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El demà àrab

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Octubre 6, 1981, havia de ser un dia de celebració a Egipte. Va marcar l'aniversari de la victòria més gran d'Egipte en tres conflictes àrabs-israelians, quan l'exèrcit desfavorit del país va creuar el canal de Suez en els primers dies de la 1973 La guerra del Yom Kippur i va enviar tropes israelianes en retirada. En un fresc, matí sense núvols, l'estadi del Caire estava ple de famílies egípcies que havien vingut a veure com l'exèrcit posava el seu maquinari. A l'estand de revisió, President Anwar el-Sadat,l'arquitecte de la guerra, observava amb satisfacció com homes i màquines desfilaven davant seu. Estava a prop, un corresponsal estranger acabat d'arribar.De sobte, un dels camions de l'exèrcit es va aturar directament davant de l'estand de revisió just quan sis avions Mirage rugien per sobre en una actuació acrobàtica., pintant el cel amb llargs estels de vermell, groc, porpra,i fum verd. Sadat es va aixecar, aparentment es prepara per intercanviar salutacions amb un altre contingent de tropes egípcies. Es va convertir en un objectiu perfecte per a quatre assassins islamistes que van saltar del camió, va assaltar el podi, i va cridar el seu cos amb bales. Mentre els assassins van continuar durant el que va semblar una eternitat ruixant el suport amb el seu foc mortal., Vaig pensar per un instant si topar a terra i arriscar-me a ser trepitjat fins a la mort per espectadors en pànic o romandre a peu i arriscar-me a agafar una bala perduda.. L'instint em va dir que em mantingués de peu, i el meu sentit del deure periodístic em va impulsar a anar a saber si Sadat era viu o mort.

Islam, Islam polític i Amèrica

Insight àrab

És possible la "Fraternitat" amb Amèrica?

Khalil al-anani

"No hi ha cap possibilitat de comunicar-se amb cap dels Estats Units. l'administració sempre que els Estats Units mantinguin la seva visió de llarga data de l'islam com un perill real, una visió que posa els Estats Units en el mateix vaixell que l'enemic sionista. No tenim idees preconcebudes sobre el poble nord-americà o els EUA. societat i les seves organitzacions cíviques i grups de reflexió. No tenim cap problema per comunicar-nos amb el poble nord-americà, però no s'estan fent els esforços adequats per apropar-nos,” va dir el Dr. Issam al-Iryan, cap del departament polític dels Germans Musulmans en una entrevista telefònica.
Les paraules d'Al-Iryan resumeixen les opinions dels Germans Musulmans sobre el poble nord-americà i els EUA. govern. Altres membres dels Germans Musulmans hi estarien d'acord, com ho faria el difunt Hassan al-Banna, qui va fundar el grup a 1928. Al- Banna va veure Occident principalment com un símbol de decadència moral. Altres salafis, una escola de pensament islàmica que es basa en els avantpassats com a models exemplars, han pres la mateixa visió dels Estats Units., però no tenen la flexibilitat ideològica defensada pels Germans Musulmans. Mentre que els Germans Musulmans creuen en comprometre els nord-americans en el diàleg civil, altres grups extremistes no veuen sentit al diàleg i sostenen que la força és l'única manera de tractar amb els Estats Units.

Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, això

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

drets humans, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, islamista

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, i

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

tractar amb règims de govern que són autoritaris, però és un fenomen nou de premsa

per a la reforma democràtica als estats on els beneficiaris més probables podrien tenir, des del

punt de vista de la UE, enfocaments diferents i de vegades problemàtics de la democràcia i la seva

valors relacionats, com ara els drets de les minories i de les dones i l'estat de dret. Aquests càrrecs són

sovint contra els moviments islamistes, per tant, és important que els responsables polítics europeus ho facin

tenir una imatge precisa de les polítiques i les filosofies dels possibles socis.

