saat ini. Sejak serangan teroris September 11, 2001, mendukung demokrasi di Timur Tengah telah mengambil kepentingan yang lebih besar bagi para pembuat kebijakan Barat, yang melihat hubungan antara kurangnya demokrasi dan kekerasan politik. Perhatian yang lebih besar telah dikhususkan untuk memahami variasi dalam Islam politik. Pemerintah Amerika baru yang lebih terbuka untuk memperluas komunikasi dengan dunia Muslim. Sementara itu, sebagian besar organisasi Islam mainstream - termasuk Ikhwanul Muslimin di Mesir, Yordania Front Aksi Islam (IAF), Maroko Partai Keadilan dan Pembangunan (PJD), Gerakan Konstitusi Islam Kuwait, dan Yaman Islah Partai - telah semakin membuat dukungan bagi reformasi politik dan demokrasi komponen utama dalam platform politik mereka. Selain, banyak telah mengisyaratkan minat yang kuat dalam membuka dialog dengan AS. dan pemerintah Uni Eropa.
Masa depan hubungan antara negara-negara Barat dan Timur Tengah mungkin sebagian besar ditentukan oleh sejauh mana yang pertama melibatkan partai-partai Islam anti kekerasan dalam dialog yang luas tentang kepentingan bersama dan tujuan. Telah ada proliferasi baru-baru ini studi tentang keterlibatan dengan Islamis, tetapi sedikit alamat jelas apa yang mungkin memerlukan dalam praktek. Sebagai Nautré Zoe, mengunjungi rekan-rekan di Dewan Hubungan Luar Negeri Jerman, dikatakan, "Uni Eropa berpikir tentang keterlibatan tetapi tidak benar-benar tahu bagaimana." 1 Dalam harapan mengklarifikasi diskusi, kita membedakan antara tiga tingkat "keterlibatan,"Masing-masing dengan cara yang bervariasi dan berakhir: tingkat rendah kontak, dialog strategis, dan kemitraan.

Pihak Islam : Tiga jenis gerakan

Tamara Cofman

Antara 1991 dan 2001, dunia politik Islam menjadi jauh lebih beragam. Hari ini, istilah "Islamis"—digunakan untuk menggambarkan perspektif politik yang diinformasikan secara terpusat oleh seperangkat interpretasi dan komitmen agama—dapat diterapkan pada beragam kelompok sehingga hampir tidak berarti.. Ini mencakup semua orang mulai dari teroris yang menerbangkan pesawat ke World Trade Center hingga legislator yang dipilih secara damai di Kuwait yang telah memilih mendukung hak pilih perempuan..
Namun, keunggulan gerakan Islam—legal dan ilegal, kekerasan dan damai—dalam barisan oposisi politik di seluruh dunia Arab membuat perlunya menarik perbedaan yang relevan menjadi jelas. Wacana keagamaan kaum Islamis kini tak terhindarkan menjadi pusat politik Arab. Diskusi kebijakan konvensional melabeli Islamis sebagai “moderat” atau “radikal”.,” umumnya mengkategorikan mereka menurut dua kriteria yang agak longgar dan tidak membantu. Yang pertama adalah kekerasan: Radikal menggunakannya dan moderat tidak. Ini menimbulkan pertanyaan tentang bagaimana mengklasifikasikan kelompok yang tidak terlibat dalam kekerasan tetapi yang memaafkan, membenarkan, atau bahkan secara aktif mendukung kekerasan orang lain. Sebentar, hanya kriteria yang agak lebih membatasi adalah apakah kelompok atau individu yang bersangkutan
menerima aturan permainan pemilu yang demokratis. Kedaulatan rakyat bukanlah konsesi kecil bagi kaum Islamis tradisional, banyak dari mereka menolak pemerintah yang dipilih secara demokratis sebagai perampas kedaulatan Tuhan.
Namun komitmen terhadap aturan prosedural pemilu demokratis tidak sama dengan komitmen terhadap politik atau pemerintahan yang demokratis.

Pihak Islam : Sebuah anugerah atau kutukan bagi demokrasi?