Les experiències de diferents països tendeixen a suggerir que més llibertat és islamista

es permeten festes, més moderats són en les seves accions i idees. En molts

casos, els partits i grups islamistes fa temps que s'han allunyat del seu objectiu original

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

Sayyid Qutb: The Karl Marx of the Islamic Revolution

Leslie Evans

Sayyid Qutb (Octubre 9, 1906-Agost 29, 1966), the Egyptian literary critic, philosopher, and theorist of the contemporary jihadist movement is only becoming a familiar name in the West in recent years, but his voluminous writings have had and continue to have enormous impact in the Muslim world. It is not an overstatement to say that it is hardly possible to understand the reasoning and goals of the Islamic militants without some familiarity with the outlook Qutb (pronounced KUH-tahb) enunciated.
Una cerca a Amazon.com retorna no menys de set llibres en anglès sobre Sayyid Qutb, així com col·leccions dels seus escrits i molts dels seus propis llibres en traducció. Les dues obres tractades aquí són només una mostra aleatòria d'una literatura molt gran que, de nou, és una petita fracció del que existeix en àrab.. Aquests dos són força diferents en abast i actitud. Adnan Ayyub Musallam, un palestí natural de Betlem, té un doctorat per la Universitat de Michigan
i actualment és professor d'història, política, i estudis culturals a la Universitat de Betlem a Cisjordània. La seva biografia generalment simpàtica però crítica se centra en l'evolució de la política de les afiliacions i el pensament de Qutb.. The quite brief and more critical piece by Paul Berman for the New York Times looks at Qutb’s theology and helps to clarify his argument with Christianity and Western secularism.
Brilliant from his earliest youth, Sayyid Qutb was an unlikely figure to serve as the inspiration for a global revolutionary movement. Although for a brief period he was a member of the militant Muslim Brothers, where he served as an editor not as an organizer, he spent most of his life as a lone intellectual. Where Marx, the theorist of world communism, labored in the British Museum, Sayyid Qutb wrote his most influential works in an Egyptian prison, where he spent most of the last eleven years of his life, until his execution by the Nasser government in 1966. Fins i tot el seu torn a l'islam d'una manera seriosa no va tenir lloc fins que va passar els quaranta, no obstant això, a la presó als cinquanta anys va produir un replantejament controvertit de la religió que ressona arreu del món.
Qutb va néixer al poble de Musha, entre el Caire i Assuan en una família de petits terratinents. Va ser enviat a la madrasa local, l'escola de govern, més que el kuttab encara més religiós, l'escola islàmica, però va guanyar un concurs entre les dues escoles per a la millor memorització de l'Alcorà. Va recordar la seva vida allà en la seva única obra biogràfica, “Nen del poble,” registrant costums i supersticions locals. A partir d'aquell període va adquirir una creença en el món dels esperits que va portar amb ell tota la vida

per què no hi ha democràcies àrabs? ?

Larry Diamond

During democratization’s “third wave,” democracy ceased being a mostly Western phenomenon and “went global.” When the third wave began in 1974, the world had only about 40 democracies, and only a few of them lay outside the West. By the time the Journal of Democracy began publishing in 1990, there were 76 electoral democracies (accounting for slightly less than half the world’s independent states). By 1995, that number had shot up to 117—three in every five states. By then, a critical mass of democracies existed in every major world region save one—the Middle East.1 Moreover, every one of the world’s major cultural realms had become host to a significant democratic presence, albeit again with a single exception—the Arab world.2 Fifteen years later, this exception still stands.
The continuing absence of even a single democratic regime in the Arab world is a striking anomaly—the principal exception to the globalization of democracy. Why is there no Arab democracy? En efecte, why is it the case that among the sixteen independent Arab states of the Middle East and coastal North Africa, Lebanon is the only one to have ever been a democracy?
The most common assumption about the Arab democracy deficit is that it must have something to do with religion or culture. Després de tot, the one thing that all Arab countries share is that they are Arab.

Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition

John L. Esposito

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afganistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Turquia, Iran, Líban, Kuwait, Iemen, Jordània, Pakistan, Bangla Desh, Malàisia, Indonèsia, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, i en particular les qüestions i preguntes sorgides de l'experiència del passat recent, segueix sent fonamental per als governs, responsables polítics, i estudiants de política internacional per igual.

INSTITUCIONS MUSULMANES I MOBILITZACIÓ POLÍTICA

SARA SILVESTRI

A Europa, i la major part del món occidental, La presència musulmana en l'esfera pública és un fenomen recent que va caracteritzar l'última dècada del segle XX i que ha marcat profundament l'inici del XXI.. Aquesta presència visible, que equival a alguna cosa entre 15 i 20 milions d'individus, es pot analitzar millor si es divideix en una sèrie de components. La primera part d'aquest capítol il·lustra on, quan i per què han sorgit veus i institucions musulmanes organitzades a Europa, i quins actors hi han participat. The second part is more schematic and analytical, inthat it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through whichMuslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often incompeting political forces and priorities. It does so by observing theobjectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in orderto articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors.The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of theconsequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation forEuropean society and policy-making.

moviment Islàmic: Political Freedom & democràcia

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (islàmic) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, despotisme polític i usurpació dels drets de les persones. El Moviment ha d'estar sempre al costat de la llibertat política, representat per veritable,no fals, democràcia. Hauria de declarar rotundament la seva negativa als tirans i allunyar-se de tots els dictadors, fins i tot si algun tirà sembla tenir-hi bones intencions per obtenir algun benefici i durant un temps que sol ser curt, com ha demostrat l'experiència.El Profeta (SERRES) dit, “Quan veus que la meva Nació és víctima de la por i no li dius a qui fa mal, "Està vostè equivocat", llavors pots perdre l'esperança en ells. Llavors, què tal un règim que obligui la gent a dir-li a un presumpte infractor?, "Que just, que gran ets. Oh el nostre heroi, el nostre salvador i el nostre alliberador!"L'Alcorà denuncia tirans com Numrudh, Faraó, Haman i altres, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Egipte, Síria, Iraq, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

Living with Democracy in Egypt

Daniel Consolatore

Hosni Mubarek was almost elected president of Egypt in September 2005. Not that the seventy-seven-year-old secular autocrat who has ruled that nationfor the past twenty-four years lost the election; by the official count, he took nearly 85 percent of the vote.His nearest competitor, Ayman Nour, the upstart headof the fledgling opposition party al-Ghad (“Tomorrow”),managed less than 8 percent. The only other candidate to take any significant tally was the aged NomanGamaa of the venerable al-Wafd (“Delegation”)party, who managed less than 3 percent. The Ikhwanal-Muslimeen (“Muslim Brotherhood”), feared by somany Westerners for its purist Islamic social and politicalagenda, didn’t even field a candidate.Mubarek’s decisive victory would seem to be reassuringto most people—particularly secular Americans—worried for the future of the few Westernfriendly,moderate Arab regimes, amenaçats com estan per la islamització de la política a la regió. L'administració Bush també semblaria tenir motius per estar satisfeta, donat el seu recent canvi d'opinió sobre la democràcia àrab. La desaparició d'armes químiques a l'Iraq i la posterior justificació de la guerra, com a precedent de democratització, han inspirat la Casa Blanca a impulsar el màxim d'eleccions possibles a la regió.. De fet, quan la secretària d'estat Condoleezza Rice va parlar a la Universitat Americana del Caire al juny, va anunciar amb certa sorpresa que "durant seixanta anys" els Estats Units s'havien equivocat en "perseguir".[ing] estabilitat a costa de la democràcia” a l'Orient Mitjà. Per generacions, nosaltres. Els experts estaven segurs que el "carrer àrab" no es podia confiar amb el vot, ja que podrien cedir el poder als comunistes o als islamistes fonamentalistes. La realpolitik dictava que autòcrates i dictadors, com Mubarek i Saddam Hussein, s'havia de mimar per mantenir l'"estabilitat" a la regió. Si aleshores organitzessin eleccions, prescindir-ne del tot, negar la llibertat d'expressió,i deixar anar la policia secreta per aterroritzar la població,la Casa Blanca probablement faria els ulls grossos. Però si Mubarek ara pogués reivindicar un veritable mandat democràtic,això seria el millor de tots els mons.