Amr Hamzawy

Nathan J. Cokelat

What role do Islamist movements play in Arab politics? With their popular messages and broad followings within Arab societies, would their incorporation as normal political actors be a boon for democratization or democracy’s bane? For too long, we have tried to answer such questions solely by speculating about the true intentions of these movements and their leaders. Islamist political movements in the Arab world are increasingly asked—both by outside observers and by members of their own societies—about their true intentions.
But to hear them tell it, leaders of mainstream Arab Islamist movements are not the problem. They see themselves as democrats in nondemocratic lands, firmly committed to clean and fair electoral processes, whatever outcomes these may bring. It is rulers and regimes that should be pressed to commit to democracy, say the Islamists, not their oppositions. We need not take such Islamist leaders at their word. Memang, we should realize that there is only so much that any of their words can do to answer the question of the relationship between these movements and the prospects for democracy.
While their words are increasingly numerous (Islamist movements tend to be quite loquacious) and their answers about democracy increasingly specific, their ability to resolve all ambiguities is limited. Pertama, as long as they are out of power—as most of them are, and are likely to remain for some time—they will never fully prove themselves. Many Islamist leaders themselves probably do not know how they would act were they to come to power.

Islam GERAKAN DAN PROSES DEMOKRATIS DI DUNIA ARAB: Menjelajahi Zona Gray

Nathan J. Cokelat, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

Selama dekade terakhir, gerakan Islam telah menetapkan diri sebagai pemain politik utama di Timur Tengah. Bersama dengan pemerintah, Gerakan Islamis, moderat serta radikal, akan menentukan bagaimana politik daerah terungkap di masa mendatang. Mereka telah menunjukkan kemampuan tidak hanya untuk membuat pesan dengan daya tarik populer yang tersebar luas tetapi juga, dan yang paling penting, untuk menciptakan organisasi dengan basis sosial asli dan mengembangkan strategi politik yang koheren. Pihak lain,
umumnya, gagal di semua akun.
Publik di Barat dan, khususnya, Amerika Serikat, baru menyadari pentingnya gerakan Islam setelah peristiwa dramatis, seperti revolusi di Iran dan pembunuhan Presiden Anwar al-Sadat di Mesir. Perhatian telah jauh lebih dipertahankan sejak serangan teroris September 11, 2001. Hasil dari, Gerakan Islam secara luas dianggap berbahaya dan bermusuhan. Sementara karakterisasi seperti itu akurat mengenai organisasi di ujung radikal spektrum Islam, yang berbahaya karena kesediaan mereka untuk menggunakan kekerasan tanpa pandang bulu dalam mengejar tujuan mereka, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, Namun, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politik, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

Radikalisasi Islam

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

ISLAM, Islamis, DAN PRINSIP PEMILU DI TIMUR TENGAH

James Piscatori

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, di dunia Muslim, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. Apakah ini budaya tertentu jangka, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

Politik Islam dan Kebijakan Luar Negeri Eropa

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, Uni Eropa (SAYA) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(EPP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Ikhwanul Muslim Moderat

Robert S. aspek

Steven Brooke

Persaudaraan Muslim tertua di dunia, terbesar, and most influential Islamist organization. Hal ini juga yang paling kontroversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s assault forcedeeply hostile to the United States.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for electionsinstead of into the lines of jihad.” Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. Posisi ini tampaknya membuat mereka moderat, the very thing the United States, singkat tentang sekutu di dunia Muslim, mencari.
But the Ikhwan juga assails US. politik luar negeri, especially Washington’s support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process. Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, Perancis, Jordan, Spanyol, Suriah,Tunisia, and the United Kingdom.

Manajemen Aktivisme Islam: Salafi, Ikhwanul Muslimin, dan Negara Power di Yordania

Faisal Ghori

In his first book, Manajemen Aktivisme Islam, Quintan Wiktorowicz examines the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis through the lens of social movement theory. Unlike some political scientists who dismiss Islamic movements because of their informal networks, Wiktorowicz contends that social movement theory is an apt framework through which Islamic movements can be examined and studied. Dalam kasus ini, his work leads the field. Yet for all its promise, this book largely fails to deliver.
The book is divided into four primary sections, through which he tries to construct his conclusion: Jordanian political liberalization has occurred because of structural necessities, not because of its commitment to democratization. Selain, the state has been masterful in what he dubs the “management of collective action," (p. 3) which has, for all practical purposes, stifled any real opposition. While his conclusion is certainly tenable, given his extensive fieldwork, the book is poorly organized and much of the evidence examined earlier in the work leaves many questions unanswered.

Apa yang Membuat Para Pemilih Mendukung Oposisi di Bawah Otoritarianisme ?

Michael DH. Robbins

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, many
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. Misalnya, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). Belum, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). Agak, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. Sebenarnya, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Belum, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
rezim.