Transicions polítiques al món àrab

en Shehata

L'any 2007 marked the end of a brief interval of political liberalization in the Arab world which began shortly after the occupation of Iraq and which resulted primarily from external pressures on Arab regimes to reform and democratize. External pressures during the 2003-2006 period created a political opening which activists across the region used to press for longstanding demands for political and constitutional reform.Faced with a combination of growing external and internal pressures to reform, Arab regimes were forced to make some concessions to their challengers.In Egypt, upon the request of the President, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to allowfor direct competitive presidential elections. In September2005, Egypt witnessed its first competitive presidential election ever and as expected Mubarak was elected for a fifth term with 87%of the vote. A més,during the November 2005 parliamentary elections,which were freer than previous elections, els Germans Musulmans, the largest opposition movement in Egypt, won 88 seats. This was the largest number of seats won by an opposition group in Egypt since the 1952 revolution.Similarly, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a majority of the seats.Hamas was thereby able to establish control over the Palestinian Legislative Council which had been dominated by Fatah since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1996. In Lebanon, in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on 14th February2005, a coalition of pro-Hariri political forces was ablet hrough broad-based mass mobilization and external support to force Syrian troops to pull out from Lebanon and the pro-Syrian Government to resign. Elections were held, and the 14th February coalition was able to win a plurality of the votes and to form a new government.In Morocco, King Mohamed VI oversaw the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee which sought to address the grievances of those who had been abused under the reign of his father.The Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) also under took some important reforms during the 2003-2006 period. a 2003 Qatar promulgated a written constitution for the first time in its history. In 2005,Saudi Arabia convened municipal elections for the firsttime in five decades. And in 2006, Bahrain held parliamentaryelections in which the Shiite society of AlWefaqwon 40%of the seats. Subsequently, the first Shiitedeputy prime minister in Bahrain was appointed.Theses events, which came to be known as ‘the Arab Spring,’ led some optimists to believe that the Arabworld was on the brink of a democratic transformation similar to those experienced in Latin American and Eastern and Central Europe during the 1980s and1990s. malgrat això, en 2007, as political liberalization gave way to heightened polarization and to renewed repression,these hopes were dispelled. The failure ofthe openings of the 2003-2006 period to create a sustained momentum towards democratization can beat tributed to a number of factors. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the failure of the United States to create a stable and democratic regime dampened support for democracy promotion efforts within the American administration and reinforced the views ofthose who held that security and stability must come before democracy. A més, the electoral successes of Islamists in Egypt and in Palestine further dampened Western support for democracy promotion efforts in the region since the principals of thesemovements were perceived to be at odds with the interestsof theWest.

Radical Islam In Egypt A Comparison Of Two Groups

By David Zeidan

The author compares two key Egyptian radical Islamic groups, the Society of Muslims(Takfir Wal Hijra) i la Societat de Lluita (Jama'at al-Jihad) i analitza les seves diferències en la doctrina i l'estratègia. Aquest estudi es presenta en el context d'un examen més ampli de la història dels grups islàmics militants a Egipte.. L'autor argumenta que les dues societats ofereixen exemples de tipus bàsics de moviments islàmics radicals. A més, Jama'at al-Jihad segueix sent important en la política egípcia contemporània i en la lluita interna d'aquest país. Els grups radicals egipcis estudien aquí., the Society of Muslims (Takfirwal-Hijra) i la Societat de Lluita(Jama'at al-Jihad), va adoptar ideologies i estratègies dràsticament diferents per obtenir el poder. La Societat de Musulmans(Takfir) tenia una ideologia passiva separatista i messiànica, retardar la confrontació activa amb l'estat fins a un punt indefinit en el futur quan podria assolir un cert grau de força. En comparació,la Societat de Lluita (al-Jihad) followedan activist, militant ideology that committedit to immediate and violent action againstthe regime.ISLAMIC RESURGENCEHistory reveals cyclical patterns ofIslamic revival in times of crisis.Charismatic leaders arose attempting torenew the fervor and identity of Muslims,purify the faith from accretions and corruptreligious practices, and reinstate the pristineIslam of the Prophet Muhammad’s day.Leaders of revivals tended to appear eitheras renewers of the faith promised at the startof each century (mujaddids), or as thedeliverer sent by God in the end of times toestablish the final kingdom of justice andpeace (mahdi).

The W&M Progressive

Julian Carr
fidel Richael
Ethan Forrest

Accepting the Responsibility of Electoral Choice

The development of democratic institutions comes with negative externalities. As a political progressive, I believe that the big picture – establishing a solid democratic foundation – outweighs the possible emergence of political parties that may advocate religious or gender intolerance. I am a firm believer in the workings of the democratic process. While I have been studying in Egypt for the semester, I am reminded that despite the imperfections of the United States democratic system, it is still many times better than living under any authoritarian regime that outlaws political parties and posts military police at a variety of locations in an effort to exert control and maintain power.

In Egypt, the electoral process is not democratic. The National Political Party – the party of President Mubarak – exerts tremendous influence in the country. Its main opposition is the Muslim Brotherhood, which was created in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood is based on very strict interpretations of the Koran and the idea that secular governments are a direct violation of the teaching of the Koran. The party has a very violent past; it has been directly responsible for several assassination attempts and the assassination of the Egyptian leader Anwar-as-Sadat in 1981.

The Muslim Brotherhood is an illegal political party. Because the political party is religious, it is not allowed to participate in the public sphere under Egyptian law. Despite this technicality, the party has members in the Egyptian Parliament. malgrat això, the parliamentarians cannot officially declare their affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood but instead identify as Independents. Though the party remains illegal, it remains the most powerful opposition to the ruling National Democratic Party.

Civil society and Democratization in the Arab World

Saad Eddin Ibrahim
Even if Islam is the Answer, Arab Muslims are the Problem

In May 2008, the Arab nation experienced a number of fires, or rather, armed conflicts—en

Líban, Iraq, Palestina, Iemen, and Somalia. In these conflicts,

the warring parties used Islam as the instrument for mobilization

and amassing support. Collectively, Muslims are

waging war against Muslims.

After some Muslims raised the slogan of “Islam is the solution,”

això

became apparent “their Islam is the problem.” No sooner have some of them acquired weapons,

than they raised it against the state and its ruling regime regardless of

whether that regime was ruling in the name of Islam or not.

We have

seen this in recent years between the followers of Osama bin Laden

and the Al-Qaeda organization on the one hand, and the authorities in

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the other. We have also seen an

explosive example of this phenomenon in Morocco, whose king rules in the name of Islam and

whose title is the ‘Prince of the Faithful.Thus each Muslim faction kills other Muslims in the

name of Islam.
A quick glance at the contents of the media confirms how the

term Islam and its associated symbols have become mere tools in the hands of these Muslims.

Prominent examples of these Islam-exploiting factions are:
The Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Jamiat al-Islamiyya, in Egypt

Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement, in Palestine Hezbollah, Fatah al-Islam,

and Jamiat al-Islammiyya, in Lebanon The Houthi Zayadi rebels and the Islamic Reform Grouping

(Islah), inYemen The Islamic courts, in Somalia The Islamic Front ,

la 500 musulmans més influents

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

La publicació que teniu a les vostres mans és la primera de la que esperem que sigui una sèrie anual que ofereix una finestra als moviments i agitadors del món musulmà.. Ens hem esforçat per destacar les persones que són influents com a musulmans, això és, persones la influència de les quals es deriva de la seva pràctica de l'islam o del fet que són musulmans. Creiem que això ofereix una visió valuosa de les diferents maneres en què els musulmans afecten el món, i també mostra la diversitat de com la gent viu com a musulmans avui dia. La influència és un concepte complicat. El seu significat deriva de la paraula llatina influs que significa afluir, assenyalant una vella idea astrològica que les forces invisibles (com la lluna) afectar a la humanitat. Les xifres d'aquesta llista també tenen la capacitat d'afectar la humanitat. De diferents maneres, cada persona d'aquesta llista té influència en la vida d'un gran nombre de persones a la terra. la 50 es perfilen les figures més influents. La seva influència prové de diverses fonts; tanmateix, estan unificats pel fet que cadascun d'ells afecta grans franges de la humanitat. Aleshores hem trencat el 500 líders en 15 categories: acadèmics, Polític,Administratiu, Llinatge, Predicadors, Dones, Joventut, Filantropia, Desenvolupament,Ciència i Tecnologia, Arts i Cultura, mitjans de comunicació, Radicals, Xarxes Islàmiques Internacionals, i Problemes del dia, per ajudar-vos a entendre els diferents tipus de maneres en què l'Islam i els musulmans afecten el món actual. Dues llistes compostes mostren com funciona la influència de diferents maneres.: InternationalIslamic Networks mostra persones que estan al capdavant d'importants xarxes transnacionals de musulmans, i Issues of the Day destaca persones la importància de les quals es deu a problemes actuals que afecten la humanitat.

Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers

Shibley Telhami


The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,", com va dir l'antic secretari d'estat adjunt Edward Djerejianonce, va portar els Estats Units a retrocedir. Fins i tot a l'administració Clinton, El secretari d'Estat Warren Christopher es va centrar inicialment en la democràcia en la seva política a l'Orient Mitjà, però ràpidament va deixar de banda la qüestió quan l'administració es va traslladar a negociar la negociació palestino-israeliana a l'ombra dels grups islamistes militants.,especialment Hamàs.

El futur de l'islam després 9/11

Mansoor Moaddel

No hi ha consens entre historiadors i islamistes sobre la naturalesa del sistema de creences islàmiques i l'experiència de l'islam històric., sobre la qual es podria basar un judici definitiu sobre la compatibilitat de l'Islam amb la modernitat. No obstant això,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, Egipte, i Jordània.